Literature DB >> 14626005

The welfare economics of moral hazard.

J A Nyman1, R Maude-Griffin.   

Abstract

Pauly's analysis of the welfare effects of moral hazard assumes that consumption of health care does not increase with income, however, empirical evidence suggests it does. For health insurance contracts that pay off by reducing price, the income effect is represented by the additional health care consumed because of income transfers from those who remain healthy to those who become ill. This implies a different decomposition of demand than the standard Hicksian decomposition. When the effect of income transfers is removed, the price-related welfare loss is smaller than either the loss suggested by Pauly's analysis or a Hicksian decomposition.

Mesh:

Year:  2001        PMID: 14626005     DOI: 10.1023/a:1011547904553

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  Int J Health Care Finance Econ        ISSN: 1389-6563


  11 in total

1.  Health insurance: tradeoffs revisited.

Authors:  W G Manning; M S Marquis
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  2001-03       Impact factor: 3.883

2.  The economics of moral hazard revisited.

Authors:  J A Nyman
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  1999-12       Impact factor: 3.883

3.  Health insurance and the demand for medical care.

Authors:  D de Meza
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  1983-03       Impact factor: 3.883

4.  The concentration of health expenditures: an update.

Authors:  M L Berk; A C Monheit
Journal:  Health Aff (Millwood)       Date:  1992       Impact factor: 6.301

5.  Health insurance: the tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard.

Authors:  W G Manning; M S Marquis
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  1996-10       Impact factor: 3.883

Review 6.  Medical care costs: how much welfare loss?

Authors:  J P Newhouse
Journal:  J Econ Perspect       Date:  1992

7.  Aggregate health care expenditures and national income. Is health care a luxury good?

Authors:  D Parkin; A McGuire; B Yule
Journal:  J Health Econ       Date:  1987-06       Impact factor: 3.883

8.  A new estimate of the welfare loss of excess health insurance.

Authors:  R Feldman; B Dowd
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  1991-03

9.  Costs, technology, and insurance in the health care sector.

Authors:  J A Nyman
Journal:  J Policy Anal Manage       Date:  1991

10.  Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment.

Authors:  W G Manning; J P Newhouse; N Duan; E B Keeler; A Leibowitz; M S Marquis
Journal:  Am Econ Rev       Date:  1987-06
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  4 in total

1.  Does employment-based private health insurance increase the use of covered health care services? A matching estimator approach.

Authors:  Astrid Kiil
Journal:  Int J Health Care Finance Econ       Date:  2012-02-26

2.  Severity of illness and the welfare effects of moral hazard.

Authors:  Joseph G Eisenhauer
Journal:  Int J Health Care Finance Econ       Date:  2006-11-30

3.  The effect of complementary private health insurance on the use of health care services.

Authors:  Astrid Kiil; Jacob Nielsen Arendt
Journal:  Int J Health Econ Manag       Date:  2016-08-31

4.  Moral hazard and selection for voluntary deductibles.

Authors:  Rob J M Alessie; Viola Angelini; Jochen O Mierau; Laura Viluma
Journal:  Health Econ       Date:  2020-07-31       Impact factor: 3.046

  4 in total

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