| Literature DB >> 27141489 |
Javad Moghri1, Mohammad Arab1, Arash Rashidian1, Ali Akbari Sari1.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Physician dual practice is a common phenomenon in almost all countries throughout the world, which could potential impacts on access, equity and quality of services. This paper aims to review studies in physician dual practice and categorize them in order to their main objectives and purposes.Entities:
Keywords: Descriptive mapping; Dual practice; Moonlight; Physician; Review
Year: 2016 PMID: 27141489 PMCID: PMC4851741
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Iran J Public Health ISSN: 2251-6085 Impact factor: 1.429
Fig. 1:Paper selection flowchart
Motivation, reasons and forces behind dual practice
| Ashmore 2013 ( | South Africa |
What South African medical specialists find satisfying about working in the public and private sectors How to better incentivize retention in the public sector. | specialists and key informants |
Although there are strong financial incentives for specialists to migrate from the public to the private sector, public work can be attractive in some ways. For example, the public hospital sector generally provides more of a team environment, more academic opportunities, and greater opportunities to feel ‘needed’ and ‘relevant’. Public specialists suffer under poor resource availability, lack of trust for the Department of Health, and poor perceived career opportunities. These non financial issues of public sector dissatisfaction appeared at least as important as wage disparities. |
| Askildsen 2013 ( | Norway | Which factors may influence physicians’ choice of work between the public sector and elsewhere. | Physicians (assistants & consultants) |
For assistant physicians higher wages at public hospitals affect negatively both the decisions to earn income externally, and level of income once active. For consultant physicians there was no such response to the wage increase. Hospital specific factors like work condition also matter for physicians’ decisions to moonlight. |
| Humphrey 2004 ( | UK | To investigate the reasons for dual practice | Physicians (surgeons and dual practitioners) |
Few respondents said that money is the dominating objective, in that they would gladly give up the private practice in exchange for a pay rise in the NHS. Private practice was seen as offering an increase in strategic influence, clinical autonomy, and realization of individual aspirations as a clinician. |
| Gruen 2002 ( | Bangladesh | To analyze the system of financial and non-financial incentives underlying job preferences of dual practitioners in Bangladesh | Physicians |
Commitment to government services was found to be greater among doctors in primary health care who reported they would give up private practice if paid a higher salary. Among doctors in secondary and tertiary care, the propensity to give up private practice was found to be low. Doctors have adopted individual strategies to accommodate the advantages of both government employment and private practice in their career development, thus maximizing benefit from the incentives provided to them e.g. status of a government job, and minimizing opportunity costs of economic losses e.g. lower salaries. |
| Ferrinho 1998 ( | Portugal | To discover the motivations and reasons why doctors resort to dual practice and have not made a complete move out of public service. | Physicians |
The two outstanding reasons why they engage in their various side activities were “to meet the cost of living”, and “to support the extended family”. 40 percent of participants reported that the median equivalent of one month's public sector salary could be generated by 7 hours of private practice, but being a civil servant was important in terms of job security, and credibility as a doctor. also the social contacts and public service gave access to power centers and resources, through which other coping strategies could be developed. |
The consequences of dual practice
| Socha 2012 ( | Denmark | To compare work behavior of dual and single practitioners in the public hospitals. | Physicians |
Dual and single practitioners did not differ significantly in terms of the average length of work week, participation in non mandatory activities or duties outside normal working hours, including duties accepted with short notice and their preferences for working hours or turnover intention. |
| Socha 2011 ( | Denmark | To review and critically discuss findings on the subject of dual practice effects for the public health care. | Physicians |
Theoretical analyses indicate both positive and negative effects of dual practice. Some of the effects depend on assumptions that are undermined in the broader literature (e.g. the intention to maximize income). costs of enforcing restrictions on dual practice are rarely considered. |
| Biglaiser 2007 ( | USA | To study job incentives in moonlighting, when public-service physicians may refer patients to their private practices. | Physicians |
Allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare, but equilibrium public-care quality may increase or decrease. Unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfare as a result of adverse behavioral reactions, such as moonlighters shirking more and dedicated doctors abandoning their sincere behavior. Price regulation in the private market limits such adverse behaviors in the public system and improves consumer welfare. |
