B Friedman1, D Farley. 1. Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), Rockville, MD 20852, USA.
Abstract
OBJECTIVE: This research addresses the following types of responses by hospitals to increased financial risk: (a) increases in prices to privately insured patients (testing separately the effects of risk from the effects of "cost-shifting" that depends on level of Medicare payment in relation to case mix-adjusted cost); (b) changes in service mix offered and selectivity in acceptance of patients to reduce risk; and (c) efforts to reduce variation in resource use for those patients admitted. DATA SOURCES: The database includes a national panel of over 400 hospitals providing information from patient discharge abstracts, hospital financial reports, and county level information over the period 1980-1987. STUDY DESIGN: Econometric methods suitable to panel data are implemented, with tests for pooling, hospital-specific fixed effects, and possible problems of selection bias. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The prices paid by private insurers to a particular hospital were affected by the changes in risk imposed by Medicare prospective payment, the generosity of Medicare payment, state rate regulation, and ability of the hospital to bear risk. The risk-weighted measure of case mix did not respond to changes in payment policy, but other variables reflecting the management of care after admission to reduce risk did change in the predicted directions. CONCLUSIONS: Some of the findings in this article are relevant to current Medicare policies that involve risk-sharing, for instance, special allowances for "outlier" patients with unusually high cost, and for sole community hospitals. The first type of allowance appears successful in preserving access to care, while the second type is not well justified by the findings. State rate regulation programs were associated not only with lower hospital prices but also with less risk reduction behavior by hospitals. The design of regulation as a sort of risk-pooling arrangement across payers and hospitals may be attractive to hospitals and help explain their support for regulation is some states.
OBJECTIVE: This research addresses the following types of responses by hospitals to increased financial risk: (a) increases in prices to privately insured patients (testing separately the effects of risk from the effects of "cost-shifting" that depends on level of Medicare payment in relation to case mix-adjusted cost); (b) changes in service mix offered and selectivity in acceptance of patients to reduce risk; and (c) efforts to reduce variation in resource use for those patients admitted. DATA SOURCES: The database includes a national panel of over 400 hospitals providing information from patient discharge abstracts, hospital financial reports, and county level information over the period 1980-1987. STUDY DESIGN: Econometric methods suitable to panel data are implemented, with tests for pooling, hospital-specific fixed effects, and possible problems of selection bias. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The prices paid by private insurers to a particular hospital were affected by the changes in risk imposed by Medicare prospective payment, the generosity of Medicare payment, state rate regulation, and ability of the hospital to bear risk. The risk-weighted measure of case mix did not respond to changes in payment policy, but other variables reflecting the management of care after admission to reduce risk did change in the predicted directions. CONCLUSIONS: Some of the findings in this article are relevant to current Medicare policies that involve risk-sharing, for instance, special allowances for "outlier" patients with unusually high cost, and for sole community hospitals. The first type of allowance appears successful in preserving access to care, while the second type is not well justified by the findings. State rate regulation programs were associated not only with lower hospital prices but also with less risk reduction behavior by hospitals. The design of regulation as a sort of risk-pooling arrangement across payers and hospitals may be attractive to hospitals and help explain their support for regulation is some states.
Authors: Karen S Palmer; Thomas Agoritsas; Danielle Martin; Taryn Scott; Sohail M Mulla; Ashley P Miller; Arnav Agarwal; Andrew Bresnahan; Afeez Abiola Hazzan; Rebecca A Jeffery; Arnaud Merglen; Ahmed Negm; Reed A Siemieniuk; Neera Bhatnagar; Irfan A Dhalla; John N Lavis; John J You; Stephen J Duckett; Gordon H Guyatt Journal: PLoS One Date: 2014-10-27 Impact factor: 3.752