Seeing and believing: children's understanding of the distinction between appearance and reality.

When young children are asked questions about objects with misleading appearances, they make two kinds of errors: (1) phenomenism--they report appearance when asked to report reality; and (2) intellectual realism--they report reality when asked to report appearance. Two studies with 3-year-old children tested the hypothesis that phenomenism errors predominate when children are asked about objects' real and apparent properties, whereas intellectual realism errors predominate when children are asked about objects' real and apparent identities. The results of these studies provided some support for the property-identity hypothesis; children's appearance-reality judgments about properties tended to differ from those about identities. More phenomenism errors were elicited when the stimuli were described to the children in terms of their properties than when the very same stimulus objects were described in terms of their identities. Identity tasks were not found to elicit predominantly intellectual realism errors, although the data showed trends in this direction. The implications of these results for theories about young children's tendency to accept things in terms of their perceptual characteristics were briefly discussed.