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Literature DB >> 16519234

Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation.

F C Santos¹, J F Rodrigues, J M Pacheco.

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation in communities described in terms of graphs, such that individuals occupy the vertices and engage in single rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma with those individuals with whom they are connected through the edges of those graphs. We find an overwhelming dominance of cooperation whenever graphs are dynamically generated through the mechanisms of growth and preferential attachment. These mechanisms lead to the appearance of direct links between hubs, which constitute sufficient conditions to sustain cooperation. We show that cooperation dominates from large population sizes down to communities with nearly 100 individuals, even when extrinsic factors set a limit on the number of interactions that each individual may engage in.

Mesh：

Year: 2006 PMID： 16519234 PMCID： PMC1560002 DOI： 10.1098/rspb.2005.3272

Source DB: PubMed Journal: Proc Biol Sci ISSN： 0962-8452 Impact factor: 5.349

11 in total

Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation.

1. Emergence of scaling in random networks

2. Size-dependent degree distribution of a scale-free growing network.

3. Truncation of power law behavior in "scale-free" network models due to information filtering.

4. Disease evolution on networks: the role of contact structure.

5. Local dispersal promotes biodiversity in a real-life game of rock-paper-scissors.

6. Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game.

7. Correlation models for childhood epidemics.

Review 8. Infectious disease dynamics: What characterizes a successful invader?

9. The Matthew effect in science. The reward and communication systems of science are considered.

10. The evolution of cooperation.

1. Active linking in evolutionary games.

2. Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics.

3. Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation.

4. Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking.

5. Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking.

6. Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation.

7. Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks.

8. Social networks in the lek-mating wire-tailed manakin (Pipra filicauda).

9. Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.

10. Population structure induces a symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperation.