Literature DB >> 19905389

Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation.

Carlos P Roca1, José A Cuesta, Angel Sánchez.   

Abstract

Spatial structure is known to have an impact on the evolution of cooperation, and so it has been intensively studied during recent years. Previous work has shown the relevance of some features, such as the synchronicity of the updating, the clustering of the network, or the influence of the update rule. This has been done, however, for concrete settings with particular games, networks, and update rules, with the consequence that some contradictions have arisen and a general understanding of these topics is missing in the broader context of the space of 2x2 games. To address this issue, we have performed a systematic and exhaustive simulation in the different degrees of freedom of the problem. In some cases, we generalize previous knowledge to the broader context of our study and explain the apparent contradictions. In other cases, however, our conclusions refute what seems to be established opinions in the field, as for example the robustness of the effect of spatial structure against changes in the update rule, or offer new insights into the subject, e.g., the relation between the intensity of selection and the asymmetry between the effects on games with mixed equilibria.

Mesh:

Year:  2009        PMID: 19905389     DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.80.046106

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys        ISSN: 1539-3755


  29 in total

1.  Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner's Dilemma.

Authors:  Carlos Gracia-Lázaro; Alfredo Ferrer; Gonzalo Ruiz; Alfonso Tarancón; José A Cuesta; Angel Sánchez; Yamir Moreno
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2012-07-06       Impact factor: 11.205

2.  Conditional cooperation can hinder network reciprocity.

Authors:  Dirk Semmann
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2012-07-27       Impact factor: 11.205

3.  Evolutionary shift dynamics on a cycle.

Authors:  Benjamin Allen; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2012-07-16       Impact factor: 2.691

4.  Genetic drift opposes mutualism during spatial population expansion.

Authors:  Melanie J I Müller; Beverly I Neugeboren; David R Nelson; Andrew W Murray
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2014-01-06       Impact factor: 11.205

5.  How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs.

Authors:  Benjamin Allen; Arne Traulsen; Corina E Tarnita; Martin A Nowak
Journal:  J Theor Biol       Date:  2011-04-05       Impact factor: 2.691

6.  How wealth accumulation can promote cooperation.

Authors:  Thomas Chadefaux; Dirk Helbing
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2010-10-27       Impact factor: 3.240

7.  Cooperation, norms, and revolutions: a unified game-theoretical approach.

Authors:  Dirk Helbing; Anders Johansson
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2010-10-12       Impact factor: 3.240

8.  Measures of success in a class of evolutionary models with fixed population size and structure.

Authors:  Benjamin Allen; Corina E Tarnita
Journal:  J Math Biol       Date:  2012-11-20       Impact factor: 2.259

9.  Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games.

Authors:  Jorge Peña; Yannick Rochat
Journal:  PLoS One       Date:  2012-09-10       Impact factor: 3.240

10.  Human behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma experiments suppresses network reciprocity.

Authors:  Carlos Gracia-Lázaro; José A Cuesta; Angel Sánchez; Yamir Moreno
Journal:  Sci Rep       Date:  2012-03-21       Impact factor: 4.379

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