Collective Psychological Ownership and Intergroup Relations.

Whereas much social psychological research has studied the in-group and out-group implications of social categorization and collective identity ("we"), little research has examined the nature and relevance of collective psychological ownership ("ours") for intergroup relations. We make a case for considering collective psychological ownership as an important source of intergroup tensions. We do so by integrating theory and research from various social sciences, and we draw out implications for future social psychological research on intergroup relations. We discuss collective psychological ownership in relation to the psychology of possessions, marking behavior, intergroup threats, outgroup exclusion, and in-group responsibility. We suggest that the social psychological processes discussed apply to a range of ownership objects (territory, buildings, cultural artifacts) and various intergroup settings, including international, national, and local contexts, and in organizations and communities. We conclude by providing directions for future research in different intergroup contexts.

“Ours”, a small word, arising out of shared events, when collectively experienced and recognized by a group of people who experience themselves as “us”, it is (. . .) capable of binding people together and controlling their behavior in pursuit of a common cause (e.g., marking, claiming, and defending a territory).

We have less and less to say about our own country and our own borders, and that scares me. The Netherlands has to be a sovereign nation (. . .), one at least has to be in control over one’s own borders. You [to the interviewer] also want to be the one who decides about who you allow to enter your home, you do not go to Brussels for that. Like everyone else, you can decide yourself about who enters your home and who gets expelled.

The first quote draws attention to a little word (“ours”) that is fundamentally important in intergroup relations but that tends to be neglected in social psychology. There is a large social psychological literature on social categorization and the related causes and consequences of “us-them” thinking. Yet there is hardly any systematic theorizing and research on the nature and implications of thinking in terms of “ours” and “theirs” as collective psychological ownership claims. This is unfortunate because—as we will try to show—such claims can play an important role in group dynamics. On the bright side, a sense of collective ownership is often involved in intragroup processes of cooperation and solidarity (first quote), but on the dark side, it can fuel intergroup tensions and conflicts (second quote).

The concept of collective psychological ownership is different from so-called common, or public, ownership whereby objects, resources, and places are freely available for use to all people, such as a park or piece of land that is open for all for sports or recreation.[1] Collective psychological ownership involves a particular group or community that has the perceived entitlement or right to determine how the target of ownership is to be used and who can use it. This is the collective level variant of personal psychological ownership whereby an individual person is perceived to have the right to decide about the usage of that which is owned.

Ownership claims on behalf of one’s group are pervasive and widespread in various contexts, such as institutions, organizations, neighborhoods, regions, and countries (G. Brown, Lawrence, & Robinson, 2005; Lyman & Scott, 1967; Toft, 2014). Adults, but also adolescents and younger children, tend to put forward collective ownership claims. For example, a sense of collective ownership is a source of social exclusion and conflict among youth and one of the roots of gang behavior (Childress, 2004; Kintrea, Bannister, Pickering, Reid, & Suzuki, 2008). And there are many situations in which groups of children make claims on a particular physical space, such as when children convert a site into their own play area, club, or hideaway (Factor, 2004). Territorial behavior whereby an intruder is excluded or punished for invading “our” play area has been found in observational and experimental research among young children (Factor, 2004; O’Neal, Caldwell, & Gallup, 1977; Zebian & Rochat, 2012). Further, among adults, and on the level of countries and ethnic groups, collective psychological ownership serves as a strong justification for territorial and nationalist sovereignty claims, and disputes about ownership of objects, cultural artifacts, and territories are frequent and tend to escalate to violent intergroup conflicts (Toft, 2014). Similarly, as the second quote illustrates, the notion of collective psychological ownership plays a role in the rejection and exclusion of immigrant minorities, paired with the opposition to European unification.

Legal scholars and political philosophers have written extensively about questions of personal ownership (“mine”: e.g., Merrill, 1998; Rose, 1985; Snare, 1972), and there is empirical research on personal psychological ownership in managerial and organizational sciences (see Pierce & Jussila, 2011), sociology (e.g., Carruthers & Ariovich, 2004; Lyman & Scott, 1967), (political) geography (e.g., Murphy, 1990, 2002; Stead, 2015), developmental psychology (see Nancekivell, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013), and social psychology (e.g., Beggan & Brown, 1994; De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005; Ye & Gawronski, 2016). However, the concept of collective psychological ownership has been largely ignored, although psychological ownership manifest itself not only at the personal level but also at the collective level (“ours”) (Furby, 1980; Pierce & Jussila, 2011).

The aim of this paper is to advance social psychological theory and research on intergroup relations by discussing collective psychological ownership as an important yet largely unexplored factor in intergroup dynamics. To make our point, we will unpack the concept of collective psychological ownership by drawing on theory and research from disciplines ranging from law to philosophy, psychology, sociology, and political theory. In the following sections, we will first focus on the nature of collective psychological ownership. We suggest that collective psychological ownership is rooted in the psychology of possessions and implies social enactment and recognition. Subsequently, we will consider three important principles that people use to infer and claim collective psychological ownership. This is followed by a discussion of some of the marking behaviors people resort to in order to communicate that something is “ours.” Further, we argue that the possibility and fear of losing control and being dispossessed is inseparable from ownership and that this specific type of threat differs from realistic and symbolic threats (Table 1) that are commonly examined in research on intergroup relations (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Additionally, we will briefly consider ownership in relation to in-group responsibility and cooperation to show that there are also intragroup benefits to the sense of collective ownership. The paper concludes with future directions for theoretical and empirical development in the hope of stimulating more systematic research on the principles, causes, and intergroup consequences of collective psychological ownership.

Table 1.

A Conceptual Distinction Between Three Types of Intergroup Threat and Their Related Psychology

Intergroup threats	Realistic	Symbolic	Ownership
Key question asked	What do we need?	Who are we?	What do we control?
What is at stake	Resources/well-being	Worldview/identity	Gatekeeper right/entitlements
What triggers the threat	Competition/zero-sum	Cultural differences	Transgression/encroachment
Intergroup behavior, e.g.	Discrimination in resource allocation	Discrimination in prestige distribution	Property marking, social exclusion in decision making

Collective psychological ownership can be discussed and investigated in a range of social contexts. Throughout the paper, we will refer to examples from daily life, history, and current politics in which collective ownership is claimed by groups on a local, regional, and national level as well as to empirical findings that attest to the relevance of ownership-related processes for intergroup relations in a range of settings and contexts (also see McIntyre, Constable, & Barlow, 2016). However, we focus predominantly on situations in which perceived ownership of places such as a neighborhood, region, or country is at stake. These are the settings where collective ownership claims are prominent in the political discourse. For example, statements such as “this is our country,” “we have to take back control,” “they stole our country,” or “we want to be master in our own house” are advanced by politicians when claiming ownership of the country in relation to immigrants and in response to globalization processes more generally. Implications of collective ownership claims on a local and especially a national scale can be far-reaching and unnerving, endangering social cohesion and international relations at large. However, we suggest that the social psychological processes discussed may also apply to many other material and immaterial objects (e.g., folklore, creative ideas) and groups and settings (e.g. institutions, organizations, mergers, etc.), and therefore, we hopefully provide directions for future research on collective psychological ownership and intergroup relations in various other social contexts.

