| Literature DB >> 24709038 |
Hitoshi Shigeoka1, Kiyohide Fushimi2.
Abstract
We estimate the degree of supplier-induced demand for newborn treatment by exploiting changes in reimbursement arising from the introduction of the partial prospective payment system (PPS) in Japan. Under the partial PPS, neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) utilization became relatively more profitable than other procedures, since it was excluded from prospective payments. We find that hospitals have responded to PPS adoption by increasing NICU utilization and by more frequently manipulating infants' reported birth weights which in large part determine their maximum allowable stay in the NICU. This induced demand substantially increases the reimbursements received by hospitals.Entities:
Keywords: Birth weight manipulation; Hospital gaming; Neonatal intensive care unit; Prospective payment system; Supplier-induced demand
Mesh:
Year: 2014 PMID: 24709038 DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.003
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Health Econ ISSN: 0167-6296 Impact factor: 3.883