Literature DB >> 26769984

THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.

Liran Einav1, Amy Finkelstein1, Paul Schrimpf1.   

Abstract

We study the demand response to non-linear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in individuals' budget set created by the famous "donut hole," where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin, to provide descriptive evidence of the drug purchase response to a price increase. We then specify and estimate a simple dynamic model of drug use that allows us to quantify the spending response along the entire non-linear budget set. We use the model for counterfactual analysis of the increase in spending from "filling" the donut hole, as will be required by 2020 under the Affordable Care Act. In our baseline model, which considers spending decisions within a single year, we estimate that "filling" the donut hole will increase annual drug spending by about $150, or about 8 percent. About one-quarter of this spending increase reflects "anticipatory" behavior, coming from beneficiaries whose spending prior to the policy change would leave them short of reaching the donut hole. We also present descriptive evidence of cross-year substitution of spending by individuals who reach the kink, which motivates a simple extension to our baseline model that allows - in a highly stylized way - for individuals to engage in such cross year substitution. Our estimates from this extension suggest that a large share of the $150 drug spending increase could be attributed to cross-year substitution, and the net increase could be as little as $45 per year.

Entities:  

Year:  2015        PMID: 26769984      PMCID: PMC4710380          DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjv005

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Q J Econ        ISSN: 0033-5533


  18 in total

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6.  Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program.

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7.  Comparison friction: experimental evidence from medicare drug plans.

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Authors:  Geoffrey F Joyce; Julie Zissimopoulos; Dana P Goldman
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10.  The effect of the Medicare Part D prescription benefit on drug utilization and expenditures.

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  13 in total

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6.  Subsidy Design in Privately Provided Social Insurance: Lessons from Medicare Part D.

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7.  The Liquidity Sensitivity of Healthcare Consumption: Evidence from Social Security Payments.

Authors:  Tal Gross; Timothy J Layton; Daniel Prinz
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8.  MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?

Authors:  Aviva Aron-Dine; Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein; Mark Cullen
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9.  The moral hazard effects of consumer responses to targeted cost-sharing.

Authors:  Christopher M Whaley; Chaoran Guo; Timothy T Brown
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  2017-10-12       Impact factor: 3.883

10.  Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores.

Authors:  Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein; Raymond Kluender; Paul Schrimpf
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