| Literature DB >> 36236684 |
Uzma Jafar1, Mohd Juzaiddin Ab Aziz1, Zarina Shukur2, Hafiz Adnan Hussain1.
Abstract
Electronic voting systems must find solutions to various issues with authentication, data privacy and integrity, transparency, and verifiability. On the other hand, Blockchain technology offers an innovative solution to many of these problems. The scalability of Blockchain has arisen as a fundamental barrier to realizing the promise of this technology, especially in electronic voting. This study seeks to highlight the solutions regarding scalable Blockchain-based electronic voting systems and the issues linked with them while also attempting to foresee future developments. A systematic literature review (SLR) was used to complete the task, leading to the selection of 76 articles in the English language from 1 January 2017 to 31 March 2022 from the famous databases. This SLR was conducted to identify well-known proposals, their implementations, verification methods, various cryptographic solutions in previous research to evaluate cost and time. It also identifies performance parameters, the primary advantages and obstacles presented by different systems, and the most common approaches for Blockchain scalability. In addition, it outlines several possible research avenues for developing a scalable electronic voting system based on Blockchain technology. This research helps future research before proposing or developing any solutions to keep in mind all the voting requirements, merits, and demerits of the proposed solutions and provides further guidelines for scalable voting solutions.Entities:
Keywords: Bitcoin; Blockchain; Internet of things; cryptography; electronic voting; ethereum; hyperledger fabric; scalability; smart contract
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36236684 PMCID: PMC9572428 DOI: 10.3390/s22197585
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.847
Figure 1Road map of Blockchain-based electronic voting.
Electronic voting system requirements.
| Requirements | Description |
|---|---|
| Anonymity | A vote should not be associated with a voter. |
| Auditability and accuracy | Voting processes should be able to be checked, audited, and certifiable by autonomous agents. |
| Democracy/singularity | Every voter should be allowed to vote only once. |
| Vote privacy | There is no way to prove the voter by his/her casted vote. |
| Robustness and integrity | It should be impossible to change or eliminate votes after they have been cast. |
| Voter verifiability | Everyone should be able to independently confirm that all the votes have been tallied accurately. |
| Verifiable participation/authenticity | Only those voters who have the right to cast a vote are verified by the system. |
| Transparency and fairness | Voting systems should be transparent and rely on the accuracy, precision, and protection of voter security. |
| Availability and mobility | Voting systems should be permanently accessible during the election period. Voting systems should not restrict the voting location. |
| Accessibility and reassurance | Voting systems should be available for people with disabilities or special conditions without requiring specific equipment or abilities. |
| Recoverability and identification | Electoral systems can detect flaws, defects, and attacks and restore voting data to their previous state. |
Figure 2Model of a Blockchain data structure.
Figure 3Blockchain scalability aspect.
Figure 4Blockchain Implications.
Figure 5Blockchain scalability trilemma.
Research questions table.
| ID | Question | Description |
|---|---|---|
| RQ1 | What are some of the most well-known proposals for scalable Blockchain-based electronic voting? | This topic highlights the most widely used Blockchain implementations utilized as the foundation for electronic voting systems. It enables the comparison and contrasting of several Blockchain and their attributes. |
| RQ2 | Were those solutions tested in a real-world scenario? | It might be possible to improve upon existing solutions by looking at how they were implemented in the actual world. |
| RQ3 | What are the verification methods used to test those solutions? | This question tries to find out how a solution was tested against the specifications of an electronic voting system. |
| RQ4 | What are the different cryptographic solutions employed in previous research? | Many cryptographic primitives and procedures are used in today’s electronic voting systems. The primary objective of this investigation is to locate them so that information about them may be incorporated into other potential solutions. |
| RQ5 | Were the cryptographic operations used in prior solutions too costly and time-consuming? | In the current scenario, cryptosystems are using too much power to solve the puzzle. Analysis of those solutions that claim to reduce the computational cost. |
| RQ6 | What are the latest Blockchain applications focused on scalability? | Blockchain applications are no longer limited to Bitcoin. Understanding the real influence of Blockchain technology on scalability will need an examination of the most recent practical uses. |
| RQ7 | What parameters test the performance and scalability of the electoral process on a large scale? | This question aims to test the current scalable Blockchain solutions on a large scale to check the performance of these solutions on a national-based electronic voting system. |
| RQ8 | What are the prior approaches for Blockchain scalability to efficiently enhance the electoral process on a large scale? | This question aims to highlight the previous scalable solutions, approaches, and future directions on a national level. |
Figure 6The process used to identify, gather, and refine research articles.
