Literature DB >> 17488135

Replace pharmaceutical patents now.

Earl L Grinols1, James W Henderson.   

Abstract

Pharmaceutical patents are anachronistic holdovers from an era in which modern economic understanding and tax tools were unavailable. Superior mechanisms lie somewhere between a first best pricing solution for the entire economy at one extreme and the current arrangements at the other. We discuss the economics of suggested alternatives and suggest that the intertemporal bounty is the best way to meet the multiple objectives of immediate distribution at marginal cost pricing of newly innovated patented drugs and easily administered, efficient inducement to continued innovation. The intertemporal bounty prevents the expansion of monopoly power resulting from co-pay or -insurance provisions common to modern prescription drug plans.

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Year:  2007        PMID: 17488135     DOI: 10.2165/00019053-200725050-00001

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Pharmacoeconomics        ISSN: 1170-7690            Impact factor:   4.981


  4 in total

1.  The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs.

Authors:  Joseph A DiMasi; Ronald W Hansen; Henry G Grabowski
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  2003-03       Impact factor: 3.883

2.  Returns on research and development for 1990s new drug introductions.

Authors:  Henry Grabowski; John Vernon; Joseph A DiMasi
Journal:  Pharmacoeconomics       Date:  2002       Impact factor: 4.981

Review 3.  Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research.

Authors:  M A Heller; R S Eisenberg
Journal:  Science       Date:  1998-05-01       Impact factor: 47.728

4.  Toward allocative efficiency in the prescription drug industry.

Authors:  R C Guell; M Fischbaum
Journal:  Milbank Q       Date:  1995       Impact factor: 4.911

  4 in total

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