Literature DB >> 24211522

Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection.

Oliver P Hauser1, Arne Traulsen2, Martin A Nowak3.   

Abstract

We introduce the concept of heterogeneity in background fitness to evolutionary dynamics in finite populations. Background fitness is specific to an individual but not linked to its strategy. It can be thought of as a property that is related to the physical or societal position of an individual, but is not dependent on the strategy that is adopted in the evolutionary process under consideration. In our model, an individual's total fitness is the sum of its background fitness and the fitness derived from using a specific strategy. This approach has important implications for the imitation of behavioural strategies: if we imitate others for their success, but can only adopt their behaviour and not their social and economic ties, we may imitate in vain. We study the effect of heterogeneity in background fitness on the fixation of a mutant strategy with constant fitness. We find that heterogeneity suppresses selection, but also decreases the time until a novel strategy either takes over the population or is lost again. We derive analytical solutions of the fixation probability in small populations. In the case of large total background fitness in a population with maximum inequality, we find a particularly simple approximation of the fixation probability. Numerical simulations suggest that this simple approximation also holds for larger population sizes.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:  Background fitness; Evolutionary dynamics; Heterogeneity; Inequality; Intensity of selection; Wealth

Mesh:

Year:  2013        PMID: 24211522     DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.10.013

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Theor Biol        ISSN: 0022-5193            Impact factor:   2.691


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