Query strings table.
| Sr. | Query Strings |
|---|---|
| 1. | (“blockchain” OR “block-chain” OR “distributed ledger”) AND “voting” |
| 2. | (“blockchain” OR “block-chain” OR “distributed ledger”) AND (“evoting” OR “electronic voting” OR “Internet voting” OR “Ivoting”) AND “voting system” |
| 3. | (“blockchain” OR “block-chain” OR “distributed ledger”) AND (“evoting” OR “electronic voting” OR “Internet voting” OR “Ivoting”) AND (“scalability” OR “scalable”) AND “large-scale” |
| 4. | (“blockchain” OR “block-chain” OR “distributed ledger”) AND (“evoting” OR “electronic voting” OR “Internet voting” OR “Ivoting”) AND (“scalability” OR “scalable”) AND (“scalable” OR “scalability”) AND “national level” |
| 5. | (Blockchain OR block-chain OR distributed ledger) AND (large-scale OR national level) AND (voting) AND (scalable OR scalability) AND (lightweight) |
Figure 7Terms that form the search string.
Inclusion criteria for systematic literature review.
| ID | Inclusion Criteria (IC) |
|---|---|
| IC1 | Complete studies of at least five pages are required for this survey. It must be a peer-reviewed work that has been published in conference proceedings or journals. |
| IC2 | Included studies must be published in the last five years (01.01.2017–31.03.2022). |
| IC3 | Studies respond to a research question or propose a suitable solution about scalability in electronic voting. |
| IC4 | Research examining the scalability of electronic voting systems based on Blockchain technology. |
| IC5 | Empirical data relating to the application and Blockchain studies that address scalable Blockchain-based electronic voting must be included in the study. |
Exclusion criteria for systematic literature review.
| ID | Exclusion Criteria (EC) |
|---|---|
| EC1 | Those studies that are not written in English. |
| EC2 | Studies that were published before (01.01.2017) and after (31.03.2022). |
| EC3 | Studies that are irrelevant to the study since they do not address research questions. |
| EC4 | Grey literature should not be included. |
| EC5 | Duplicated studies. |
| EC6 | Papers more than five years old. |
Figure 8Number of papers obtained from each queried database.
Figure 9PRISMA systematic literature review process diagram.
Figure 10Percentage of articles found in each database searched.
Figure 11Graph of publications obtained for each queried database per year.
Data extraction.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| ID | Individual study identifier. |
| Authors | List of the authors. |
| Year | Year of the journal. |
| Title | Title of the journal. |
| Source | IEEE Digital Library, Springer Link, Scopus, ACM Digital Library, and Science Direct |
| Type | Journal and conference papers only. |
| Research Question 1 | What are some of the most well-known proposals for scalable Blockchain-based electronic voting? |
| Research Question 2 | Were those solutions tested in a real-world scenario? |
| Research Question 3 | What are the verification methods used to test those solutions? |
| Research Question 4 | What are the different cryptographic solutions employed in previous research? |
| Research Question 5 | Were the cryptographic operations used in prior solutions too costly and time-consuming? |
| Research Question 6 | What are the latest Blockchain applications focused on scalability? |
| Research Question 7 | What parameters test the performance and scalability of the electoral process on a large scale? |
| Research Question 8 | What are the prior approaches for Blockchain scalability to efficiently enhance the electoral process on a large scale? |
Quality criteria.