| Brekke 2006 ( | Norway | To analyze the interaction between public and private health care provision in a NHS system, where publicly employed physicians may work in the private sector. | Physicians |
Allowing physician dual practice ‘crowds out’ public provision, and results in lower overall health care provision. While the health authority can mitigate this effect by offering a higher wage, a ban on dual practice is more efficient if private sector competition is weak and public and private care are sufficiently close substitutes. On the other hand, if private sector competition is sufficiently tough, a mixed system, with physician dual practice, is always preferable to a pure NHS system. |
| Gonzalez 2004 ( | Spain | To analyze how the behavior of a physician in the public sector is affected by his activities in the private sector. | Physicians |
Physician will have incentives to over-provide medical services when he uses his public activity as a way of increasing his prestige as a private doctor. Physicians’ dual practice can be either welfare improving or reducing, depending on the treatment policy that the health authority wants to implement (If the priority is to contain costs, then the doctor’s dual activity is negative. If the priority is to minimize patients’ health losses, his dual practice affords the objective at a lower cost). |
| Bir 2003 ( | Indonesia | To show that allowing dual practice helps low-income governments retain skilled physicians to assure patient access. | Physicians |
Governments can meet the participation constraint of physicians without paying salaries commensurate to physicians’ abilities because physicians also value the “non salary benefit” of the opportunity to earn significant private practice revenues. If dual-practitioner differentially refer higher income patients to private practice, public funding becomes more effectively targeted on the poor. However, physician incentives to concentrate inducement on those most responsive to inducement-often the poor and uneducated–may act counter to such a social objective. |
Other studies
| Garcia-Prado 2011 ( | Spain | To analyze the extent of DP, the underlying factors that motivate physicians to engage in it, the main implications of their decision to do so, and discusses current policies that address DP. | Physicians |
Dual practice could be found almost in all countries (it is wide spread in many developing countries). Economic motives are not the only reason why physicians engage in DP. Other non-pecuniary factors such as job complementarities, and institutional, professional, structural and personal variables play a relevant role. While dual providers may be tempted to skimp on time and effort in their main job, to induce demand for their private services, or to misuse public resources, the legalization of dual practice may also contribute to recruit and retain physicians with less strain on the budget and improve access to health services, especially in developing countries. The article provides some qualified support for the use of “rewarding” policies to retain physicians in the public sectors of more developed countries, while “limiting” policies are recommended for developing countries - with the caveat that the policies should be accompanied by the strengthening of institutional and contracting environments |
| Jumpa 2007 ( | Peru | To examine in Peru the nature of dual practice, the factors that influence individuals’ decisions to undertake dual practice, the conditions faced when doing so and the potential role of regulatory intervention in this area. | Physicians |
Dual practice is widespread and well-accepted. The prime personal motivation was financial. However, broad macroeconomic influences on dual practice such as the oversupply of medical services, the deregulated nature of this market, and the economic crisis throughout the country were also important. There were some support among doctors for tighter regulation. Policy responses to dual practice involve tighter controls on the supply of medical practitioners, alleviation of financial pressures brought by macro-economic conditions, and closer regulation of such activities to ensure some degree of collective action over quality and the maintenance of professional reputations. |
| Eggleston 2006 ( | USA |
To provide a summary and comparison of five models of dual practice, including one we have developed based on total compensation theory and contracting limitations. To discuss whether theoretical predictions are consistent with empirical evidence from developed and developing countries. | Physicians |
All theories to date suggest that the impact of dual practice on public service quality is ambiguous. The social trade-off between the benefits and costs of dual practice hinge on the quality of a country’s contracting institutions. Allowing dual practice may improve social welfare and the quality of public services, under specific circumstances. The evidence does not support the perception that ‘full-timers’ embody greater commitment and contribution to public sector provision. |
| Ferrinho 2004 ( | Portugal | In this paper dual practice is approached from six different perspectives: conceptual (what is mean by DP?), descriptive(it's typology), quantitative (it's prevalence), it's impacts, qualitative (reasons for engaging in DP), and possible interventions. | Health workers |
