A model for the evolutionary maintenance of monogyny in spiders.

Sexual selection theory predicts that males should attempt to mate with several females, unless the benefits of male promiscuity are trumped by alternative benefits associated with male monogamy (monogyny). Here we use a game theory model to address the adaptive value of a monogynous strategy, which has the sole benefit of enhancing a male's paternity share in the context of competition with other males. We consider two ways in which monogynists might enhance their paternity: by outcompeting rival ejaculates in sperm competition, and by reducing the probability that a female remates with rival males. The model is based on the biology of some particularly well-studied spider species, in which males are morphologically restricted to mate with either one or at most two females in their lifetime. Our results suggest that, regardless of the mechanism of paternity enhancement involved, a male-biased sex ratio is generally required for the evolution and maintenance of monogyny. Moreover, we show that there is a large region of parameter space where monogyny and bigyny can coexist as alternative mating strategies under negative frequency dependent selection. There is also a narrow range of conditions where either monogyny or bigyny can be evolutionarily stable. Our results are in qualitative agreement with empirical findings in spiders.