The Concept of Ownership

Questions of ownership are at the heart of the functioning of societies, and psychological ownership has profound implications for how people behave (Ye & Gawronski, 2016). Ownership helps to organize the social and physical environment, regulates social interactions, and implies normative and moral rights, privileges, and responsibilities. Ownership is beneficial in clarifying how to behave in relation to resources, artifacts, and goods; in simplifying how people relate to each other; and for understanding and predicting behavior. Ownership is also central to the normative and moral fabric of communities and society, as is visible in the moral transgressions of theft, trespassing, and vandalism that are specific to ownership (Snare, 1972).

Legal scholars and philosophers have discussed the concept of ownership and property (Merrill, 1998; Rose, 1985; Snare, 1972). The core aspect of personal ownership is the control over material (objects, places) and immaterial (ideas, arguments) goods that are “mine” and not “yours.” When you own something, it is up to you to decide what happens with it and not up to someone else. Ownership implies a bundle of rights: (1) the right of usage, (2) the right of transfer, and (3) the right of exclusion (Reeve, 1986; Snare, 1972). First, it implies the right to use what is owned: to use it or not use it as one sees fit. Second, the owner has the right to decide whether to keep the target of ownership or to give it away or sell it, to share it, or to lend it. Third, it implies the right to exclude others and to decide whether others are permitted or prohibited to use the object or have access to it. It has been argued that this “gatekeeper right” is the sine qua non of ownership and has primacy over the other two rights (Merrill, 1998). Thus, the defining feature of ownership is the right to regulate others’ access to or use of one’s possessions. Ownership tells us not only what one may properly do to or with an object but especially what others may not do: “It is fundamentally a right not to be interfered with” (Sadowsky, 1974, p. 120; Snare, 1972).[2]

The Psychology of Possession and Ownership

People can feel that particular objects, places, and ideas are “theirs” even in the absence of social or legal recognition. This sense of ownership is based on the psychology of possession (Rochat, 2014; Rose, 1985). The feeling of possession develops very early in life and probably has roots in evolutionary history, as is illustrated in the territorial instinct that is found in many species (Hinde, 1970; Taylor, 1988). The etymology of the term possession relates to control or power over things (“under my thumb”’ Rochat, 2014). Inversely, a person is considered to be “possessed” when he or she cannot control his or her “dark” inner thoughts or is under the spell of some mysterious outside force.

Possession and ownership are different, yet related, social psychological constructs (see G. Brown, 2009; Rochat, 2014; Snare, 1972). Psychologically, possession concerns the subjective, personal feelings about material and immaterial objects. These feelings might remain private but can also be objectified in a public claim of ownership. The “possession-to-ownership” transition implies the social enactment and assertion of the subjective sense of control and power over things (“this is mine”). Thus, we consider ownership a social normative construct that refers to social relationships between individuals with respect to objects. Ownership needs to be asserted, marked, and defended in relation to other people, and this can be instinctual or deliberate, based on different principles (e.g., first possession or investment); can be done in various ways (e.g., gestures or signs), and can be formalized in legal rules that transform ownership into property.

Ownership with its gatekeeper right provides a legitimate reason to prevent unwanted intrusion and to exclude others. Even young children adhere to this right of social exclusion (Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009; Ross, Conant, & Vickar, 2011). Although ownership is not an obvious social property of objects but is rather abstract and intangible, young children recognize it. It has been shown that children 2 years old assert their ownership rights and recognize the rights of others (Pesowski & Friedman, 2015; Ross, Friedman, & Field, 2015). Preschoolers have a basic understanding of ownership of physical objects and appreciate that owners are entitled to greater control over their property than nonowners (Fasig, 2000; Kim & Kalish, 2009; Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). Children give priority to ownership in judging who should use an object and settling disputes about usage (Neary & Friedman, 2014; Ross et al., 2011). They tend to pick up a toy and express ownership as soon as another child shows an interest in the same toy. By the age of 6 or 7, children’s notions of ownership are also applied to places (O’Neal et al., 1977), to ideas and intellectual property (Shaw, Li, & Olson, 2012; Yang, Shaw, Garduno, & Olson, 2014), and later in life also to arguments (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005). Isaacs (1933, p. 222) gives the example of two boys who felt a keen sense of ownership of the nursery rhymes and songs that they heard first: “No one else had the right to sing or hear these things without their permission. All the children felt that anything was ‘theirs’ if they had used it first, or had made it, even with material that itself belonged to all” (p. 22). Ownership gives a sense of control over an object and over others’ access to or use of it. It satisfies the need for control, and it provides a sense of efficacy.

Psychological Ownership and the Personal Self

The theoretical and empirical literature on the self and on ego extensions demonstrates that the distinction between “me” and “mine” is often difficult to draw. The self includes the individual’s ego extensions that are experienced as part of who one is. Research on the mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992), the endowment effect (e.g., Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990), and tests of object memorability (Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008) shows that people have greater preference and liking of objects they possess and that they value these more, compared with identical objects they do not possess. These effects are stronger for people striving for self-enhancement and occur even when there is little possibility of losing these objects (Beggan, 1992; Nesselroade, Beggan, & Allison, 1999). These findings suggest that the ownership effect not only is due to loss aversion that is induced by the pain of giving something up (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) but also involves the desire for a positive view of the self. Thus, there tends to be a very close (implicit) mental association between what is “me” and that which is “mine”: Possessions are included in one’s concept of self (Beggan, 1992; De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005; Ye & Gawronski, 2016). In a well-known quote, William James (1890) argued:

In its widest possible sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputations and works, his land and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down—not necessarily in the same degree for each thing but in much the same way. (p. 292)

Although the things Williams James talks about might be similar in emotional meaning, they differ in terms of what one can do with them morally. Some of these possessions can be transferred and therefore are alienable, but others are inalienable. Experiencing one’s clothes, house, land, horses, or yacht as “mine” differs from experiencing one’s wife, children, or workers as “mine.” The former are one’s property that can be transferred, whereas the latter cannot, or at least not in most modern societies. In modern societies, the feeling that this is my wife or these are my children or my coworkers differs from societies in which it is considered acceptable to buy and sell wives and children and to have slaves. People might have a sense of possession of these “objects” but that does not have to mean that they feel that they own them as their property. Research on taboo tradeoffs demonstrates that people are extremely resistant and morally outraged when they are asked to apply market-pricing norms to domains of life that are considered to have special status, such as individual-to-individual and individual-to-society relationships (Tetlock, 1986). Buying or selling one’s organs, adoption rights for orphans, or votes in political elections elicit intense negative emotional reactions (disgust, contempt) and resistance (Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). And research on commodification shows that turning an object into a commodity changes the meaning of the object and the attitude that people have toward it (e.g., Frey, 1997; Isaksen & Roper, 2012; see also Sandel, 2012). From something meaningful and valuable in itself it becomes something that is owned and can be traded.

