| Literature DB >> 25755639 |
Matteo M Galizzi1, Jeroen Nieboer1.
Abstract
We look at the links between the Digit Ratio-the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length of the ring finger-for both right and left hands, and giving in a Dictator Game. Unlike previous studies with exclusively Caucasian subjects, we consider a large, ethnically diverse sample. Our main results are as follows. First, for Caucasian subjects we estimate a significant positive regression coefficient for the right hand digit ratio and a significant negative coefficient for its squared measure. These results replicate the findings of Brañas-Garza et al. (2013), who also observe an inverted U-shaped relationship for Caucasian subjects. Second, we are not able to find any significant association of the right hand digit ratio with giving in the Dictator Game for the other main ethnic groups in our sample, nor in the pooled sample. Third, we find no significant association between giving in the Dictator Game and the left hand digit ratio.Entities:
Keywords: C91; C92; D44; D81; D87; altruism; dictator game; digit ratio; social preferences; testosterone
Year: 2015 PMID: 25755639 PMCID: PMC4337370 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00041
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Behav Neurosci ISSN: 1662-5153 Impact factor: 3.558
Summary of studies on digit ratio and pro-social behavior in experimental games with real monetary incentives.
| Brañas-Garza et al., | DG | Scanned | Both | University of Granada students; Caucasian | 95, 76 | Yes, non-linear |
| Buser, | DG, UG, TG, PGG | Self-reported | Both | University of Amsterdam students; Caucasian | 69, 152 | Yes, positive |
| Millet and Dewitte, | Modified PGG | Scanned | Right | University of Leuven undergraduate students; Not reported | 27, 43 | Yes, non-linear |
| Ronay and Galinsky, | UG | Scanned | Right | Psychology students; Not reported | 28, 20 | Yes, positive |
Game defines the type of experimental game: DG, refers to the Dictator Game; UG, to the Ultimatum Game; UG P.1, to the Ultimatum Game Player 1; UG P.2, to the Ultimatum Game Player 2; TG, to the Trust Game; PGG, to the Public Good Game. N.
This study used a binary proxy for the DR and therefore the exact shape of the positive relationship is not known.
This study reports a correlation only and therefore the exact shape of the positive relationship is not known.
Summary statistics for Left-Hand and Right-Hand Digit Ratios.
Significant differences between sub-samples (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests) are shown as brackets. Stars indicate significance levels: .
Figure 1Histogram of individual giving in the Dictator Game.
Summary statistics for individual giving in the Dictator Game.
Significant differences between sub-samples (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test) are shown as brackets. Stars indicate significance levels: .
DG Giving and RHDR (OLS).
| RHDR | −1.172 | −1.069 | −2.193 | −5.175 | 103.2 | 631.2 | −178.8 | 104.2 |
| (2.679) | (4.424) | (4.631) | (6.681) | (115.5) | (201.2) | (178.7) | (223.3) | |
| RHDR squared | −53.60 | −325.9 | 90.81 | −55.78 | ||||
| (59.40) | (103.6) | (91.92) | (114.8) | |||||
| Female | 0.297 | 0.495 | 0.229 | 0.493 | 0.300 | 0.487 | 0.217 | 0.497 |
| (0.188) | (0.349) | (0.297) | (0.496) | (0.188) | (0.345) | (0.297) | (0.493) | |
| Constant | 3.768 | 3.418 | 4.559 | 8.104 | −46.94 | −302.8 | 90.33 | −45.49 |
| (2.588) | (4.255) | (4.471) | (6.489) | (56.08) | (97.62) | (86.84) | (108.5) | |
| Observations | 602 | 201 | 221 | 81 | 602 | 201 | 221 | 81 |
| R-squared | 0.004 | 0.010 | 0.003 | 0.017 | 0.005 | 0.050 | 0.007 | 0.021 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels:
p < 0.01.
DG Giving and LHDR (OLS).
| LHDR | −2.646 | −1.096 | −6.830 | 1.750 | −35.33 | 237.2 | −21.36 | −16.11 |
| (2.666) | (4.549) | (4.718) | (5.322) | (104.4) | (199.9) | (164.8) | (161.4) | |
| LHDR squared | 16.81 | −122.4 | 7.457 | 9.193 | ||||
| (53.73) | (102.9) | (84.20) | (83.25) | |||||
| Female | 0.303 | 0.484 | 0.253 | 0.414 | 0.305 | 0.489 | 0.254 | 0.414 |
| (0.187) | (0.343) | (0.292) | (0.499) | (0.187) | (0.344) | (0.293) | (0.503) | |
| Constant | 5.192 | 3.451 | 9.027 | 1.392 | 21.06 | −112.4 | 16.09 | 10.06 |
| (2.577) | (4.397) | (4.559) | (5.194) | (50.70) | (96.91) | (80.61) | (78.17) | |
| Observations | 602 | 201 | 221 | 81 | 602 | 201 | 221 | 81 |
| R−squared | 0.005 | 0.010 | 0.012 | 0.010 | 0.005 | 0.016 | 0.012 | 0.010 |
Standard errors in parentheses.