Paul R Lichter1. 1. Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences, W. K. Kellogg Eye Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA.
Abstract
PURPOSE: To show how physicians' conditioned response to "keeping up" has helped industry's opportunistic funding of continuing medical education (CME) and to propose ways to counter the conditioned response to the benefit of patients and the public. METHODS: Review of the literature and commentary on it. RESULTS: The pharmaceutical and device industries (hereafter referred to as industry) have a long history of bribing physicians to prescribe and use their products. Increasing pressure from Congress and the public has been brought to bear on industry gifting. This pressure, coinciding with increasing financial problems for the providers of CME, provided industry with reason and opportunity to expand its role in the financing of CME. Industry's incentive to make its CME funding appear to be an arm's-length transaction has spawned medical education service supplier (MESS) companies. Industry makes "unrestricted grants" to the MESS, and the MESS puts on the CME program. Helped by these CME programs, industry is able to subtly "buy" physicians one at a time, so that under the cover of "education" they and their academic institutions and medical organizations lose sight of being CME pawns in industry's sole objective: profit. CONCLUSIONS: Despite a vast literature showing how physician integrity is easy prey to industry, the medical profession continues to allow industry to have a detrimental influence on the practice of medicine and on physician respectability. It will take resolute action to change the medical profession's conditioned response to industry's CME bell and its negative effect on patients and the public.
PURPOSE: To show how physicians' conditioned response to "keeping up" has helped industry's opportunistic funding of continuing medical education (CME) and to propose ways to counter the conditioned response to the benefit of patients and the public. METHODS: Review of the literature and commentary on it. RESULTS: The pharmaceutical and device industries (hereafter referred to as industry) have a long history of bribing physicians to prescribe and use their products. Increasing pressure from Congress and the public has been brought to bear on industry gifting. This pressure, coinciding with increasing financial problems for the providers of CME, provided industry with reason and opportunity to expand its role in the financing of CME. Industry's incentive to make its CME funding appear to be an arm's-length transaction has spawned medical education service supplier (MESS) companies. Industry makes "unrestricted grants" to the MESS, and the MESS puts on the CME program. Helped by these CME programs, industry is able to subtly "buy" physicians one at a time, so that under the cover of "education" they and their academic institutions and medical organizations lose sight of being CME pawns in industry's sole objective: profit. CONCLUSIONS: Despite a vast literature showing how physician integrity is easy prey to industry, the medical profession continues to allow industry to have a detrimental influence on the practice of medicine and on physician respectability. It will take resolute action to change the medical profession's conditioned response to industry's CME bell and its negative effect on patients and the public.