Thus, the use of personal possessive pronouns does not always express a sense of ownership (Day, 1966; Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Snare, 1972). Similarly, place attachment in the sense of an affective bond or attachment that people have with specific areas in which they feel comfortable and safe does not have to imply a sense that one owns the place (Hernández, Hidalgo, Salazar-Laplace, & Hess, 2007). People feel attached to all sorts of things (“I love my neighborhood”), but ownership implies a sense of proprietary attachment that is established and maintained in relation to others (“This is my neighborhood and not yours”). Furthermore, objects and products resulting from one’s personal efforts are typically experienced as central to the self but do not have to imply the sense that one owns them. An artist’s painting, an author’s book, and an architect’s building are all felt to be part of who they are, but once given away or sold to someone else, they are no longer owned. So a feeling of ownership not only is based on a sense of being psychologically tied to a material or immaterial object but also involves a sense of exclusive social control.

Collective Psychological Ownership

Ownership can be experienced not only on the personal level but also on the collective or group level. There is a connection not only between “me” and that which is “mine” but also between “we” and that which is “ours.” A group of people who perceive themselves as “us” can have a collective sense of things that are “ours.” Self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) proposes that people self-categorize at different levels of abstraction: Personal self-categories define people’s personal identity (“I”), and social or collective self-categories define their group or collective identities (“we”). Our self-concepts are inextricably linked to the groups to which we belong and vice versa. For SCT, the process of depersonalization implies a redefinition of the self: from thinking in terms of personal identity (“I”) to thinking about the self in terms of group identity (“we”). Through depersonalization the group becomes the (temporary) measure of things, and the values and norms that guide our behavior are those of the group with which we (momentarily) identify. Depersonalization redefines self-related terms: It is about collective self-esteem, collective self-efficacy, and collective self-interests rather than personal self-esteem, personal self-efficacy, and personal self-interests. And it is about “our” organization, neighborhood, city, or country on which “we” can decide.

Research demonstrates that children start to develop a sense of “we” around the age of 5 (Bennett & Sani, 2004) but already recognize the right of ownership usage and control by 2 years of age (e.g., Ross et al., 2015). Further, research has shown that perceived collective psychological ownership of domestic national products is a strong predictor of consumer behavior of these products (“buy American”), independently of the perceived quality of the products, consumer ethnocentrism, and level of national identification (Gineikiene, Schlegelmilch, & Auruskeviciene, 2016). The question “who we are” is a different one from “what we own” (Table 1). The former question is about how “we” differ from others and relates to the psychology of intergroup similarities and differences (Brewer, 1991; Turner et al., 1987), whereas the latter relates to the psychology of possessions. Furthermore, group identity has to do with in-group defining stereotypical traits, norms, and values, whereas ownership is about the proprietary rights of people with respect to material and immaterial objects and resources. Ownership adds something to who “we” are, namely a powerful justification for what “we” rightfully can do with what is “ours,” including the right to exclude others. These differences mean that not everything that we call “ours” implies a sense of collective ownership: It is our neighborhood, our local shop, our religion, and our team that we support, but this does not have to imply that group members think that they have exclusive control over these things. The word “our” (like “mine”) can indicate an affiliation or some sort of felt association rather than an assertion of ownership. So a sense of attachment or group identification does not have to imply a feeling of collective ownership, but collective ownership does imply a sense of “us” and social identification.

That which we consider “ours” can be an important aspect of how we perceive and understand ourselves. Collective ownership can underlie and strengthen the development of a sense of “who we are” and “what we are about,” and such a sense also can lead to claiming ownership in relation to out-groups (“this should be ours”). What we own can develop into an intrinsic, self-defining part of who we are, as is the case of luxury goods among some of the rich people. Another example of ownership defining one’s group identity is when members of the dominant group are accused of exploiting and appropriating the cultural property of less privileged groups (e.g., tribal names, images, folklore, and artifacts of native Americans, “Blackface,” and “yellowface” performances; Scafidi, 2005). Collective ownership can symbolize one’s higher social class, subculture prestige, or ethnic and racial heritage. This means that in addition to the need for control that is served by ownership, specific identity motives can become important for understanding the social psychological dynamics of collective ownership. Ownership can provide a sense of collective self-esteem, positive distinctiveness, belonging, having a meaningful existence, empowerment, and identity continuity (Vignoles, 2011). For example, symbolic self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981) has been used to argue and demonstrate experimentally that people use material objects that are collectively owned (e.g., historical buildings, domestic products) as symbols of their group identity and to communicate their group identity to others (Gineikiene et al., 2016; Ledgerwood, Liviatan, & Carnevale, 2008). Further, in-group bias in the evaluation of property objects has been found among people with a low external motivation to respond without prejudice (McIntyre et al., 2016). Additionally, the home advantage effect indicates the advantage enjoyed by the owner of a territory over a visitor or intruder to it (McAndrew, 1993). The advantages of being on one’s own turf for effective social influence and successful negotiations have been shown in several studies (e.g., Harris & McAndrew, 1986), including among preschool children (Han, Li, & Shi, 2009). Thus, collective ownership can help people to define themselves, to feel a sense of home, to have a purpose and direction in life, to feel strong and powerful, and to have a sense of collective continuity across time. Yet in our view, these motives are not inherently linked to ownership but rather form additional features of ownership experiences. Indeed, these identity motives may arise in situations in which a sense of ownership is not involved and engage psychological processes that are distinct from the core feature of a sense of control that ownership provides.

The fact that collective ownership can become a defining aspect of social identity is also illustrated by the role of group identification. Group-level perceptions and feelings are particularly likely and important for those who identify highly with their in-group. High identifiers are the ones who think of themselves in terms of their group membership, feel close to their group, are concerned and committed to the group, and act on behalf of the group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Higher identifiers also are more likely to have a sense of collective ownership. In two survey studies in the Netherlands, it was found that the association between national identification and attitudes toward immigrants was mediated by a sense of natives’ collective ownership of the country (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). And in a survey among Finnish majority members, it was found that perceived ownership of the country mediated the relationship between national identification and attitudes toward the Russian-speaking minority (Brylka, Mähönen, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015).

Principles of Collective Ownership

Having discussed the concept of collective psychological ownership and its relevance for group identities, the next question that arises is which principles people use to determine ownership so that ownership claims are understandable and legitimate in the eyes of themselves and others. Various ownership principles have been proposed, and here we focus on three principles that are likely to be important for collective ownership claims in intergroup relations[3]: (1) first possession principle, (2) labor and investment principle, and (3) formative principle.

First possession principle

In political theory, the term “historical right” refers to the right to a piece of land because of first occupancy (Gans, 2001; Murphy, 1990). It proceeds on the basis that the first user of a natural resource, such as a piece of land, did not displace or dispossess anyone else in order to take possession. In international law, terra nullius describes territory that nobody owns so that the first nation to discover it is entitled to take it over, as “finders keepers”. In 19th-century South Africa, the “empty or vacant land theory” was propagated by European settlers for claiming the land, and it is still used by some groups of European descent to support their claims to land ownership in the country (Bosma, 2015). European settlers also declared Australia terra nullius, allowing them to disregard the ownership and use of the land by its indigenous inhabitants and claim it for themselves. Nowadays, the term indigenous is used for more than 5,000 groups classified or considered to be the first, original inhabitants, such as the Inuit and the First Peoples in Canada, the Aboriginals in Australia, and the Maori in New Zealand (Gagné & Salaün, 2012; Hodgson, 2002). There are various examples of corrective justice in which indigenous groups successfully reclaim territory and rights based on the (alleged) fact of first possession and subsequent wrongful dispossession (Meisels, 2003; Roosens, 1998).