| ID | Quality Assessment Criteria (QAC) |
|---|---|
| QAC1 | Does the research contribute to the field of Blockchain-based electronic voting that can be scaled up? |
| QAC2 | Are the methods described in these papers being utilized in practice today? |
| QAC3 | Are practitioners going to benefit from this article? |
| QAC4 | Are the limitations of the proposed method presented and examined? |
| QAC5 | Are the findings of the research being addressed in any way? |
| QAC6 | Is there a suitable explanation provided for the background of the study? |
| QAC7 | Is the context of the study sufficiently explained? |
| QAC8 | Does the research include presentations of the related works? |
| QAC9 | Are the study’s objectives and scope adequately stated? |
Papers about Blockchain for electronic voting selected for analysis.
| ID | Article Title | Research Method | Research Result | Research Gap | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Secure large-scale E-voting system based on Blockchain contract using a hybrid consensus model combined with sharding | Simulation: Proposed PSC-Bchain hybrid consensus | Security, performance, and scalability of Blockchain-based e-voting systems | Coercion resistance and receipt freeness | [ |
| 2 | COVID-19: Implementation e-voting Blockchain Concept | Quantitative: SUS trial analysis | Tackles election during COVID-19, brings effectiveness and efficiency | Authentication, refining the process of Blockchain for e-voting | [ |
| 3 | On the Design and Implementation of a Blockchain Enabled E-Voting Application Within IoT-Oriented Smart Cities | Simulation: Designed a new system model for e-voting application | Privacy, trust, and security | Real-time data | [ |
| 4 | Empirical analysis of transaction malleability within Blockchain-based e-Voting | Experimental: Process model diagram for transaction malleability | Network delay and block generation rate | Needs to develop new mechanisms and methods to mitigate malleability attack | [ |
| 5 | Towards A Privacy-Preserving Voting System Through Blockchain Technologies | Experimental: Proposed algorithm for privacy-preserving voting | Political race control, control hacking of electronic democratic machine, cost-productive | Adaptability, coercion resistance, and scalability | [ |
| 6 | Efficient, Coercion-free and Universally Verifiable Blockchain-based Voting | Experimental: Proposed algorithm with zkSNARK | Coercion resistance, receipt freeness, and universal verifiability | Trustworthy election authorities | [ |
| 7 | Architecture-Centric Evaluation of Blockchain-Based Smart Contract E-Voting for National Elections | Architecture trade-off analysis method (ATAM) | Security attacks, internal vote manipulation, and endorsed transparency | Lack of security and consensus protocol | [ |
| 8 | An enhanced security mechanism through Blockchain for E-polling/counting process using IoT devices | Simulation: Proposed e-voting layout with IoT devices | Enhanced security via Blockchain in e-voting applications using IoT devices | Insufficient evidence to handle malicious IoT devices | [ |
| 9 | AttriChain Decentralized traceable anonymous identities in privacy-preserving permissioned Blockchain | Simulation: Proposed AttriChain protocol for security in permissioned Blockchain | Increases user privacy and autonomy in a permissioned network and enables auditing | Inability to deal with financial scenarios, public Blockchains are not supported | [ |
| 10 | Blockchain voting Publicly verifiable online voting protocol without trusted tallying authorities | Simulation: Proposed a novel encryption scheme | Voters can store, verify, and tally all submitted votes | Double encryption and zero-knowledge/partial-knowledge proofs are weaknesses | [ |
| 11 | A Blockchain-based self-tallying voting protocol in decentralized IoT | Simulation: Proposed self-tallying voting protocol with IoT | Self-tallying technology encrypts votes for a specified duration to guarantee voting confidentiality | Yes/no voting does not work in boardrooms or classrooms | [ |
