Literature DB >> 22936541

Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games.

K Argasinski1, M Broom.   

Abstract

In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of "costs" and "benefits", there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure "benefit" or "cost"? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic "cost" versus "benefits", is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk-Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced.

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Year:  2012        PMID: 22936541      PMCID: PMC3766521          DOI: 10.1007/s00285-012-0573-2

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Math Biol        ISSN: 0303-6812            Impact factor:   2.259


  9 in total

1.  What pair formation can do to the battle of the sexes: towards more realistic game dynamics.

Authors:  S D Mylius
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  1999-04-21       Impact factor: 2.691

2.  Stability in N-species coevolutionary systems.

Authors:  Ross Cressman; József Garay
Journal:  Theor Popul Biol       Date:  2003-12       Impact factor: 1.570

3.  Ideal free distributions, evolutionary games, and population dynamics in multiple-species environments.

Authors:  Ross Cressman; Vlastimil Krivan; József Garay
Journal:  Am Nat       Date:  2004-09-01       Impact factor: 3.926

4.  Dynamic multipopulation and density dependent evolutionary games related to replicator dynamics. A metasimplex concept.

Authors:  Krzysztof Argasinski
Journal:  Math Biosci       Date:  2006-04-25       Impact factor: 2.144

5.  Migration dynamics for the ideal free distribution.

Authors:  Ross Cressman; Vlastimil Krivan
Journal:  Am Nat       Date:  2006-08-07       Impact factor: 3.926

6.  Surprising evolutionary predictions from enhanced ecological realism.

Authors:  Ulf Dieckmann; Johan A J Metz
Journal:  Theor Popul Biol       Date:  2006-02-15       Impact factor: 1.570

7.  How can we model selectively neutral density dependence in evolutionary games.

Authors:  Krzysztof Argasinski; Jan Kozłowski
Journal:  Theor Popul Biol       Date:  2007-11-29       Impact factor: 1.570

8.  Eco-evolutionary feedbacks in community and ecosystem ecology: interactions between the ecological theatre and the evolutionary play.

Authors:  David M Post; Eric P Palkovacs
Journal:  Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci       Date:  2009-06-12       Impact factor: 6.237

9.  How should we define 'fitness' for general ecological scenarios?

Authors:  J A Metz; R M Nisbet; S A Geritz
Journal:  Trends Ecol Evol       Date:  1992-06       Impact factor: 17.712

  9 in total
  6 in total

1.  A stochastic differential game approach toward animal migration.

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Journal:  Theory Biosci       Date:  2019-04-11       Impact factor: 1.919

2.  The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game.

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Journal:  J Math Biol       Date:  2021-02-06       Impact factor: 2.259

3.  Evolutionary bet-hedging in structured populations.

Authors:  Christopher E Overton; Kieran J Sharkey
Journal:  J Math Biol       Date:  2021-04-01       Impact factor: 2.259

4.  Towards a replicator dynamics model of age structured populations.

Authors:  K Argasinski; M Broom
Journal:  J Math Biol       Date:  2021-04-02       Impact factor: 2.259

5.  Weak Selection and the Separation of Eco-evo Time Scales using Perturbation Analysis.

Authors:  Philip Gerlee
Journal:  Bull Math Biol       Date:  2022-03-19       Impact factor: 3.871

6.  Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics.

Authors:  K Argasinski; M Broom
Journal:  Theory Biosci       Date:  2017-11-20       Impact factor: 1.919

  6 in total

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