The claim of primo-occupancy represents a strong justification for territorial and nationalist sovereignty claims and is a core issue in violent conflicts and war (Toft, 2014). For instance, the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda had part of its roots in Hutu’s claims to primo-occupancy (Adamczyk, 2011), and these claims play a role in the incessant Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Kelman, 2001). Furthermore, the notion of primo-occupancy is used in relation to immigrants. For example, Malays have always regarded Malaysia as their home because they claimed to be the original people, making non-Malays immigrants (Noor & Leong, 2013). And in European discussions about immigration and multiculturalism in far-right discourse, primo-occupancy and the related bundle of rights is presented as natural and self-evident and typically accompanied by an “implicit call for excluding strangers (‘allochthons’), whoever they may be” (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005, p. 386).

Psychological research on children and adult’s first possession bias (Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Neary, 2008) demonstrates that individuals judge that an object belongs to the first person seen to possess it (Blake & Harris, 2009; Friedman & Neary, 2008). Older children and adults also claim that the first person seen to have found and possessed a previously nonowned object is its owner (Friedman, 2008; Friedman & Neary, 2008), and the same has been found for the ownership of ideas (Shaw et al., 2012). Similarly, being first at a particular place is information that is used to infer ownership. First arrival indicates one’s presence on a place before anyone else, and this in itself is an important basis for establishing ownership. In several experimental studies among early adolescents, it was demonstrated that a first arriving individual (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015) or group (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinovic, 2015) is perceived to own a piece of land more because they have established ownership simply by being there first.

Labor and investment principle

In justifying the confiscation of occupied territories, Israeli officials sometimes appeal to a 19th-century law of the Ottoman empire. According to this law, the state can appropriate a piece of land when for a long time it has not been cultivated by its owner. The philosopher John Locke acknowledged the first occupancy principle as a moral basis for land ownership, but it also mattered to him that the land was cultivated or used productively. More generally, he proposed the labor principle that stipulates that one is justified to claim ownership of an artefact or territory if its existence or cultivation results from one’s physical labor. Everyone owns the labor of one’s body, and therefore, one has the moral right to own, and thereby exclusively use, the results of one’s hands and the fruits of one’s (creative) thinking (Day, 1966).[4] Similarly, the sociologist Durkheim (1957) argued that when one creates an object, one owns it in much the same way as one owns oneself. Investment of the self into a target appears to be an important intuitive principle to infer and justify ownership (Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981).

Experimental research has shown that past investment in an object provides a justification of ownership (Beggan & Brown, 1994). In research among early adolescents, it was found that compared to simply being there first, having settled and worked the land strengthens the perceived ownership of first comers (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015, Experiment 2). Furthermore, experimental research among children and adults showed that ownership decisions are based on creative labor in both the United Kingdom and Japan (Kanngiesser, Itakura, & Hood, 2014). Rochat and colleagues found that 5-year-olds from seven different cultures attributed ownership of an object to the agent who created it (Rochat et al., 2014). And preschoolers and adults transfer ownership from the owner of raw materials to the one who invests effort to create a new object (Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010). Additionally, in four experiments among adults, it was found that a person who creates an object is considered to own it, especially when the creation was intentional (Levene, Starmans, & Friedman, 2015). This effect was found even when controlling for other factors typically associated with ownership such as physical possession.

Formative principle

The term “historical right” as used in political theory not only refers to first occupancy of a territory but also to the formative meaning of that territory for collective identity (Gans, 2001; Murphy, 1990). There is not only the notion of the primacy of the group on the “empty” territory but also the constitutive primacy of the territory in forming the historical identity of the group. An example is the belief among native communities in North America that their native identity is inevitably connected to the land, or mother earth, and this belief is associated with valuing collective attempts for land reclamation (Giguère, Lalonde, & Jonsson, 2012). And many Jews claim not only that they were the first to maintain an organized settlement in Palestine (Eretz Yisrael) but also that the early experiences of the Jews in Palestine were formative in their collective identity. So Jews would have a historical right to the territory not so much “because they were the first among contemporary peoples to occupy it but rather because it was of primary importance in forming their identity as a historical entity” (Gans, 2001, p. 60).

This formative principle is used to justify claims of ownership in various contexts. Notions of “formative value” and the related intimate knowledge of a particular “object” are behind many intergroup conflicts in which history is interpreted in selective and self-serving ways. People with British descent in the United States and Australia cannot claim to have been there first but do argue for the formative importance of the country in contrast to recent immigrants. They display slogans such as “we grew here, you flew here” to communicate to Arab and Asian immigrants that they are not welcome (Due & Riggs, 2008).

In 1965 the sociologists Elias and Scotson published a classical book titled The Established and the Outsiders. The book is based on their research on intergroup relations in Winston Parva, a suburb of an industrial city in England’s Midlands (actually South Wigston, Leicester). Winston Parva had less than 5,000 inhabitants and was situated between two railways, making it a distinct community with its own factories, schools, churches, shops, and associations. There also was a sharp social boundary between the inhabitants of the different neighborhoods or “zones” as Elias and Scotson called them. On the one hand, there was the relatively old working-class neighborhood (“the village”) and a middle-class neighborhood and, on the other hand, a newer working class area. Thus, the boundary did not follow the social class distinction that—certainly in those days—predominated English society but rather was between the established who had lived for generations in Winston Parva and the “newcoming” outsiders. The established were relatively cohesive, considered themselves superior, and made it clear that the outsiders did not belong. Their identity was intimately linked to and formed by the area, and they considered themselves the rightful owners of Winston Parva. They claimed ownership and tried to maintain their dominant position by stigmatization and exclusion of the outsiders. A similar discourse as in Winston Parva can be heard among “established” inhabitants of urban residential areas in relation to immigrants (e.g., Verkuyten, 1997). These inhabitants regard the neighborhood as “theirs” because they were born and raised there and made them who they are.

Marking Collective Ownership

Whatever the principle on which ownership is claimed, in order for it to be recognized by others, ownership has to be marked and signaled. Ownership that is socially recognized and accepted regulates social interactions and prevents and reduces conflict (“good fences make good neighbors”). When it is clear what belongs to whom, it is less likely that people will clash over rights and responsibilities (G. Brown et al., 2005). That means that it is important that ownership is expressed in practices, signs, symbols, and rituals that mark and communicate one’s ownership status. Naming is an example of asserting ownership, such as Scotland being the land of the Scots, Ireland of the Irish, Finland of the Fins, and the Basque Country of the Basques.

