| Literature DB >> 28451549 |
Javad Moghri1, Arash Rashidian2, Mohammad Arab2, Ali Akbari Sari2.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Mixed health care systems to work simultaneously on both public and private facilities, is common today. This phenomenon referred to as dual practice (DP), has potential implications for access, quality, cost and equity of health services. This paper aimed to review systematically studies that assess the implications of DP among health workers.Entities:
Keywords: Consequences; Dual practice; Health workers; Implications
Year: 2017 PMID: 28451549 PMCID: PMC5402772
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Iran J Public Health ISSN: 2251-6085 Impact factor: 1.429
Fig. 1:Paper selection flowchart
List of the relevant studies
| Barros & Oliviera. (2005) ( | Modelling | HICs | 1. “Physicians do not necessarily end up treating the mildest cases from the waiting list” (because only more severe patients in the waiting list are willing to use private services and pay for it). |
| Biglaiser & Ma (2007) ( | HICs | 1. “Allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare, but equilibrium public-care quality may increase or decrease”. | |
| 2. “Unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfare as a result of adverse behavioral reactions, as moonlighters shirking more and dedicated doctors abandoning their sincere behavior”. | |||
| Bir & Eggleston (2003) ( | LMICs | 1. “Governments can meet the participation constraint of physicians without paying salaries to commensurate to physicians’ abilities because physicians also value the “non-salary benefit” of the opportunity to earn significant private practice revenues”. | |
| 2. “If dual-practitioner differentially refers higher income patients to private practice, public funding becomes more effectively targeted on the poor. However, physician incentives to concentrate inducement on those most responsive to inducement -often the poor and uneducated–may act counter to such a social objective”. | |||
| Brekke & SØrgad (2006) ( | HICs | 1. “Allowing physician DP ‘crowds out’ public provision and results in lower overall healthcare provision”. | |
| Gonzalez (2004)( | Both HICs and LMICs | 1. “Physician will have incentives to over-provide medical services when he uses his public activity as a way of increasing his prestige as a private doctor”. | |
| 2. “Physicians’ DP can be either welfare improving or reducing, depending on the treatment policy that the health authority wants to implement (If the priority is to contain costs, then the doctor’s dual activity is negative. If the priority is to minimize patients’ health losses, his DP affords the objective at a lower cost)”. | |||
| Gonzalez (2005) ( | Both HICs and LMICs | 1. “When physicians are dual providers, the problem of cream skimming arises”. | |
| Iversen (1997) ( | HICs | 1. “Without rationing of waiting-list admissions, a private sector is shown to result in a longer waiting time if the demand for a public treatment is sufficiently elastic with respect to the waiting time. When waiting list admissions are rationed, the waiting time is shown to increase if the public sector consultants are permitted to work in the private sector in their spare time”. | |
| Jiwei (2010) ( | LMICs | 1. “Allowing DP can improve welfare through escalating efficiency in two ways: first, resource allocation within the hospital is more efficient; second, allowing DP can save salary expenditure for the public hospital”. | |
| 2. “After allowing dual practice, rich patients with mild cases are more likely to be induced to private clinics from the hospital. Low-income patients, or patients with serious conditions, are more likely to be treated in the hospital. Therefore, physician DP can also be interpreted as an alternative instrument for sorting in terms of both illness severity and switching costs”. | |||
| Morga & Xavier (2001) ( | HICs | 1. “The presence of ‘selfish’ behavior among dual practitioners was found to lead to: a) a decrease in the optimal number of patients treated as NHS elective surgery cases; b) An increase the waiting time NHS elective care patient’s face; c) an increase in health care costs”. | |
| Hanvoravongchai et al. (2000) ( | Survey | LMICs | 1. “Private practice could lead to deterioration of public confidence in obstetric services in public hospitals, and consequently it encourages a move to private practice”. |
| 2. “Private practice, whereby physicians feel obliged to provide personal delivery services when triggered by leisure and time conflict, leads to higher and possibly unnecessary cesarean procedures”. | |||
