| Literature DB >> 15606924 |
Jennifer A H Bell1, Sylvia Hyland, Tania DePellegrin, Ross E G Upshur, Mark Bernstein, Douglas K Martin.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Priority setting is one of the most difficult issues facing hospitals because of funding restrictions and changing patient need. A deadly communicable disease outbreak, such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Toronto in 2003, amplifies the difficulties of hospital priority setting. The purpose of this study is to describe and evaluate priority setting in a hospital in response to SARS using the ethical framework 'accountability for reasonableness'.Entities:
Keywords: Empirical Approach; Health Care and Public Health
Mesh:
Year: 2004 PMID: 15606924 PMCID: PMC544195 DOI: 10.1186/1472-6963-4-36
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMC Health Serv Res ISSN: 1472-6963 Impact factor: 2.655
The four conditions of 'accountability for reasonableness'
| Rationales for priority setting decisions must rest on reasons (evidence and principles) that 'fair-minded' people can agree are relevant in the context. 'Fair-minded people seek to cooperate according to terms they can justify to each other – this narrows, though does not eliminate, the scope of controversy, which is further narrowed by specifying that reasons must be relevant to the specific priority setting context. | |
| Priority setting decisions and their rationales must be publicly accessible. | |
| There must be a mechanism for challenge, including the opportunity for revising decisions in light of considerations that stakeholders may raise. | |
| There is either voluntary or public regulation of the process to ensure that the first three conditions are met. |
Figure 1Reasons justifying priority setting decisions
List of decisions, reasons, and decision level
| Determine which staff to deploy to help with screening at the doors | Operational need; Screening capability; Infection control; Medical need | Hospital Command |
| Determine urgent patients and care for those first | Medical need | Individual Clinicians |
| The hospital as a whole determined few hospital workers unessential | Operational need; Screening capability; Infection Control | Hospital Command |
| Redeploy staff from screening back to clinical areas | Medical need; Duty to care; Operational need | Hospital Command |
| Hire screeners | Medical need; Operational need; Infection control | Hospital Command |
| Remove pregnant staff from the clinical environment | Staff safety | Corporate Command; Hospital Command |
| Decant staff and inpatients (25) from 8th floor general medicine to make room for SARS unit and potential SARS patients | Operational need; Medical need | Hospital Command; Department Managers/Chiefs |
| Separate staff entrance from visitor and patient entrance | Operational need; Infection control | Corporate Command; Hospital Command |
| Send staff home | Infection control | Department Managers/Chiefs |
| Accept SARS patient transfers from other hospitals | Duty to care | Corporate Command; Individual Clinicians |
| Each GTA and Simcoe County hospital to establish a SARS specific isolation unit. | Infection control | MOHLTC |
| Hospitals greater than 500 beds will be expected to provide a 30 bed unit each. (Mar 27) | ||
| Create SARS unit physical space on 8B with negative pressure capabilities | Directive; Infection control; Medical need; Operational need; Duty to care | Hospital Command; Department Managers/Chiefs; Individual Clinicians |
| Maintain emergency based activity during initial days of outbreak | Duty to care; Medical need | Corporate Command; Hospital Command |
| Ramp up clinical activity | Duty to care; Medical need | Corporate Command |
| Allocate OR time by division | Medical need; Surgeon activity | Department Managers/Chiefs |
| Determine which patient needed urgent OR care this could be listed second | Medical need | Individual Clinicians |
| SARS II – the decision not to cancel surgery again | Medical need; Duty to care | Corporate Command |
| Treat some 'elective cases' in the OR as being urgent | Medical need; Surgeon activity; Duty to care; Squeaky wheel | Individual Clinicians; Department Managers/Chiefs |
| Determine what/who is emergent and urgent in terms of clinical volumes in family medicine | Screening capability; Medical need; Squeaky wheel | Department Managers/Chiefs; Individual Clinicians |
| Family Medicine did not go out into the community to provide care in the initial stages of SARS (care to detox centres, shelters) | Infection control; Screening capability | Corporate Command; Department Managers/Chiefs |
| No Visitor Policy except for compassionate grounds (such as palliative care, critically ill children or visiting a patient whose death may be imminent) | Infection control | MOHLTC |
| Restrict visitors for certain hours (5–9 pm) | Screening capability | Hospital Command |
| Lift visiting restrictions on case-by-case basis | Compassion; Squeaky wheel; Medical need | Department Managers/Chiefs |
| Hospitals must restrict access to each hospital site. Ideally, access should be restricted to one staff and one public entrance for each building | Infection control | MOHLTC |