Marking as a form of ownership behavior does not only have to serve the function of claiming and justifying control but can also define group identity. In the intergroup literature, a conceptual distinction is made between two functions of in-group bias (see D. Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2002, 2003). The instrumental function consists of engaging group members to maintain or secure the position and standing of their group, whereas the identity confirmation function refers to behavior that affirms symbolically the distinctiveness and value of the group. For example, soccer fans’ songs can be instrumental in motivating their team and can also express the club’s distinctiveness and worth (D. Scheepers et al., 2003). Applied to ownership, this means that an analytical distinction can be made between control-oriented marking and identity-oriented marking (see G. Brown et al., 2005). The same ownership behavior may sometimes serve to promote group control and other times bolster group identity, and sometimes both functions are fulfilled simultaneously. It is only by making an analytical distinction between control-oriented and identity-oriented marking that these sorts of dynamics can be examined empirically.

Control-oriented marking

This form of marking communicates to out-group members that a particular (material or immaterial) object or territory is “ours” and therefore that “we” are entitled to control the access or use of the object in question. Examples are name tags and plates, the use of graffiti, displaying gang symbols, border control, and putting up the national flag on a “discovered” or conquered piece of land (e.g., the moon). These kinds of marking symbolize that the object is claimed and (should) discourage intrusion, misappropriation, trespassing, and infringements by outsiders. The importance of control-oriented marking is likely to depend on whether the ownership and the boundaries of the object in question are clear or rather ambiguous (G. Brown et al., 2005). Greater ambiguity can be expected to trigger stronger ownership behavior with higher levels of control-oriented marking. Ambiguity may stem from the perceived lack of boundary markers (e.g., blurring of national borders in the European Union) or from institutional, organizational, or societal changes (e.g., increasing cultural diversity in neighborhoods) that involve a restructuring of claims and entitlements. Under such circumstances, group members are likely to want to emphasize and reestablish their collective ownership by engaging in control-oriented marking, such as spreading out belongings, (re)emphasizing historical claims, putting up signs and fences, and intensifying patrolling and border control.

Identity-oriented marking

Collective ownership is based on social categorization, on the mere distinction between “us” and “others.” However, as discussed earlier, there can be a close connection between collective ownership and people’s understanding of their group identity. Ownership helps people to define who they are, can provide a feeling of belonging and empowerment, can provide a sense of identity continuity, and can give purpose and direction to one’s life. What is owned collectively shapes how we think and feel about ourselves. When these psychological dynamics are involved, ownership behavior becomes more identity-oriented. Identity-oriented marking of collective ownership expresses and asserts one’s social identity to in-group and out-group members. Labels, graffiti, gang symbols, border control, and the national flag not only communicate what belongs to us but often also symbolize our unique history, cultural tradition, status, and purpose (e.g., Ley & Cybriwsky, 1974). These things help to define who we are in relation to others, our group distinctiveness, meaning, and value.

Furthermore, identity-oriented marking of collective ownership not only expresses group identity but also elicits reactions from in-group and out-group members and thereby can work to refine or redefine the identity involved. Ownership boundaries and claims can be accepted or rejected, and the feedback given by others can have an impact on how group members come to understand themselves and make sense of their group identity. For example, for original inhabitants of old neighborhoods, the meaning of their local identity is likely to change when newcomers start to change the streetscape that used to reflect this identity (Verkuyten, 1997). And when in the 20th century colonial powers (United Kingdom, France, Belgium) had to give up their former colonies, this had an impact on how these powers’ national identity was defined and understood. Thus, the relationship between collective ownership and group identity is not unidirectional.

Intergroup Threats

An intrinsic part of the sense of ownership is the possibility of losing control and being dispossessed (Rochat, 2014). Ownership can be challenged, disputed, or threatened, which leads to behavior to defend and restore one’s ownership claims. Theft, trespassing, encroachment, and annexation (e.g., Crimea by Russia, Israel-occupied territories) lead to ownership disputes and conflicts, and U.S. sports teams using Native American tribal names have been accused of cultural misappropriation. Obviously, there are many differences between these types of conflicts, but they do seem to involve strong beliefs about collective psychological ownership.

Any real or perceived threat of losing control over something that one feels to be “ours” tends to trigger anticipatory and reactionary defenses (G. Brown, 2009; De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005). The latter are reactions taken after an infringement and serve to restore one’s claim to ownership with the related bundle of rights. For example, the “Black First–Land First” movement in South Africa that writes in its manifesto, “Twenty years after democracy black people are still at the bottom of society. We, the black majority, are last instead of being the first in our own country. Now we have decided to put black people first! It is only when we as black people are seen and treated as the rightful owners of this country shall we be really liberated and treated with the dignity that we deserve.”[5] Anticipatory defense, in contrast, occurs before an infringement and serves to thwart infringement attempts by others, such as the setting up of fences and walls (e.g., to keep immigrants from entering the United States), use of warning signs and border controls, and the implementation of exclusionary rules and regulations (e.g., new voting restrictions).

In the intergroup literature, various forms of out-group threat are examined and we propose that perceived threat to collective ownership differs from realistic and symbolic threats that are predominantly studied in the literature (see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). As indicated in Table 1, different questions are asked and different issues are at stake in the three forms of threat (see also Table 2). Ownership threat raises the question of in-group control and entitlements, whereas realistic threats relate to in-group’s material interests (e.g., jobs, houses; P. Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Sherif, 1966), and symbolic threats to the distinctiveness, value, and integrity of the in-group identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Although in some situations there can be an overlap between these forms of threat or the one form of threat can give rise to another one (Esses, Jackson, & Bennett-AbuAyyash, 2010), it is important to make an analytical distinction because different psychological processes and different behaviors are likely to be involved in each. Some of the key features of the proposed differences between these forms of threat are summarized in Table 1 and discussed below.

Table 2.

Items Used for Measuring Realistic, Symbolic, and Ownership Threats

Realistic threats

Because of the arrival of immigrants, Dutch natives less quickly find a job

Due to the immigration it is more difficult for the Dutch to get a house

I am afraid that because of the immigration, unemployment will increase in the Netherlands

Immigrants cost too much and therefore are a threat to the welfare state

Symbolic threats

Immigrants are a threat to the Dutch culture

Dutch values and norms are undermined by the presence of immigrants

The Dutch identity is threatened by the great number of immigrants

I am afraid that because of all these foreign culture, the Dutch culture will get lost

Ownership threat

Because many immigrants live here, Dutch natives have less and less influence in their own country

The Dutch natives are slowly losing their say about the Netherlands to newcomers

Sometimes it feels like this country is owned more by immigrants than by the native Dutch

Sometimes it seems like natives have to adjust to newcomers, instead of the other way around

Note: Listed items refer to the Dutch context, and in the French study, they referred to France.

Realistic threat posed by an out-group predominantly concerns threats to the physical and material well-being of the in-group and its members. It relates to the question “What do we need?” and involves the resources that we need to live our lives (Table 1). Perceptions and feelings of realistic threat can relate to developments that challenge the welfare of the group (health and safety threats, pollution) but typically arise as a result of intergroup competition over tangible, scarce resources (e.g., jobs, houses, welfare) and involve the perception of a zero-sum competition whereby the material gains of the out-group imply a loss for the in-group.