| Socha & Bech (2011) ( | HICs | 1. “Results do not reveal any patterned relationship between DP and public hospital work hours, participation in voluntary tasks or activities that might conflict with the private-practice hours, or preferences for part-time employment”. | |
| 2. “Results also do not support the general presumption that the physicians who work exclusively in public hospitals are more altruistic and hence, voluntarily provide more work inputs than dual-practitioners”. | |||
| Bloor et al. (2004) ( | Secondary data analysis | HICs | 1. “Consultant surgeons with a ‘maximum part-time’ contract had significantly higher activity rates than those with a full-time contract”. |
| Johannessen & Hagen (2014) ( | HICs | 1. “The total working hours in public hospitals were similar for both those who did and did not engage in DP (in different tasks such as the planned working hours, on call duties, and overtime work); however, DP reduced public working hours in some specialties with significantly higher private incomes”. | |
| Eggleston & Bir (2006) ( | Review | Both HICs and LMICs | 1. “All theories to date suggest that the impact of DP on public service quality is ambiguous”. |
| 2. “The social trade-off between the benefits and costs of DP hinge on the quality of a country’s contracting institutions”. | |||
| 3. “Allowing DP may improve social welfare and the quality of public services, under specific circumstances”. | |||
| 4. “The evidence does not support the perception that ‘full-timers’ embody greater commitment and contribution to public sector provision”. | |||
| Ferrinho et al. (2004) ( | LMICs | 1. “Negative impacts are predatory behavior (self-gain is preferred to the interests of others), conflict of interest (lower the quality in the public sector to advertise for the private sector), brain drain (to other countries, private sector, or urban areas), Competition for time and limits to access, Outflow of resources and corruption (illegal use of public resources for private patients)”; | |
| 2. “Positive impacts are the ability to generate additional income for health workers, and higher professional satisfaction”. | |||
| Hippgrave et al. (2014) ( | LMICs | 1. “Lack of information from studies at the country level, tendency of reviews to rely on secondary data, and rapidly changing environment made it very difficult to write with confidence about the impacts of DP among nations in South and East Asia”. | |
| 2. “Positive and negative impacts of DP have been mentioned in different studies in the region. Positive effects were improving access through parallel supply chains and expand services in terms of hours of availability and provision of health care in rural areas, improving the satisfaction of health workers (increasing income, prestige, etc), improving equity of access and system efficiency through sorting of patients, and etc. Negative aspects were decreasing access and equity through absenteeism in the public sector and the tendency of workers to migrate to urban areas (more DP opportunities compared with rural areas), prioritizing better off patients and neglecting the other group, cream skimming, and etc”. | |||
| 3. “ In market economies with limited public sector capacity, well-regulated DP probably improves health service access and possibly its efficiency”. | |||
| Jan et al. (2005) ( | LMICs | 1. “DP can be a possible system solution to issues such as limited public sector resources, low regulatory capacity, and the interplay between market forces and human resources”. | |
| Prado & Gonzalez (2011) ( | Both HICs and LMICs | 1. “While dual providers may be tempted to skimp on time and effort in their main job, to induce demand for their private services, or to misuse public resources, the legalization of DP may also contribute to recruit and retain physicians with less strain on the budget and improve access to health services, especially in developing countries”. | |
| 2. “The implications of DP that are important to one country are not necessarily important to others”. | |||
| Socha & Bech (2011) ( | Both HICs and LMICs | 1. “Theoretical analyses indicate both positive and negative effects of dual practice”. | |
| 2. “Some of the effects depend on assumptions that are undermined in the broader literature (e.g. the intention to maximize income)”. |
HICs: High-income countries. LMICs: Low-and-Middle-income countries.
Fig. 2:Dual practice possible implications on patients, health workers, public sector, private sector, and overall health sector (The meaning of background color of rounded rectangles: white (Possible positive impacts) and gray (Possible negative impacts))