| Literature DB >> 36267496 |
Andre J Hartmann1, Katharina Gangl2, Matthias Kasper1, Erich Kirchler1,2, Martin G Kocher3, Martin Mueller1, Axel Sonntag2.
Abstract
In a scenario study with 1200 Austrian taxpayers, we examined how tax compliance is affected by the economic crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, we investigated the potential of trust in government, attitude towards taxes, and justice perceptions in mitigating potential effects. The results suggest a strong effect of the economic environment on tax compliance. Specifically, tax compliance was lower in scenarios where the pandemic had a negative effect on the economy than in scenarios with no negative effect. However, for individuals with a positive attitude towards taxes, compliance was not lower in a negative economic environment than in pre-COVID-19 times. Moreover, we found that taxpayers who were not affected economically, taxpayers with a positive attitude towards taxes, and taxpayers with a low propensity to take risks generally indicated higher levels of tax compliance. Exploratory analyses indicate that taxpayers who change their compliance behavior in response to the economic environment are, on average, younger, less educated, more strongly affected economically, and more uncertain about their current economic situation than taxpayers with stable compliance levels. Policy interventions should target these groups to strengthen tax compliance in times of crisis.Entities:
Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic; Economic crisis; Scenario study; Tax compliance
Year: 2022 PMID: 36267496 PMCID: PMC9569854 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102572
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Econ Psychol ISSN: 0167-4870
Fig. 1Distribution of relative tax compliance in the four scenarios. Notes. Compliance is the relative share of an additional income of €1000 that participants would report in their tax declaration. Bars show 95 percent confidence levels.
Three linear mixed-effects regression with tax compliance as dependent variable. Model 2 added trust in government, attitude towards taxes, and justice perceptions as independent variables. Model 3 added optimism, political orientation, risk propensity, economic affectedness, economic uncertainty, perceived abuse of the system by others and sociodemographic variables as control variables.
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Compliance | |||||||||
| (Intercept) | 0.45 | (0.01) | *** | 0.19 | (0.03) | *** | 0.29 | (0.08) | *** |
| Present | −0.06 | (0.01) | *** | −0.07 | (0.02) | *** | −0.07 | (0.02) | *** |
| Positive Outlook | 0.00 | (0.01) | 0.00 | (0.02) | −0.00 | (0.02) | |||
| Negative Outlook | −0.06 | (0.01) | *** | −0.07 | (0.02) | *** | −0.07 | (0.02) | *** |
| Trust in Government (TIG) | 0.14 | (0.05) | ** | 0.06 | (0.05) | ||||
| Attitude Towards Taxes (ATT) | 0.38 | (0.05) | *** | 0.29 | (0.05) | *** | |||
| Justice Perceptions (JP) | 0.03 | (0.07) | 0.09 | (0.07) | |||||
| Present × TIG | −0.01 | (0.03) | −0.01 | (0.03) | |||||
| Positive Outlook × TIG | −0.00 | (0.03) | −0.00 | (0.03) | |||||
| Negative Outlook × TIG | −0.04 | (0.03) | −0.04 | (0.03) | |||||
| Present × ATT | 0.03 | (0.03) | 0.04 | (0.03) | |||||
| Positive Outlook × ATT | 0.01 | (0.03) | 0.02 | (0.03) | |||||
| Negative Outlook × ATT | 0.05 | (0.03) | * | 0.06 | (0.03) | * | |||
| Present × JP | −0.01 | (0.04) | −0.01 | (0.04) | |||||
| Positive Outlook × JP | −0.02 | (0.04) | −0.02 | (0.04) | |||||
| Negative Outlook × JP | 0.02 | (0.04) | 0.01 | (0.04) | |||||
| Optimism | 0.04 | (0.05) | |||||||
| Political Orientation: Right | 0.00 | (0.05) | |||||||
| Risk Propensity | −0.15 | (0.05) | *** | ||||||
