Transaction costs, externalities and information technology in health care.

This paper discusses some of the economic issues which underpin the rationale for investment in information and communications technologies (ICTs). Information imperfections lead to significant transaction costs (search, negotiating and monitoring) which in turn confer a negative externality on parties involved in exchange. This divergence in private and social costs leads to a degree of resource misallocation (efficiency loss) which, uncorrected, results in a sub-optimal outcome. Traditional solutions to this problem are to rely upon direct government action to reduce the costs of transacting between market agents, or to employ tax/subsidy measures and other legislative action to achieve the desired market outcome. Three key policy questions are raised in the context of the NHS purchaser/provider relationship. Firstly, what is the optimum level of transaction costs; secondly, can ICTs assist in lowering the level of transaction costs to the optimum level; thirdly, who should bear the investment cost in reducing the level of transaction costs? The issue of property rights in different information systems is discussed and raises interesting policy questions about how much investment should be undertaken centrally rather than devolved to a more local level. In some ways this economic framework offers a post hoc justification of why different ICT systems have been introduced at various levels of the NHS. Essentially this reduces to the problem of externalities: providing good information confers a positive externality: not providing relevant, timely and accurate information confers a negative externality, by increasing further the level of transaction costs. The crucial role which ICT systems can play lies in attempting to reduce the level of transaction costs and driving the market towards what Dahlman has described as the transaction-cost-constrained equilibrium.