| 12 | Anonymous and Coercion-Resistant Distributed Electronic Voting | Simulation: Proposed scheme resistant to double voting | Enhanced the integrity, efficiency, and voter turnout of the election process | Ignores security and privacy | [ |
| 13 | Blockchain Technology based Electoral Franchise | Simulation: Proposed architecture BCT-based electronic franchise | Immutable and distributable to minimize voting system assaults | Needs trusted third-parties, data integrity, and verification | [ |
| 14 | A hyper-ledger fabric framework as a service for improved quality e-voting system | Proposed framework as a service | A highly maintainable, large-scale, cost-effective solution for personalized private Blockchain | Private Blockchain compromised data integrity and privacy | [ |
| 15 | E-Voting System using Hyperledger Sawtooth | Experimental: Using Sawtooth with Solidity language | Large-scale implementation, reliability, as well as security | Nontransparent; system may be flawed based on consensus | [ |
| 16 | Electronic voting based on virtual id of aadhar using Blockchain technology | Proposed framework: virtual ID based on UIDAI | Secured e-voting system by using biometric details | Generating and analysing fingerprints is hard | [ |
| 17 | Blockchain-Based Self-Tallying Voting System with Software Updates in Decentralized IoT | Simulation: It uses IoT. The algorithm’s efficiency and average runtime are examined | A self-tallying voting system with software updates in decentralized IoT | Inability to deal with user privacy and security | [ |
| 18 | Digital Voting A Blockchain-based E-Voting System using Biohash and Smart Contracts | Simulation: Smart contract and bio hash | Data integrity and anonymity, privacy, security | Fingerprint authentication is expensive and inaccurate | [ |
| 19 | A Blockchain-based Traceable Self-tallying E-voting Protocol in AI Era | Simulation: AI-based self-tallying e-voting scheme | Satisfies anonymity, time-bounded privacy, linkability, and full traceability | Absence to real-world applications on large scale | [ |
| 20 | Decentralized E-voting system based on Smart Contract by using Blockchain Technology | Simulation: Ethereum with smart contract on local blockchain | Reliable, safe, flexible, and able to support real-time services | Latency throughput issues arise. Ethereum’s speed limits large-scale deployment. | [ |
| 21 | Efficient, coercion-free and universally verifiable Blockchain-based voting | Simulation: Ethereum with smart contract with a focus to reduce the gas fee | Scalable and practical for large-scale elections | A trustworthy administrator registers voters and an aggregator compile results | [ |
| 22 | TrustVote On Elections We Trust with Distributed Ledgers and Smart Contracts | Simulation: Ethereum with Hyperledger | Compares permissioned and public Blockchain for better performance, transaction speed, and privacy | Coercion-resistant, needs trusted authorities | [ |
| 23 | Efficient Privacy-Preserving Electronic Voting Scheme Based on Blockchain | Simulation: Ethereum with multicandidate electronic voting scheme | Good performance and the feasibility and correctness of the voting scheme | Permissioned Blockchain requires trusted authorities, scalability issues on large scale | [ |
| 24 | Provotum A Blockchain-based and End-to-end Verifiable Remote Electronic Voting System | Simulation: End-to-end verifiable remote private Blockchain scheme | Practical design and architecture of public bulletin boards, ballot secrecy, and end-to-end verifiability | Does not support multiway elections, lack of secure communication channels | [ |
| 25 | Investigating performance constraints for Blockchain based secure e-voting system | Simulation: Permissioned and permissionless blockchain to measure performance | Efficiency, performance, and scalability | It does not explicitly state security aspects such as uniqueness and ballot reception | [ |
| 26 | A Smart Contract System for Decentralized Borda Count Voting | Simulation: A decentralized, multicandidate, public-verifiable voting system. | Self-tallying decentralized and ranked-choice voting system | Large-scale voting is also impossible. No protocol considers voter privacy | [ |