Dual practice is approached in the literature with great diversity: health professionals with multiple specialization, working within different paradigms of health, combining different forms of health-related practice, combining professional health practice with an economic activity not related to health, and multiple health-related practices in the same or different sites or sectors. Typologies of DP: In terms of sector location, dual practice may be public on public, public on private or private on private. Dual practice is probably present in all countries regardless of income, even in settings – such as China – where there are major regulatory restrictions. It has positive and negative impacts. Negative impacts are predatory behavior (self gain is preferred to the interests of others), conflict of interest (lower the quality in the public sector to advertise for the private sector), brain drain (to other countries, private sector, or urban areas), Competition for time and limits to access, Outflow of resources and corruption (illegal use of public resources for private patients); Positive impacts: it's ability to generate additional income for health workers, and higher professional satisfaction. The reasons for dual practice are contextual. The extent of dual practice seems to vary according to urban or rural residence, according to professional group, according to specialty or occupation. This evidence suggests that dual practice depends not so much on the personal, social (marital status) and professional characteristics of health workers, but on factors that are manageable. Sometimes dual practice may be the unexpected result of health care reform. Adequate responses imply the identification of the main underlying reason for the observed dual practice. There is no single recipe to address the reality of dual practice. |
| Berman 2004 ( | USA | To examine the systemic and individual causes of multiple job holding among physicians and other health care professionals and evidence on its prevalence | Health care professionals |
MJH is very widespread. Governments have a wide range of responses to it based mostly on assumption, anecdote, and etc. Governments’ efforts to modify or regulate MJH are often not enforced or implemented effectively. Increasing income is likely to be the main reason for engaging in DP, but job complementarity, institutional and professional factors (the desire to interact among professionals in the practice site, to secure approval from peers, and to influence fellow professionals and ...) are probably also important. Efforts to address MJH should consider what could be done about both the systemic causes of MJH and its program and worker specific manifestations. All MJH is not of equal importance for health outcomes and making services work for the poor. Governments should set priorities carefully, understand causes and effects, and engage in collaborative process with health workers to find solutions which are both acceptable to them and improve system outcomes. Governments should Increase the benefits and reduce the costs (negative effects) in relation to government objectives through the best possible design of incentives and regulations to affect the behavior of health care workers given their demand for MJH (Banning MJH is not really a feasible and effective strategy in most countries, because they lack the capacity to enforce it, and these regulation are often not seen as legitimate by the health workers, their supervisors, and general population; Also Removing the conditions creating the demand for MJH among health workers is rarely viable, because it needs sufficient resources and contractual and monitoring capacities which are not present in many countries). |
| Bian 2003 ( | China | To describe policies and regulations of DP, the current situation, and its impact on access to services and physician behavior in china | Physicians |
Dual practice was very low among physicians, less than twice a month. On average physicians have earned approximately 30% of their total monthly income from DP. The main reason cited for DP was to strengthen cooperation with other hospitals. Most doctors (85.6%) think DP is acceptable and that it should be legal. About 70% of respondents think that DP activities will result in negative influences in their hospital. The level of awareness of the relevant regulation on DP amongst doctors was low, at 24.4%. Over 70% of doctors complained that their income was lower than that in other comparable occupations, while 55% of patients think doctors’ income is quite high compared with other jobs in current Chinese society). Different specialties have different opportunities to undertake DP: surgeons have more scope for DP than physicians. |
Policies and regulations about dual practice and their impacts
| Akbari Sari 2013 ( | Iran | To explore the perception of the chancellors at Iran universities of medical sciences, regarding the challenges and possible negative consequence of physician dual practice law in the country. | Medical university chancellors |
The need for increasing the share of healthcare budget from the gross domestic product (GDP), inefficient tariff and payment system, and difficulty in obtaining collaboration with other stakeholders are the main challenges of full-time practice program in Iran. Inappropriate implementation of this program might lead to unexpected transfer of the experienced and high skilled physicians from public hospitals. |
