Evolutionary dynamics, intrinsic noise, and cycles of cooperation.

We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of amplification of demographic noise can give rise to coherent oscillations in parameter regimes where deterministic descriptions converge to fixed points with complex eigenvalues. These quasicycles between cooperation and defection have previously been observed in computer simulations; here we provide a systematic and comprehensive analytical characterization of their properties. We are able to predict their power spectra as a function of the mutation rate and other model parameters and to compare the relative magnitude of the cycles induced by different types of underlying microscopic dynamics. We also extend our analysis to the iterated prisoner's dilemma game with a win-stay lose-shift strategy, appropriate in situations where players are subject to errors of the trembling-hand type.