| 27 | Secure Online Voting System Using Biometric and Blockchain | Experimental: Using Biometric with sidechain | Tamper-proof storage, user authenticity, and data security | It cannot engage stakeholders on Blockchain quality or feasibility | [ |
| 28 | An improved FOO voting scheme using Blockchain | Experimental: many-functional Blockchain-based FOO protocol | Fairness and correctness | Coercion-resistant | [ |
| 29 | Fault-Tolerant Architecture Design for Blockchain-Based Electronics Voting System | Simulation: fault-tolerant e-voting systems | Data security, performance, measuring computing resources and agility | Weaknesses in anonymization, Internet security, and managing unforeseen events | [ |
| 30 | Large-Scale Electronic Voting Based on Conflux Consensus Mechanism | Simulation: comparative Blockchain-based voting systems | Decentralized, self-managed, noninteractive, and free of charge | Inability to deal coercion-resistant privacy and security | [ |
| 31 | Securing e-voting based on Blockchain in P2P network | Simulation: using Python with ECC public key cryptography | Avoids forgery of votes, authentication, nonrepudiation, and changing of vote before a preset deadline | The system’s PKI database may invalidate its vote block verification process | [ |
| 32 | Towards A Privacy-Preserving Voting System Through Blockchain Technologies | Proposed: Cost-productive framework | Fairness, independence, and unbiasedness | The proposed system was not tested and implemented | [ |
| 33 | End-to-End Voting with Non-Permissioned and Permissioned Ledgers | Simulation: E2E verifiable system using Bitcoin and MultiChain | Uncoercibility and receipt freeness and data confidentiality and neutrality | Not formally proven, needs to measure the qualitative properties | [ |
| 34 | An Anti-Quantum E-Voting Protocol in Blockchain with Audit Function | Simulation: Niederreiter’s code-based cryptosystem | True fairness, audit voters, transparency, and efficiency in small-scale election | Largely appropriate for small-scale elections | [ |
| 35 | Chaintegrity: Blockchain-enabled large-scale e-voting system with robustness and universal verifiability | Simulation: Impractical properties of Blockchain-based e-voting | Large-scale e-voting system | Uniqueness and ballot reception are not explicitly stated | [ |
| 36 | voteChain: Community Based Scalable Internet Voting Framework | Proposal presented: Mixed approach to achieve require results | Scalable Internet voting | Multiple vote casting, possibility of attack | [ |
| 37 | A Secure Decentralized Trustless E-Voting System Based on Smart Contract | Simulation: Privacy-preserving e-voting protocol | Decentralized, trustless electronic voting system based on the smart contract | Cannot scale, needs a lot of processing and communication power | [ |
| 38 | Towards Blockchain-Based E-Voting Systems | Simulation: Efficiency- and scalability-based system | Cost-effective, lightweight, and efficient | The study did not specify the system’s needs | [ |
| 39 | Votereum: An Ethereum-Based E-Voting System | Simulation: Robust, private, and verifiable system | Privacy, uniqueness, universal verifiability, and robustness | This mechanism cannot assure free receipt or withstand coercion | [ |
| 40 | TrustedEVoting (TeV) a Secure, Anonymous and Verifiable Blockchain-Based e-Voting Framework | Conceptual design: Secure and verifiable e-voting system (TeV) | Nontampering, voter anonymity, and vote verifiability | TeV was not implemented or evaluated in a nationwide election | [ |
| 41 | LaT-Voting: Traceable Anonymous E-Voting on Blockchain | Simulation: Traceability prefixes anonymous protocol | Authentication, privacy, and subtle traceability | No central authority to monitor | [ |
| 42 | A Simple Voting Protocol on Quantum Blockchain | Simulation: Quantum Blockchain electronic | Anonymous, binding, nonreusable, verifiable, eligible, fair, and self-tallying | It lacks auditability consistency | [ |
| 43 | Transparent E-Voting dApp Based on Waves Blockchain and RIDE Language | Simulation: Privacy and tally voting system | Substantially enhances performance | Waves votes dApps. Large-block, voter-controlled blockchains | [ |