Realistic threats concern the notion of in-group interests and relate to the social dominance perspective that sees the world in terms of an inherently competitive jungle (Duckitt, 2006). These feelings of realistic threat lead to forms of (institutional) discrimination (Table 1) that are instrumental reactions for reducing or removing the group competition. There is much empirical evidence in support of these propositions in different countries and contexts (see Esses et al., 2010). Furthermore, politicians around the world often appeal to zero-sum competition over limited resources when they argue that immigration is not in the best interest of the majority population and therefore should be reduced or stopped. Immigrants would “take away jobs and houses,” “reduce majority members’ opportunities,” and “unduly benefit from the welfare system.” For instance, in relation to Europe, right-wing politicians argue that European unification and the Euro currency go against the national interest because the costs outweigh the benefits. Similarly, in the United States, there is opposition to immigration from Mexico, given that Mexican (illegal) laborers allegedly take away job opportunities from Americans and import drugs and crime (Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

Symbolic threat relates to the question “Who are we?” and involves the perception and feeling that the cultural worldview of the in-group and its self-defining values and beliefs are challenged or undermined by a culturally distinct out-group (Table 1). For example, concerns have been raised regarding the threat posed by immigrants to the national identity and Anglo-Protestant nature of the United States (Huntington, 2004; Schlesinger, 1991). Similarly, the threat of immigration and European unification to the “unique and valuable national identity and culture” is a key theme in right-wing political rhetoric in Europe (Wodak, Khosravinik, & Mral, 2013). The emphasis in this rhetoric is on in-group defining cultural traditions, practices, norms, and values that would be endangered by newcomers or by European rules and regulations. Out-groups that hold worldviews and values that differ from the in-group threaten the self-defining way of life of the in-group. Symbolic threat is concerned with the fear that the distinctiveness, value, and continuity of the in-group identity is undermined by others. It involves the need for a positive and distinctive sense of collective self and leads to identity management strategies including positive intergroup differentiation (in-group bias), worldview defense, and discrimination in prestige distribution (Table 1; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van den Bos, 2009). Research has shown that perceived cultural differences, the lack of belief and value congruency, and value violations are important causes for prejudice and in-group bias (e.g., Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2016; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013).

Ownership threat refers to the fear of being deprived of or losing one’s control and gate-keeper right: the right to decide about the target of ownership (Table 1). Ownership confers specific rights and privileges with respect to that which is owned and thereby justifies the entitlements of owners in relation to others. The issue of ownership is a separate and important theme in right-wing political rhetoric. The anti-Europe discourse in almost all European countries depicts “Brussels and its bureaucrats” as a threat to national sovereignty: an interference with “our” right of self-determination. What is at stake here is the right to subject the whole world to “our” decisions regarding the country and the regulation of life within it. For example, in the party manifesto for the general elections of 2012 of the right-wing Dutch Party for Freedom, it is stated in relation to immigration and European unification: “We are no longer master in our own house. We are guests in our own country: no longer able to determine our own future. . . . But people who are master in their own country decide themselves who enters and who not.” This rhetoric, with the related sentiments, was central in the outcome of the British referendum (June 2016) to leave the European Union (Brexit).

A similar discourse is used in relation to immigration and immigrants who are presented as a threat to native majorities’ right to decide about what happens in their “own house” and about who should be allowed to enter. The comparison with the rights that apply in one’s house or home is often made (Roosens, 1998; Verkuyten, de Jong, & Masson, 1995), and the tendency to govern the state like a home is labeled “domopolitics” (Walters, 2004). A house or home is “our” place where we belong naturally and where, by definition, others do not. Those who own the house are the master and can invite guests, but these guests should comply with our rules or should not enter the house and certainly should not overstay their welcome but rather return to “their homes.” One has ownership to the extent that one has control and the right to exclude, and one loses control when one no longer has gatekeeper rights. So what is involved here is the threat of losing exclusive control that differs from competition over scarce material resources that threatens material well-being or perceived group differences in values and beliefs that threaten the value and meaning of the in-group identity.

Relations Between Forms of Threat

It is likely that a distinction between the three forms of threat is sometimes relatively easy to make, but in other contexts, it might be more difficult because of overlap and mutual influence (Esses et al., 2005). The experience of these forms of threat can be present in society at the same time and work in concert in fueling intergroup tensions and conflicts. In relation to European unification, the discourse of right-wing politicians clearly taps simultaneously into the three different concerns of the country’s economic interests, cultural identity, and national sovereignty. And periods of rapid changes (e.g., large influx of immigrants and refugees) might trigger economic and cultural fears but also the fear of losing control and the gatekeeper right over what is “ours.” This might instigate attempts to regain exclusive control, for example by building fences and walls along the border (e.g., the Mexican border in the United States and antirefugee borders in Hungary, Slovenia, and Macedonia) or leaving the European Union (Brexit).

Some forms of threat can also be more important in some contexts than in others. If groups have a history of conflict over scarce resources, realistic threats are likely to underlie out-group negativity and discrimination. For instance, among Israeli citizens, Bizman and Yinon (2001) found that realistic threat to the in-group, but not symbolic threat, was a more important predictor of attitudes toward immigrants. Further, realistic threats can be expected to play a larger role in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration when the economic conditions are worse (e.g., Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009). In contrast, symbolic threat is more important when cultural group differences are more prominent, such as among majority members in their negative reactions toward immigrants (see Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014) and Muslim immigrants in particular (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). And in conflict societies where group identity is primarily at stake, such as in the context of Northern Ireland, symbolic threat, but not realistic threat, was found to predict out-group attitudes and trust (Tausch, Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2007).

To our knowledge, there is no empirical research that has examined the importance of ownership threat for out-group attitudes and behavior, alongside symbolic and realistic threat. We suggest that ownership threat can represent a distinct category relative to realistic and symbolic threats. Competition over scarce material resources in which material well-being is at stake and identity undermining out-group norms and values in which a positive and distinctive in-group identity is at stake do not have to be experienced as an infringement on our “gatekeeper right” with the related indignation and anger. But when they do, outgroup derogation is likely to be strong, and the exclusion of outgroup members is considered just: A sense of ownership involves the legitimate right to exclude others from unwanted invasions and intrusions. It is up to the gatekeeper (“us”) to exercise the power of exclusion and inclusion and defend or restore this power when it is perceived to be threatened. The key slogan of the successful pro-Brexit campaign was “Let’s take back control” so that “we” again can decide who can and who cannot enter the country, and this rhetoric also was a central theme in Trump’s victorious presidential campaign in the United States.

Unfortunately, because of the lack of any systematic empirical research, we do not know whether, for example, measurements of perceived symbolic and realistic threat can be distinguished from perceived ownership threat. One exception is a survey in France and the Netherlands (N = 851; Mahfud, Badea, & Verkuyten, 2016) that used multiple items to assess realistic threat, symbolic threat, and ownership threat (see Table 2). Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that in both countries these three constructs were empirically distinct.[6] Furthermore, in a multiple regression analysis, symbolic and ownership threats were independently associated with prejudicial attitudes toward immigrants (β = .344, p < .001, and β = .270, p < .001, respectively; for realistic threat, β = .088, p = .072). And the findings were qualitatively the same for France and the Netherlands, with higher perceived symbolic and ownership threats being significantly related to more negative attitudes. So people appear to make a distinction between these three forms of threat, and ownership threat adds something in explaining out-group negativity. Therefore, empirical research would benefit from examining how ownership threat differs and relates to other forms of group threat, under what circumstances feelings of ownership threat are triggered, and what role these feelings play in intergroup relations.

