Literature DB >> 10263961

Health insurance and the demand for medical care.

D de Meza.   

Abstract

With rare exceptions the provision of actuarially fair health insurance tends to substantially increase the demand for medical care by redistributing income from the healthy to the sick. This suggests that previous studies which attribute all the extra demand for medical care to moral hazard effects may overestimate the efficiency costs of health insurance.

Mesh:

Year:  1983        PMID: 10263961     DOI: 10.1016/0167-6296(83)90011-5

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Health Econ        ISSN: 0167-6296            Impact factor:   3.883


  5 in total

1.  The welfare economics of moral hazard.

Authors:  J A Nyman; R Maude-Griffin
Journal:  Int J Health Care Finance Econ       Date:  2001-03

2.  Does employment-based private health insurance increase the use of covered health care services? A matching estimator approach.

Authors:  Astrid Kiil
Journal:  Int J Health Care Finance Econ       Date:  2012-02-26

3.  Severity of illness and the welfare effects of moral hazard.

Authors:  Joseph G Eisenhauer
Journal:  Int J Health Care Finance Econ       Date:  2006-11-30

4.  The effect of complementary private health insurance on the use of health care services.

Authors:  Astrid Kiil; Jacob Nielsen Arendt
Journal:  Int J Health Econ Manag       Date:  2016-08-31

5.  The Liquidity Sensitivity of Healthcare Consumption: Evidence from Social Security Payments.

Authors:  Tal Gross; Timothy J Layton; Daniel Prinz
Journal:  Am Econ Rev Insights       Date:  2022-06
  5 in total

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