| 44 | Design of Blockchain-based electronic election system using Hyperledger: Case of Indonesia | Proposed design: Blockchain necessity, issue solution, and secure election needs | Security and performance | Security and performance were not tested on the design | [ |
| 45 | DABSTERS: A Privacy Preserving e-Voting Protocol for Permissioned Blockchain | Formal Verification: Election privacy and transparency protocol | Voter privacy, integrity, and verifiability | ProVerif validated. Performance and implementation assessments are lacking | [ |
| 46 | Privacy-protected Electronic Voting System Based on Blockchin and Trusted Execution Environment | Simulation: Cost-effective and efficient electronic voting | Economical, efficient, and privacy for board-scale elections | Needs more research on large-scale elections and the system | [ |
| 47 | Implementation of an E-Voting Scheme Using Hyperledger Fabric Permissioned Blockchain | Simulation: Consortium blockchain with smart contracts | Increased transparency and trust | The system was developed for general e-voting, not stakeholder demands | [ |
| 48 | Designing Process-Centric Blockchain-Based Architectures A Case Study in e-voting as a Service | Architecture Design: Blockchain-based e-voting with cloud | Process-centric, trusted, configurable and multipurpose electronic voting service | Security and privacy were not discussed and it was not implemented | [ |
| 49 | Blockchain centered homomorphic encryption: A secure solution for E-balloting | Simulation: Blockchain voting through additive homomorphism | Prevention of multiple voting, privacy and end-to-end verifiability | Scalability and multicasting voting issues | [ |
| 50 | A privacy-preserving voting protocol on Blockchain | Simulation: Homomorphic encryption counts smart-contract votes | End-to-end privacy, detectability, and correctability against cheating | The system is unfair and does not prevent malicious activity | [ |
| 51 | SHARVOT: Secret SHARe-Based VOTing on the Blockchain | Proposed Solution: Used circle shuffle technique | Privacy, anonymity, ballot irrevocability, and transparency | Needs centralization. Authorities sabotage voting | [ |
| 52 | Improving end-to-end verifiable voting systems with Blockchain technologies | Experimental: Helios has DDoS and data manipulation difficulties | End-to-end verifiability, data tampering, immutability, and public accessibility | This voting technique involves a “centralized database service” | [ |
| 53 | SecEVS: Secure Electronic Voting System Using Blockchain Technology | Experimental: Secure electronic voting system using Blockchain technology | Transparency, decentralization, irreversibility, and nonrepudiation | This work is costly and time-consuming | [ |
| 54 | A proposal of Blockchain-based electronic voting system | Experimental: double-envelope encryption and Blockchain | High availability and universal verifiability | E-voting privacy was not discussed | [ |
| 55 | PHANTOM protocol as the new crypto-democracy | Mathematical Modelling: PHANTOM protocol with encription method | Vote rigging, hacking, election manipulation, and polling booth capturing | This protocol was not implemented or evaluated | [ |
| 56 | Blockchain-based e-voting system | Experimental: Scheme uses a smart contract to tally the result | Security and decreased cost of hosting a nationwide election | Compromised security, privacy, and anonymity | [ |
| 57 | E-Voting with Blockchain: An E-Voting Protocol with Decentralisation and Voter Privacy | Experimental: Proposed a decentralized voting scheme | Open, fair, and independently verifiable | It does not provide auditability, consistency, or privacy | [ |
| 58 | Blockchain-Enabled E-Voting | Experimental: Smartphone-based electronic platform | Reduced voter fraud and increased voter access | It is more of an example of i-voting rather than e-voting | [ |
| 59 | Crypto-voting, a Blockchain based e-Voting System | Experimental: Voting uses sidechains, holds voters and vote data | Traceability and auditability | Compromising on fairness | [ |