Ownership Threat, Encroachment, and Out-Group Negativity

Collective ownership implies a sense of proprietary claim over certain “objects” that can be denied to out-groups. Potential and actual outgroup behaviors that make unwanted or unjustified inroads upon “our” property actions (e.g., misappropriation, trespassing, intrusion, invasion) trigger the fear of being deprived of and losing what is ours (Table 1). According to the group position model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996), out-group negativity is especially likely under the condition of encroachment, whereby there is a gradual usurpation of “our” possessions or entrance upon our territory (Bobo, 1999). When an encroachment clearly challenges “our” perceived prerogatives or rights, a feeling of indignation and infringement occurs. This involves the sense that others, without permission, attempt to claim, take, or use a particular entity that we believe is “ours.” Feelings of infringement are inherently emotional and threaten not only proprietary claims but are also seen as violating intuitive principles and social norms of ownership. In a large-scale survey among Dutch natives, it was found that the endorsement of ownership based on primo-occupancy was only associated with more negative attitudes toward immigrants for natives who perceived out-group encroachment (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). Similarly, in a study on the Chilean-Bolivian territorial conflict, it was shown that a sense of territorial ownership of Chileans was associated with a greater willingness to protest against the Bolivian territorial demand only for those Chileans who thought Bolivia represented a serious threat (Martinovic, Bobowik, Hatibovic, & Verkuyten, 2016). It is when people have a sense that something is “theirs” and at the same time fear that they are losing their say about it that prejudicial attitudes and defensive behaviors develop.

The strong appeal of an argument about collective ownership and the related rights is demonstrated by the fact that excluded out-groups typically do not deny the validity of the argument as such. Rather, they might challenge the specific proprietary claim, for example, by constructing a counternarrative in which they themselves are the original inhabitants of the disputed territory. Examples are Serbs and Albanians, both of whom view Kosovo as primarily their in-group’s ancestral homeland (Vickers, 1998), and Rumanians and Hungarians, who cannot agree about ownership of the Transylvanian region (Baár & Ritivoi, 2006). Another example is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is, to a great extent, fought around the issue of who owns the historical territory (“who’s house this is”; Oz, 2004).

The rhetoric of lost sovereignty and no longer being master in one’s own house justifies out-group exclusion. In this rhetoric, exclusion or “denial of access” is not unjust or discriminatory but rather a right that the owner has and that confirms collective ownership. This means that claims of ownership can play a powerful justifying role in intergroup relations. Perceived ownership implies psychological entitlement that predicts negative views of out-groups, independently of in-group identification (Anastasio & Rose, 2014). Further, the expression of out-group negativity and discrimination is facilitated by justifications such as legitimizing myths that support unequal social arrangements (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Ownership implies the right to decide and not to be interfered with, which makes social exclusion of out-group intruders and trespassers acceptable and just. To the extent that these out-group members recognize and accept the ownership of the in-group, these members can be expected to accept the more marginal position of their group. Thus, it can be argued that collective ownership is a powerful ideological belief or hierarchy-enhancing myth (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) that for disadvantaged group members serves the function of justifying their unfavorable social position and supporting the very system that gives rise to it (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; but see Brandt, 2013).

The importance of perceived collective ownership for justifying negative out-group attitudes was demonstrated in two experimental studies in the context of the United States and Australia among participants of White European descent (Martinovic, Verkuyten, & Jetten, 2016). In both countries, the land that the European colonizers supposedly discovered had already been inhabited by indigenous groups—Native Americans and Aborigines. An experimental design was used in which participants either read a story about their European ancestors being the first immigrants to the country, the indigenous group being the first group to inhabit the territory, or a control condition. Subsequently they were asked about their feelings toward immigrant minorities. In both studies, it was found that stronger endorsement of ownership based on primo-occupancy was particularly related to more negative feelings in the Europeans-first condition. This indicates that in this condition, collective ownership based on primo-occupancy was used as a justifying ideology for negative out-group feelings. Furthermore, it was found that participants were more willing to grant compensatory rights to the indigenous group when reading about this out-group, instead of the White European in-group, being the primo-occupant. Thus, the acknowledgement of ownership based on first arrival led to more positive attitudes toward indigenous groups.

Responsibilities and Intragroup Implications

Ownership implies the right to alter one’s possessions or leave them as they are, and there is typically no formal responsibility to take care of what one owns. However, there is often a social and moral responsibility to do so. Experienced responsibility can be an antecedent to a sense of ownership. Individuals entrusted with the care of an object (i.e., stewardship) will exercise control over it, can develop intimate knowledge of it and invest in it, and thereby gradually develop a sense of ownership. But felt responsibility can also be a consequence of ownership. The famous Italian educator Maria Montessori developed the idea of collective ownership of the school (“children’s house”) in which parents cared for the school building and contributed to the learning of their children. In general, people will strive to maintain and take care of what they own. They experience ownership and tend to feel a sense of accountability and responsibility for the target of ownership. When one’s collective identity is closely linked to an organization, neighborhood, city, or country through collective ownership, the desire to maintain and protect one’s identity results in an enhanced sense of responsibility. In that case, taking care of one’s property is experienced as taking care of oneself, and taking care of what is ours implies taking care of ourselves. In contrast, a lack of ownership implies the absence of self-involvement and control that can lead to alienation with its feelings of powerlessness and estrangement (Blauner, 1964).

Feelings of “ours” can lead to investment of time and energy in proactive behavior aimed at maintaining and improving the target of ownership. A sense of collective responsibility typically has positive intragroup consequences. It binds people together, increases commitment, stimulates collective action, defines collective responsibilities and works against social loafing. Cooperative ownership, for example, is an economic model that has benefits for communities because it not only provides an adequate (social) capital base but also creates a sense of ownership. And the concept of “collective ownership” as a central feature of multiculturalism in Singapore implies that self-help organizations differentiated by racial identities have the power to decide over specific state funds (Noor & Leong, 2013). Further, employee-owned organizations and various initiatives to “give back” the street or neighborhood to its inhabitants appeal to the notion of ownership responsibility and commitment. This sense of collective ownership can increase investment and engagement and can lead to (organizational) citizenship behavior such as speaking up on behalf of one’s organization or neighborhood, assisting co-workers or co-residents, volunteering for special tasks, and cooperation more generally (see Pierce & Jussila, 2011). The felt responsibility hampers one’s engagement in negative or harmful behavior directed to what is “ours” and provides an impetus to control the destructive behavior of other in-group members. An example is the neighborhood ownership model of the U.S. city of St Louis: a community-based approach that emphasizes local ownership and responsibility in trying to improve the neighborhood and reduce local crime.