| Economic Affectedness | −0.11 | (0.06) | * | ||||||
| Economic Uncertainty | −0.06 | (0.04) | |||||||
| Perceived Abuse | 0.03 | (0.04) | |||||||
| Gender: Male | −0.08 | (0.02) | *** | ||||||
| Age | 0.11 | (0.06) | |||||||
| Education | 0.10 | (0.03) | ** | ||||||
| Blue Collar Worker | −0.07 | (0.05) | |||||||
| White Collar Worker | −0.01 | (0.05) | |||||||
| Self-employed | 0.11 | (0.06) | |||||||
| In Training | 0.10 | (0.06) | |||||||
| Retired | 0.00 | (0.05) | |||||||
| Stay at Home | −0.05 | (0.07) | |||||||
| Job Other | −0.03 | (0.07) | |||||||
| 4800 | 4800 | 4776 | |||||||
| 1200 | 1200 | 1194 | |||||||
| Marginal | 0.004 | 0.102 | 0.151 | ||||||
| Random effects (individual): | |||||||||
| Intercept | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.38 | ||||||
| Residual | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | ||||||
Notes. *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Past (reference category), Present, Positive Outlook, and Negative Outlook refer to the four experimental scenarios. Six participants were excluded from the analysis in Model 3 because they identified as neither male nor female. Higher values indicate higher trust in government, a more positive attitude towards taxes, higher perceived justice, higher optimism, higher risk propensity, higher economic affectedness, higher economic uncertainty, higher perceived abuse of the system by others, and higher education. Job was dichotomized with unemployed as reference category. In all models, no significant order effects of outlook scenarios were detected.
Fig. 2Tax compliance per subgroup across experimental scenarios. Notes. Compliance is the relative share of an additional income of €1000 that participants would report in their tax declaration. Bars show 95 percent confidence levels. Noncomplier (n = 297), Complier (n = 344), Conditional Complier (n = 559). Means of independent variables per group are presented in Table A3 of the Online Appendix.
Odds ratios of three independent logistic mixed-effects regression with dichotomized group affiliation to Noncomplier (NC), Complier (C), and Conditional Complier (CC) as dependent variable.
| NC | C | CC | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ( | ( | ( | |
| (Intercept) | 0.97 | 0.21* | 0.55 |
| Trust in Government | 0.41 ** | 1.33 | 1.61 |
| Attitude Towards Taxes | 0.19 *** | 5.17 *** | 0.87 |
| Justice Perceptions | 0.54 | 0.92 | 1.64 |
| Optimism | 0.73 | 1.30 | 1.05 |
| Political Orientation: Right | 1.60 | 1.35 | 0.55 * |
| Risk Propensity | 1.95 * | 0.36 *** | 1.34 |
| Economic Affectedness | 1.07 | 0.36 ** | 1.90 * |
| Economic Uncertainty | 0.70 | 0.73 | 1.61 * |
| Perceived Abuse | 0.81 | 1.07 | 1.09 |
| Gender: Male | 1.48 * | 0.65 ** | 1.07 |
| Age | 1.72 | 2.12 * | 0.41 ** |
| Education | 0.86 | 2.17 *** | 0.59 ** |
| Blue Collar Worker | 1.48 | 0.56 | 1.06 |
| White Collar Worker | 0.81 | 0.66 | 1.61 |
| Self-employed | 0.40 * | 1.30 | 1.45 |
| In Training | 0.25 ** | 1.25 | 1.86 * |
| Retired | 0.89 | 0.83 | 1.11 |
| Stay at Home | 0.54 | 0.70 | 1.89 |
| Job Other | 0.98 | 0.83 | 1.17 |
| COVID-19 Unemployed | 1.08 | 0.75 | 1.13 |
| COVID-19 Short time | 0.94 | 1.23 | 0.93 |
Notes. *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. Six participants were excluded from the analysis because they identified as neither male nor female. Higher values indicated higher trust in government, a more positive attitude towards taxes, higher perceived justice, higher optimism, higher risk propensity, higher economic affectedness, higher economic uncertainty, higher perceived abuse of the system by others, and higher education. Job was dichotomized with unemployed as reference category.