Literature DB >> 26644569

Computational complexity of ecological and evolutionary spatial dynamics.

Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen1, Krishnendu Chatterjee2, Martin A Nowak3.   

Abstract

There are deep, yet largely unexplored, connections between computer science and biology. Both disciplines examine how information proliferates in time and space. Central results in computer science describe the complexity of algorithms that solve certain classes of problems. An algorithm is deemed efficient if it can solve a problem in polynomial time, which means the running time of the algorithm is a polynomial function of the length of the input. There are classes of harder problems for which the fastest possible algorithm requires exponential time. Another criterion is the space requirement of the algorithm. There is a crucial distinction between algorithms that can find a solution, verify a solution, or list several distinct solutions in given time and space. The complexity hierarchy that is generated in this way is the foundation of theoretical computer science. Precise complexity results can be notoriously difficult. The famous question whether polynomial time equals nondeterministic polynomial time (i.e., P = NP) is one of the hardest open problems in computer science and all of mathematics. Here, we consider simple processes of ecological and evolutionary spatial dynamics. The basic question is: What is the probability that a new invader (or a new mutant) will take over a resident population? We derive precise complexity results for a variety of scenarios. We therefore show that some fundamental questions in this area cannot be answered by simple equations (assuming that P is not equal to NP).

Keywords:  complexity classes; evolutionary games; fixation probability

Mesh:

Year:  2015        PMID: 26644569      PMCID: PMC4697423          DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1511366112

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A        ISSN: 0027-8424            Impact factor:   11.205


  34 in total

1.  Spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with three strategies and external constraints

Authors: 
Journal:  Phys Rev E Stat Phys Plasmas Fluids Relat Interdiscip Topics       Date:  2000-07

2.  A dynamic model of social network formation.

Authors:  B Skyrms; R Pemantle
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2000-08-01       Impact factor: 11.205

3.  Local dispersal promotes biodiversity in a real-life game of rock-paper-scissors.

Authors:  Benjamin Kerr; Margaret A Riley; Marcus W Feldman; Brendan J M Bohannan
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2002-07-11       Impact factor: 49.962

4.  Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games.

Authors:  György Szabó; Christoph Hauert
Journal:  Phys Rev Lett       Date:  2002-08-23       Impact factor: 9.161

5.  Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations.

Authors:  Martin A Nowak; Akira Sasaki; Christine Taylor; Drew Fudenberg
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2004-04-08       Impact factor: 49.962

6.  Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game.

Authors:  Christoph Hauert; Michael Doebeli
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2004-04-08       Impact factor: 49.962

7.  Evolutionary dynamics on graphs.

Authors:  Erez Lieberman; Christoph Hauert; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2005-01-20       Impact factor: 49.962

8.  A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks.

Authors:  Hisashi Ohtsuki; Christoph Hauert; Erez Lieberman; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2006-05-25       Impact factor: 49.962

9.  The "Sewell Wright Effect".

Authors:  R A FISHER
Journal:  Heredity (Edinb)       Date:  1950-04       Impact factor: 3.821

10.  The linear process of somatic evolution.

Authors:  Martin A Nowak; Franziska Michor; Yoh Iwasa
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2003-12-01       Impact factor: 11.205

View more
  15 in total

1.  Evolution of cooperation on large networks with community structure.

Authors:  Babak Fotouhi; Naghmeh Momeni; Benjamin Allen; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  J R Soc Interface       Date:  2019-03-29       Impact factor: 4.118

2.  Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure.

Authors:  Benjamin Allen; Gabor Lippner; Yu-Ting Chen; Babak Fotouhi; Naghmeh Momeni; Shing-Tung Yau; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Nature       Date:  2017-03-29       Impact factor: 49.962

3.  The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory.

Authors:  Christine Sample; Benjamin Allen
Journal:  J Math Biol       Date:  2017-03-28       Impact factor: 2.259

4.  A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure.

Authors:  Benjamin Allen; Alex McAvoy
Journal:  J Math Biol       Date:  2018-11-14       Impact factor: 2.259

5.  Learning enables adaptation in cooperation for multi-player stochastic games.

Authors:  Feng Huang; Ming Cao; Long Wang
Journal:  J R Soc Interface       Date:  2020-11-18       Impact factor: 4.118

6.  Quantifying the web browser ecosystem.

Authors:  Sela Ferdman; Einat Minkov; Ron Bekkerman; David Gefen
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2017-06-23       Impact factor: 3.240

7.  Spatial social dilemmas promote diversity.

Authors:  Christoph Hauert; Michael Doebeli
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2021-10-19       Impact factor: 11.205

8.  Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory.

Authors:  Alex McAvoy; John Wakeley
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2022-07-05       Impact factor: 12.779

9.  Evolution of prosocial behaviours in multilayer populations.

Authors:  Qi Su; Alex McAvoy; Yoichiro Mori; Joshua B Plotkin
Journal:  Nat Hum Behav       Date:  2022-01-03

10.  Fast and strong amplifiers of natural selection.

Authors:  Josef Tkadlec; Andreas Pavlogiannis; Krishnendu Chatterjee; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  Nat Commun       Date:  2021-06-29       Impact factor: 14.919

View more

北京卡尤迪生物科技股份有限公司 © 2022-2023.