Future Directions

Collective ownership is a core feature of the social organization of everyday life and the functioning of communities and societies. It structures society, regulates social interactions, and defines rights and responsibilities. Yet the societal and everyday importance of collective ownership is largely ignored or underrated in social psychology. We have discussed the nature of collective psychological ownership and indicated that it is an important aspect of group dynamics in a range of settings and contexts. Collective psychological ownership is rooted in the psychology of possessions and involves social enactment and active assertion of exclusive control over “objects,” relative to other people. It implies a “gate keeper right,” which in different ways and based on different principles is claimed, marked, and established, but which can also be challenged and threatened. The fact or possibility of losing control and being dispossessed is inseparable from ownership and leads to intergroup conflicts and reactionary and anticipatory defenses.

We have discussed various implications of the construct of collective psychological ownership, and for several of these implications, there is empirical evidence. Yet the different aspects should be examined more fully and systematically in future research and are meant as directions for further social psychological theory and research on collective ownership. For example, the possible links between the different identity motives (Vignoles, 2011) and collective ownership deserve systematic research attention. Further, the nature of ownership threat and how it differs from and relates to other forms of threat should be examined systematically. Integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) makes a distinction between symbolic and realistic threats and intergroup anxiety.[7] The latter relates to anticipated personal encounters with outgroup members and does not refer to threats to the in-group. Perceived ownership threat might prove to be an important additional group-based threat.

Furthermore, future research could examine whether in situations in which the boundaries of ownership are relatively ambiguous the likelihood of engaging in control-oriented ownership marking is stronger (1) among groups with a stronger sense of collective ownership, (2) in situations in which this sense is threatened by outgroups, and (3) among group members with higher in-group identification. Additionally, research could examine empirically whether the association between feelings of collective ownership and identity-oriented marking is stronger when group boundaries are rather diffuse or the identity content is relatively vague or disputed. Groups with a stronger sense of collective ownership, in situations of perceived threat, and higher in-group identifiers can be expected to engage more in identity-oriented marking of ownership when in-group distinctiveness is relatively low or the meaning of the identity is unclear. And because the relationship between collective ownership and group identity is not unidirectional, future research could examine the various reciprocal influences that might exist between identity-oriented marking of ownership and a sense of group identity.

There are some additional issues that might be important for future work that we were not able to discuss thus far and that provide directions for future work. We will briefly draw attention to five of these. First, there are many situations and contexts in which questions of collective ownership are salient and consequential: in institutions, (voluntary) organizations, working groups, streets, neighborhoods, and cities. This means that collective psychological ownership might be an important construct to consider in a range of settings and contexts. The specific setting and context will matter for what ownership means and how it plays out in intergroup relations, but at the same time, across contexts, similar underlying processes might be involved that are related to the psychology of possessions, feelings of ownership threat, and ownership marking. There are quite a number of studies in the context of work and organization in which personal ownership is examined in relation to organizational characteristics such as mergers and forms of employee-owned organizations, as well as job characteristics, such as job complexity and self-management. Furthermore, a sense of personal ownership is examined in relation to organizational-based-self-esteem, work motivation, and employee performance (see Pierce & Jussila, 2011). However, this research has mostly ignored the construct of collective psychological ownership (but see Furby, 1980; Gineikiene et al., 2016; Pierce & Jussila, 2011). There is also research in developmental psychology that examines the origins of personal possession and how the understanding of owing and sharing changes with age (see Rochat, 2014). Yet this research has largely ignored how children understand collective ownership (but see Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinovic, 2015) and the ways in which this structures their everyday life.

Second, collective ownership involves establishing and maintaining one’s exclusive relationship with an object relative to other people. This makes it important to examine the principles people use to infer and justify ownership claims that make these claims understandable and legitimate in the eyes of themselves and others, such as the first possession (“primo-occupancy”) principle and the labor (investment) principle (Friedman, 2008; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015). Further, ownership implies entitlements, rules, and rights that enable and constrain, which makes it important to investigate how people perceive what may be owned, who can be an owner (e.g., immigrants having limited or full ownership rights), what constitutes acceptable use of property, how property can be transferred, and what the limits are of the gatekeeper right. It might also be useful to examine systematically the social psychological differences and similarities between collective ownership and common or public ownership, including open source initiatives.

Third, it is important to note that we have discussed collective ownership from a more explicit or reflexive perspective. The reason is that we considered ownership as a social-behavioral construct: It is in relation to other people that one claims, marks, and defends the targets of ownership. Yet this can also be done intuitively and spontaneously, which means that implicit or unconscious processes are involved (Ye & Gawronski, 2016). Thus, future research examining both automatic and controlled processes might be important to shed further light on the psychological processes involved in collective psychological ownership. By studying collective ownership using both explicit and implicit measures as well as by using blatant and subtle discrimination paradigms (e.g., Rooth, 2010), we may be able to better understand the various ways in which collective psychological ownership can impact group dynamics.

Fourth, we provided a conceptual and theoretical analysis with the aim to initiate new lines of social psychological research. This means that future work should empirically examine the suggested processes underlying collective ownership as well as individual differences (e.g., in-group identification) and social conditions (e.g., perceived threat) that stimulate or hamper collective ownership perceptions and claims. Future work could systematically examine, for example, whether collective ownership depends on locus of control (G. Brown, 2009), on self-concept clarity and self-uncertainty (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005), on social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and on promotive versus preventative orientation (Avey et al., 2009). Future research could also examine the collective emotions that are involved in the sense of collective ownership and ownership threats, such as pride, indignation, and anger. For example, people tend to get quite upset and distressed when their property is damaged, violated, or used without permission (Pesowski & Friedman, 2015).

Fifth, from a theoretical perspective, it is important to examine collective psychological ownership cross-culturally. People’s ownership feelings appear to be universally present in all human societies (D. E. Brown, 1991; Ellis, 1985) and might have evolutionary roots or stem from their own body awareness. Yet there are always social and cultural factors that have a strong influence on the appreciation and acknowledgment of ownership rights and on what can be owned (Dittmar, 1992). Historically, the belief that land could be individually owned only developed in 16th-century Britain (Linklater, 2014), and the Sami people, native Americans, and Aborigines have long lived with the belief that the land was there to be used and taken care for but not to be owned. There also may be cultural differences in collective ownership related to the distinction in individualist-collectivist value orientation (Furby, 1978).

Conclusion

In the past decade, social psychological research on intergroup relations has grown tremendously, particularly in relation to ethnic and racial minorities, immigrants, and cultural diversity. Whereas the great majority of studies on the topic have focused on social categorization processes and realistic and symbolic threats, this work has not examined the importance of collective psychological ownership for group dynamics. Ownership implies a bundle of rights, including the right not to be interfered with, that provides a self-evident and strong justification for the exclusion of out-group members. This means that it is important to consider and systematically investigate the bases for claiming and marking collective ownership and the types of defenses in reaction to threats and encroachment. We have identified several important questions and processes that may be useful in further exploration. In our view, systematic attention for questions on collective psychological ownership is important and very promising. It can contribute to social psychological thinking and research and can enhance the field’s contribution to the understanding of intergroup tensions and conflicts in various contexts and settings around the world.