| 60 | Towards secure e-voting using ethereum Blockchain | Experimental: Voting through Ethereum with Android application | Safer, cheaper, more secure, more transparent, and easier to use | The drawbacks are that it lacks robustness and receiving freedom | [ |
| 61 | Towards the intelligent agents for Blockchain e-voting system | Conceptual model: Auditable Blockchain voting system multiagent concept | Transparency and auditability | Data and privacy insecurity via email voting | [ |
| 62 | A Survey of Blockchain Based on E-voting Systems | Survey: It highlights current security and privacy vulnerabilities | Security and privacy requirements of the existing Blockchain e-voting systems | It lacks scalability, throughput, and latency | [ |
| 63 | E-Voting on the Blockchain | Analysis: Blockchain voting is discussed | Reduced voter fraud and increased voter access | It is not entirely decentralized; utilizes Blockchain to store votes | [ |
| 64 | A study on decentralized e-voting system using Blockchain technology | Proposed model: E-voting system with SHA voter data encryption | Vote rigging and hacking of the EVM | One chain per candidate adds storage and processing complexity | [ |
| 65 | A secure end-to-end verifiable e-voting system using zero knowledge based Blockchain | Proposed scheme: DRE-ip with zero-knowledge-based public Blockchain | Authenticated, end-to-end verifiable, and with secret ballot election | Large computational costs make these technologies costly to use and deploy in DeFi. | [ |
| 66 | Voting process with Blockchain technology: Auditable Blockchain voting system | Proposed scheme: supervised Internet voting system | Audit and verification capability | Lack of audits and system verification compromises transparency and tamper-proofness | [ |
| 67 | Secure Digital Voting System Based on Blockchain Technology | Scheme: E-voting using jeopardizing cryptographic hashes | Increased efficiency and reduced errors | It allowed multiple votes to one user | [ |
| 68 | Decentralized Voting Platform Based on Ethereum Blockchain | Experimental: Voting on multiple votes per mobile (MSISDN) | Ensuring data integrity, transparency, enforcement, and privacy | Absence of clarity and time consumption | [ |
| 69 | Blockchain based e-voting recording system design | Simulation: Recording of voting result using Blockchain algorithm | Security, transparency, and reduced cheating sources of database manipulation | Lack of personal voter authentication | [ |
| 70 | Decentralized E-Voting Systems Based on the Blockchain Technology | Scheme: Blockchain-based, secret sharing and homomorphic encryption | Anonymity, privacy, and verifiability | Missed quality targets | [ |
| 71 | An e-voting protocol based on Blockchain | Scheme: Blockchain and blind signature | Satisfied coercion resistance and access control | The limits are coercion resistance, robustness, and fairness | [ |
| 72 | The future of e-voting | Academic proposal: Zcash protocol with zero knowledge | Security and anonymity | A server challenge-response handshake to stores email, fake emails are simple | [ |
| 73 | A conceptual secure Blockchain-based electronic voting system | Academic proposal: voting scheme using hash value | Secure, reliable, anonymous voting might improve local or national elections | Lack of authentication and privacy for users | [ |
| 74 | A smart contract for boardroom voting with maximum voter privacy | Academic proposal: Comprehensive secure protocol using the Ethereum | An Internet voting system that is both decentralized and self-tallying while also protecting the privacy of voters | Their arithmetic-heavy technique requires a lot of computing power | [ |
| 75 | E-Voting System Based on Blockchain Technology: A Survey | Analysis: Blockchain voting security and transparency | Less trust, privacy, and security | Absence of dialogue around scalability and anonymity | [ |
| 76 | Blockchain for Electronic Voting System Review and Open Research Challenges | Analysis: Blockchain voting challenges and future research | Privacy protection, scalability, and transaction speed | Usage authentication not stated | [ |
Figure 12Implementation of Blockchain in electronic voting.
