| Literature DB >> 27826275 |
Stephen C Pritchard1, Regine Zopf2, Vince Polito1, David M Kaplan2, Mark A Williams2.
Abstract
The concept of self-representation is commonly decomposed into three component constructs (sense of embodiment, sense of agency, and sense of presence), and each is typically investigated separately across different experimental contexts. For example, embodiment has been explored in bodily illusions; agency has been investigated in hypnosis research; and presence has been primarily studied in the context of Virtual Reality (VR) technology. Given that each component involves the integration of multiple cues within and across sensory modalities, they may rely on similar underlying mechanisms. However, the degree to which this may be true remains unclear when they are independently studied. As a first step toward addressing this issue, we manipulated a range of cues relevant to these components of self-representation within a single experimental context. Using consumer-grade Oculus Rift VR technology, and a new implementation of the Virtual Hand Illusion, we systematically manipulated visual form plausibility, visual-tactile synchrony, and visual-proprioceptive spatial offset to explore their influence on self-representation. Our results show that these cues differentially influence embodiment, agency, and presence. We provide evidence that each type of cue can independently and non-hierarchically influence self-representation yet none of these cues strictly constrains or gates the influence of the others. We discuss theoretical implications for understanding self-representation as well as practical implications for VR experiment design, including the suitability of consumer-based VR technology in research settings.Entities:
Keywords: agency; embodiment; presence; self-representation; virtual hand illusion; virtual reality
Year: 2016 PMID: 27826275 PMCID: PMC5078469 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01649
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Psychol ISSN: 1664-1078
Figure 1(A) Experimental setup, with the tactor positioned beneath the right index finger. The monitor offers a 2D depiction of the participant's view for the experimenter to observe. (B) An overhead view of the entire virtual environment (i.e., not from the participant's viewpoint). (C) Virtual hand/finger placement, also depicting the visual feedback corresponding to a touch. Dynamic illumination effects such as the light flash reflection from the hand and table are visible. (D) A close up of the virtual button in the “no touch” condition with the incongruent FORM (a sphere).
Embodiment rating scale (Based on Longo et al., .
| 1. | It seemed like I was looking directly at my own hand rather than the target | Ownership |
| 2. | It seemed like the target began to resemble my real hand | Ownership |
| 3. | It seemed like the target belonged to me | Ownership |
| 4. | It seemed like the target was my hand | Ownership |
| 5. | It seemed like the target was part of my body | Ownership |
| 6. | It seemed like my hand was in the location where the target was | Location |
| 7. | It seemed like the target was in the location where my hand was | Location |
| 8. | It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the button flash at the target | Location |
| 9. | It seemed like I was feeling the touch in the location where I saw the target being touched | Location |
| 10. | It seemed like I could have moved the target if I had wanted. | Agency |
| 11. | It seemed like I was in control of the target | Agency |
These items not included in “no-touch” conditions.
General form of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (Polito et al., .
| 1. | Doing what I was meant to was hard | Effortlessness |
| 2. | I chose how to respond | Involuntariness |
| 3. | My experiences and actions felt self-generated | Involuntariness |
| 4. | I went along with my experiences freely | Effortlessness |
| 5. | My experiences and actions were under my control | Involuntariness |
| 6. | I felt that my experiences and actions were not caused by me | Involuntariness |
| 7. | My experiences and actions occurred effortlessly | Effortlessness |
| 8. | I was mostly absorbed in what was going on | Effortlessness |
| 9. | My responses were involuntarily | Involuntariness |
| 10. | I was reluctant to go along with my experiences | Effortlessness |
These items are reverse scored.
Statistics (.
| Ownership | 2.76 | 0.103 | 0.054 | ||||||
| Location | |||||||||
| Agency | 0.26 | 0.615 | 0.005 | ||||||
| Involuntariness | 0.60 | 0.443 | 0.012 | 2.86 | 0.097 | 0.056 | |||
| Effortlessness | 2.79 | 0.066 | 0.055 | 0.65 | 0.425 | 0.013 | |||
| Presence | 2.85 | 0.098 | 0.056 | ||||||
Bold text indicates a significant result.
Figure 2. For each subscale, TOUCH conditions (Synchronous, Asynchronous, No Touch) are depicted for all FORM and OFFSET conditions: (A) No Offset—Hand; (B) Offset—Hand; (C) No Offset—Sphere; and (D) Offset—Sphere. Error bars present the standard error of the mean.
Figure 4. For each subscale, TOUCH conditions (Synchronous, Asynchronous, No Touch) are depicted for all FORM and OFFSET conditions: (A) No Offset—Hand; (B) Offset—Hand; (C) No Offset—Sphere; and (D) Offset—Sphere. Error bars present the standard error of the mean.
Statistics (.
| 1.21 | 0.311 | 0.282 | 1.92 | 0.063 | 0.384 | 0.47 | 0.920 | 0.132 | ||||
| Ownership | 1.57 | 0.214 | 0.032 | 1.78 | 0.188 | 0.036 | 0.01 | 0.994 | 0 | 1.32 | 0.273 | 0.027 |
| Location | 2.13 | 0.124 | 0.043 | 1.67 | 0.194 | 0.034 | 0.83 | 0.441 | 0.017 | |||
| Agency | 0.37 | 0.692 | 0.008 | 1.27 | 0.265 | 0.026 | 1.27 | 0.287 | 0.026 | 0.65 | 0.527 | 0.013 |
| Involuntariness | 1.07 | 0.349 | 0.022 | 0.10 | 0.757 | 0.002 | 0.64 | 0.533 | 0.013 | 0.55 | 0.581 | 0.011 |
| Effortlessness | 0.05 | 0.950 | 0.001 | 0.11 | 0.745 | 0.002 | 0.24 | 0.786 | 0.005 | 0.93 | 0.399 | 0.019 |
| Presence | 2.08 | 0.131 | 0.042 | 3.27 | 0.077 | 0.064 | 0.77 | 0.466 | 0.016 | 0.12 | 0.890 | 0.002 |
Bold text indicates a significant result.