PURPOSE OF REVIEW: Paid living unrelated kidney donor transplantation has flourished in Pakistan and Iran. This review discusses the dynamics and consequences of organ trade in Pakistan and of a regulated paid donor model in Iran on transplant activities in these countries. RECENT FINDINGS: In 2007, over 2500 renal transplants were performed in Pakistan, where more than 70% were from socioeconomic disadvantaged kidney vendors. More than half of recipients were foreigners who paid US$20,000-30,000. Recipients of vendor kidneys had poor outcome and high infectious complications. Regulated paid donor kidney transplant in Iran number around 1500 per year and constitute 70% of the total transplants. Graft survival rates are similar to those for living related donors. The donors are paid US$1200 and additional monies are negotiated between the recipient-donor pair. This model claims to have abolished waiting lists, although many poor patients wait for deceased donors. In both countries, recipients are relatively rich and vendors are the poor of the society who sell kidneys for quick money or to repay debts. SUMMARY: Paid donation, regulated or commercial, leads to coercion and exploitation of the poor and benefits the rich. This situation has forestalled deceased donor program and hence other solid-organ transplants. The way forward is to promote deceased donors by making transplant available to all who need it.
PURPOSE OF REVIEW: Paid living unrelated kidney donor transplantation has flourished in Pakistan and Iran. This review discusses the dynamics and consequences of organ trade in Pakistan and of a regulated paid donor model in Iran on transplant activities in these countries. RECENT FINDINGS: In 2007, over 2500 renal transplants were performed in Pakistan, where more than 70% were from socioeconomic disadvantaged kidney vendors. More than half of recipients were foreigners who paid US$20,000-30,000. Recipients of vendor kidneys had poor outcome and high infectious complications. Regulated paid donor kidney transplant in Iran number around 1500 per year and constitute 70% of the total transplants. Graft survival rates are similar to those for living related donors. The donors are paid US$1200 and additional monies are negotiated between the recipient-donor pair. This model claims to have abolished waiting lists, although many poor patients wait for deceased donors. In both countries, recipients are relatively rich and vendors are the poor of the society who sell kidneys for quick money or to repay debts. SUMMARY: Paid donation, regulated or commercial, leads to coercion and exploitation of the poor and benefits the rich. This situation has forestalled deceased donor program and hence other solid-organ transplants. The way forward is to promote deceased donors by making transplant available to all who need it.
Authors: Giorgina Barbara Piccoli; Laura Sacchetti; Laura Verzè; Franco Cavallo Journal: Philos Ethics Humanit Med Date: 2015-12-18 Impact factor: 2.464