| Literature DB >> 26823178 |
Tiziana Leone1, Valeria Cetorelli1, Sarah Neal2, Zoë Matthews2.
Abstract
OBJECTIVES: Evidence on whether removing fees benefits the poorest is patchy and weak. The aim of this paper is to measure the impact of user fee reforms on the probability of giving birth in an institution or undergoing a caesarean section (CS) in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Cameroon and Nigeria for the poorest strata of the population.Entities:
Keywords: Africa; Equity; Universal health care; c-section; maternal health; user fees
Mesh:
Year: 2016 PMID: 26823178 PMCID: PMC4735164 DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2015-009692
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMJ Open ISSN: 2044-6055 Impact factor: 2.692
Figure 1Country selection process. SSA, sub-Saharan African.
Figure 2Trends in the proportion of births in facilities 1990–2011 during period of user fee reform in all countries (exemption on user fee reforms: Ghana—2005 and Burkina Faso—2006).
Figure 3Trends in the proportion of births by caesarean section 1990–2013 during period of user fee reform in all countries (exemption on user fee reforms: Ghana—2005 and Burkina Faso—2006).
Determinants of level of facility births, caesarean sections using difference in difference modelling in five sub-Saharan African countries to test user fees policy removal (adjusted for other fixed effects)
| Birth in facilities | p Value | Caesarean section | p Value | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No fees | 0.248 (0.006) | 0.000 | 0.007 (0.002) | 0.001 |
| Country | ||||
| Burkina Faso | Ref | |||
| Cameroon | 0.0117 (0.005) | 0.025 | 0.010 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| Ghana | −0.164 (0.006) | 0.000 | 0.021 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| Nigeria | −0.202 (0.005) | 0.000 | 0.009 (0.002) | 0.576 |
| Zambia | −0.148 (0.005) | 0.000 | 0.007 (0.002) | 0.002 |
| Period (ref second half 2000s) | ||||
| First half of 1990s | −0.044 (0.005) | 0.000 | −0.0047 (0.001) | 0.011 |
| Second half of 1990s | −0.0326 (0.004) | 0.000 | −0.010 (0.001) | 0.000 |
| First half of 2000s | −0.0178 (0.0042) | 0.000 | −0.002 (0.002) | 0.013 |
| Education (ref none) | ||||
| Primary | 0.204 (0.004) | 0.000 | 0.006 (0.001) | 0.000 |
| Secondary+ | 0.327 (0.004) | 0.000 | 0.023 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| Age (15–19 ref) | ||||
| 20–24 | 0.0205 (0.006) | 0.000 | 0.006 (0.002) | 0.013 |
| 25–29 | 0.0678 (0.006) | 0.000 | 0.019 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| 30–34 | 0.091 (0.007) | 0.000 | 0.031 (0.003) | 0.000 |
| 35–39 | 0.106 (0.007) | 0.000 | 0.041 (0.003) | 0.000 |
| 40–44 | 0.117 (0.008) | 0.000 | 0.044 (0.003) | 0.000 |
| 45–49 | 0.107 (0.010) | 0.000 | 0.043 (0.004) | 0.000 |
| Residence (rural ref) | ||||
| Urban | 0.159 (0.004) | 0.000 | 0.011 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| Children ever born (1 ref) | ||||
| 2 | 0.0715 (0.004) | 0.000 | −0.016 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| 3+ | −0.125 (0.005) | 0.000 | −0.032 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| Wealth quintile (poorest ref) | ||||
| Poor | 0.043 (0.004) | 0.000 | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.443 |
| Average | 0.1255 (0.004) | 0.000 | 0.005 (0.001) | 0.000 |
| Rich | 0.239 (0.005) | 0.000 | 0.010 (0.002) | 0.000 |
| Richest | 0.322 (0.006) | 0.000 | 0.031 (0.003) | 0.000 |
| 0.289 (0.007) | 0.000 | 0.008 (0.002) | 0.002 | |
Effect of user fees removal in Ghana and Burkina Faso on the probability of institutional delivery by women's education, household wealth and residence
| Facility births | Caesarean section | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coefficient | p Value | Coefficient | p Value | |
| Education | ||||
| No education | 0.310 | 0.000 | 0.011 | 0.000 |
| Primary | 0.160 | 0.000 | 0.012 | 0.017 |
| Secondary or higher | 0.060 | 0.000 | 0.005 | 0.568 |
| Wealth | ||||
| Poorest | 0.240 | 0.000 | 0.007 | 0.025 |
| Below average | 0.340 | 0.000 | 0.010 | 0.004 |
| Average | 0.330 | 0.000 | 0.011 | 0.013 |
| Above average | 0.250 | 0.000 | 0.015 | 0.014 |
| Richest | 0.010 | 0.551 | −0.013 | 0.143 |
| Residence | ||||
| Rural | 0.315 | 0.000 | 0.049 | 0.007 |
| Urban | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.011 | 0.000 |
Difference-in-difference coefficients from linear regression models controlling for women's age, children ever born, education, urban status, country fixed-effects and period fixed-effects.