| Gonzalez 2013 ( | Spain |
To analyze and compare some of the most common regulations in dual practice. To investigate whether regulations that are optimal for developed countries are adequate for developing countries as well. | Physicians |
Forbidding dual practice is seldom optimal, as it usually expels valuable professionals from the public system. Limiting income is always less effective than limiting involvement. Results offer theoretical support for the desirability of different regulations in different economic environments. In developed countries the key factor is the potential negative effect of dual practice on public performance: when this effect is low the best option is not to intervene; when it is sufficiently high the best option is to impose a limit on physician involvement. For developing countries, the design of the optimal policy is more complex as it also depends on the attractiveness of the private sector. When this attractiveness is very high the best option is not to intervene and thereby avoid an exodus of highly skilled physicians from the public sector. When it takes an intermediate value, then limits on the involvement are desirable. Finally, if the potential gains from private practice are low, the optimal intervention is either to limit dual practice (if the associated costs are low) or to ban it (if such costs are high). |
| Kiwanuka 2011 ( | Uganda | To assess the effects of regulations implemented to manage dual practice. | Health workers |
There is not any scientifically rigorous study in this field (RCTs, nRCTs, CBA or ITS designs). |
| Jiwei 2010 ( | China | To analyze whether dual practice should be allowed in the context of the policy objective that patients should receive their care in the treatment setting that is most efficient. | Physicians |
Allowing dual practice can improve welfare even when physicians have homogeneous quality/morality. When information is asymmetric among physicians, patients and the planner, dual practice can be conceived as a tool to improve welfare in two ways: first, resource allocation within the hospital is more efficient; second, allowing dual practice can save salary expenditure for the public hospital. People with high opportunity cost (high income) in switching providers will be more likely to go to the hospital while people with low opportunity cost in switching providers (low income) will visit the GP first. Hence, after allowing dual practice, rich patients with mild cases are more likely to be induced to private clinics from the hospital. Low income patients, or patients with serious conditions, are more likely to be treated in the hospital. Therefore, physician dual practice can also be interpreted as an alternative instrument for sorting in terms of both illness severity and switching costs. Under some conditions, allowing dual practice can lead to a second-best improvement in efficiency, compared with a situation in which dual practice is not allowed. |
| Garcia-prado 2007 ( | Spain | To study and analyze different governmental responses to physician dual practice. | Physicians |
There are wide variations in how governments tackle this issue. Banning dual practice, enforcing restrictions on private practice earnings of physicians, offering exclusive contracts in the public sector, encouraging public doctors to develop their private practice in public facilities, raising public sector salaries, and self-regulation are six mechanisms which have been used by different countries. |
| Chue 2007 ( | Canada | To examine the incentives of dual practitioners in Canada’s health care system in three scenarios of dual practice (banning DP, allowing DP without any restrictions, allowing DP with some restrictions). | Physicians |
Banning of dual practice worsen the social welfare of the public health sector. It causes dual practitioners to either move out of the province or stay and just shirk in effort. These physicians, who want to dual practice but now is unable to, lowers the aggregate welfare of patients in the public sector by constantly maintaining low quality service rather than trying to improve the service. Allowing dual practice without restrictions is unlikely to result in an improvement in the social welfare of patients. The social welfare of people in Canada’s mixed health care system will be better off where restrictions on dual practice are present (Both exclusive contracts and price ceiling allow physicians to still use the over-providing strategy if they choose to dual practice, while also keeping ‘public’ physicians in the public sector). |
| Jan 2005 ( | UK | To examine the policy options for the regulation of dual job holding by medical professionals in relation to the objectives of quality of care and access to services in highly resource constrained settings. | Medical professionals |
Dual practice can be a possible system solution to issues such as limited public sector resources, low regulatory capacity, and the interplay between market forces and human resources. This paper offers some supports for policies that allow for the official recognition of such activity and embrace a degree of professional self regulation in highly resource constrained settings (because evidence shows that DP is typically poorly regulated in these countries. Regulations are either lacking, or when they exist, are vague or poorly implemented because of low regulatory capacity). |