| Literature DB >> 29084796 |
Marc Bardou1,2,3, Bruno Crépon4, Anne-Claire Bertaux5, Aurélie Godard-Marceaux6,7, Astrid Eckman-Lacroix8, Elise Thellier9, Frédérique Falchier10, Philippe Deruelle11, Muriel Doret12, Xavier Carcopino-Tusoli13, Thomas Schmitz14, Thiphaine Barjat15, Mathieu Morin16, Franck Perrotin17, Ghada Hatem18, Catherine Deneux-Tharaux19, Isabelle Fournel1, Laurent Laforet1, Nicolas Meunier-Beillard6, Esther Duflo20, Isabelle Le Ray21.
Abstract
INTRODUCTION: Prenatal care is recommended during pregnancy to improve neonatal and maternal outcomes. Women of lower socioeconomic status (SES) are less compliant to recommended prenatal care and suffer a higher risk of adverse perinatal outcomes. Several attempts to encourage optimal pregnancy follow-up have shown controversial results, particularly in high-income countries. Few studies have assessed financial incentives to encourage prenatal care, and none reported materno-fetal events as the primary outcome. Our study aims to determine whether financial incentives could improve pregnancy outcomes in women with low SES in a high-income country. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: This pragmatic cluster-randomised clinical trial includes pregnant women with the following criteria: (1) age above 18 years, (2) first pregnancy visit before 26 weeks of gestation and (3) belonging to a socioeconomically disadvantaged group. The intervention consists in offering financial incentives conditional on attending scheduled pregnancy follow-up consultations. Clusters are 2-month periods with random turnover across centres. A composite outcome of maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality is the primary endpoint. Secondary endpoints include maternal or neonatal outcomes assessed separately, qualitative assessment of the perception of the intervention and cost-effectiveness analysis for which children will be followed to the end of their first year through the French health insurance database. The study started in June 2016, and based on an expected decrease in the primary endpoint from 18% to 14% in the intervention group, we plan to include 2000 women in each group. ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION: Ethics approval was first gained on 28 September 2014. An independent data security and monitoring committee has been established. Results of the main trial and each of the secondary analyses will be submitted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal. TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER: NCT02402855; pre-results. © Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2017. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.Entities:
Keywords: clinical governance; maternal medicine; organisation of health services
Mesh:
Year: 2017 PMID: 29084796 PMCID: PMC5665235 DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2017-017321
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMJ Open ISSN: 2044-6055 Impact factor: 2.692
Figure 1Scheduled prenatal care visits and time window for financial incentives. If a woman shows up for a scheduled visit more than 2 weeks after her standard preplanned visit, she will receive the incentive for the next visit. This means that she will not attend a scheduled visit without receiving an incentive (with the limit of no more than one incentivised visit per month), but she may receive fewer incentive payments than the maximum she could have obtained. 26WG, 26 weeks of gestation; FU, follow-up.
Figure 2Overall management of women, according to their allocation group. CRA, clinical research assistant.