Literature DB >> 6227681

Intuitive physics: the straight-down belief and its origin.

M McCloskey, A Washburn, L Felch.   

Abstract

This study examines the nature and origin of a common misconception about moving objects. We first show through the use of pencil-and-paper problems that many people erroneously believe that an object that is carried by another moving object (e.g., a ball carried by a walking person) will, if dropped, fall to the ground in a straight vertical line. (In fact, such an object will fall forward in a parabolic arc.) We then demonstrate that this "straight-down belief" turns up not only on pencil-and-paper problems but also on a problem presented in a concrete, dynamic fashion (Experiment 1) and in a situation in which a subject drops a ball while walking (Experiment 2). We next consider the origin of the straight-down belief and propose that the belief may stem from a perceptual illusion. Specifically, we suggest that objects dropped from a moving carrier may be perceived as falling straight down or even backward, when in fact they move forward as they fall. Experiment 3, in which subjects view computer-generated displays simulating situations in which a carried object is dropped, and Experiment 4, in which subjects view a videotape of a walking person dropping an object, provide data consistent with this "seeing is believing" hypothesis.

Entities:  

Mesh:

Year:  1983        PMID: 6227681     DOI: 10.1037//0278-7393.9.4.636

Source DB:  PubMed          Journal:  J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn        ISSN: 0278-7393            Impact factor:   3.051


  22 in total

1.  Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion.

Authors:  M Kozhevnikov; M Hegarty
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2001-09

2.  The natural appearance of unnatural incline speed.

Authors:  Doug Rohrer
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  2003-07

3.  The methodology of testing naive beliefs in the physics classroom.

Authors:  R D Donley; M H Ashcraft
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1992-07

4.  The ultimate challenge: prove B. F. Skinner wrong.

Authors:  Paul Chance
Journal:  Behav Anal       Date:  2007

5.  Heuristics and invariants in dynamic event perception: Immunized concepts or nonstatements?

Authors:  H Hecht
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  1996-03

Review 6.  The impetus theory in judgments about object motion: a new perspective.

Authors:  Peter A White
Journal:  Psychon Bull Rev       Date:  2012-12

7.  Functional neuroanatomy of intuitive physical inference.

Authors:  Jason Fischer; John G Mikhael; Joshua B Tenenbaum; Nancy Kanwisher
Journal:  Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A       Date:  2016-08-08       Impact factor: 11.205

8.  Relative consistency and subjects' "theories" in domains such as naive physics: common research difficulties illustrated by Cooke and Breedin.

Authors:  M Ranney
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1994-07

9.  The development of beliefs about falling objects.

Authors:  M K Kaiser; D R Proffitt; M McCloskey
Journal:  Percept Psychophys       Date:  1985-12

10.  Constructing naive theories of motion on the fly.

Authors:  N J Cooke; S D Breedin
Journal:  Mem Cognit       Date:  1994-07
View more

北京卡尤迪生物科技股份有限公司 © 2022-2023.