Studies utilizing specific Blockchain implementations.
| # | Blockchain Framework | Articles |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Bitcoin | [ |
| 2 | Ethereum | [ |
| 3 | Hyperledger Fabric | [ |
| 4 | Hyperledger Sawtooth | [ |
| 5 | Multichain | [ |
| 6 | Helios | [ |
| 7 | Phantom | [ |
| 8 | Blockchain Database | [ |
| 9 | Conflux | [ |
| 10 | Waves | [ |
| 11 | Platform Independent | [ |
The methods of verification employed in the chosen articles.
| Verification Method | Research Article |
|---|---|
| Examination of evaluation criteria | [ |
| Scalability testing (nodes, transactions per second, response time) | [ |
| Performance tests (blocks per hour, blocks per day, transaction latency, transaction throughput) | [ |
| Security test/analysis (vulnerability towards specific types of attacks) | [ |
| Cost evaluation | [ |
Explicitly revealed cryptographic solutions in researched articles.
| Cryptography | Cryptography Solution | Research Article |
|---|---|---|
| Symmetric Key | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) | [ |
| Asymmetric/Public Key | Homomorphic | [ |
| RSA | [ | |
| Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) | [ | |
| Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) | [ | |
| ElGamal | [ | |
| DSA | [ | |
| Hash Functions | SHA’s | [ |
Cryptographic operations.
| Cryptography Solution | Articles | Cost | Time (Key Generation Time) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) | [ | N/A | 1 KB file size encryption time: 128-bit key generation ~14,594 microsecond, 192-bit key generation ~14,432 microsecond, and 256-bit key generation ~16,222 microsecond. Relatively fast over all ~ 0.0023 s. |
| Homomorphic | [ | N/A | Bits slower ~ 41 milliseconds. |
| RSA | [ | 512-bit RSA keys—2 CPU hours (the cost of USD 0.06) | 1024-bit key generation ~0.16 s, 2240-bit key generation ~7.47 s, 3072-bit key generation ~9.80 s. Overall key generation time ~15 min, RSA bits slower. |
| Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) | [ | 160 bits ECC keys— (the cost of USD 0.02) | 1024-bit key generation ~0.08 s, 2240-bit key generation ~0.18 s, 3072-bit key generation ~0.27 s. |
| Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) | [ | N/A | 163-bit key generation ~0.08 s, 233-bit key generation ~0.18 s, 283-bit key generation ~0.27 s, 409-bit key generation ~0.64 s, 571-bit key generation ~1.44 s, |
| ElGamal | [ | N/A | 25 KB file size encryption time: ~1858.6 millisecond, 50 KB file size encryption time: ~2346.2 millisecond. |
| Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) | [ | N/A | 512-bit key generation ~19 millisecond, 1024-bit key generation ~82 millisecond. |
| SHA’s (SHA-2 to SHA 256) | [ | N/A | 1.4 MB file size 0.04 s, 2.2 MB ~ 0.07 s, 3.3 MB ~0.13 s, 5.9 MB ~ 0.21 s and 6.9 MB ~ 0.24 s. |
Scalability scenario classification.
| Scalability Scenario Classification | Research Articles |
|---|---|
| Small Scale or Organization Voting | [ |
| National Voting | [ |
| Generic Voting | [ |
Identified performance parameters.
| Performance Parameter | Description | Articles |
|---|---|---|
| Block frequency | Interval time between two succeeding blocks | [ |
| Block size | A block’s capacity to hold the number of transactions | [ |
| Workload type | Smart contract | [ |
| CPU Usage/Node configuration | CPU, network speed, RAM | [ |
| Network size | The number of nodes | [ |
| Network structure/Network usage | Network structure of the Blockchain | [ |
| Workload quantity | Total transactions to be carried out | [ |
| Amount of miners/sealers/Memory usage | Actively participating nodes | [ |
| Blockchain client and API | E.g., Geth or Parity, web3.js or web3.py | [ |
Identified scalability parameters.
| Scalability Metric | Description | Articles |
|---|---|---|
| Throughput | Number of accomplished transactions per second (TPS) | [ |
| Latency | The time difference in seconds between when a transaction is submitted and completed | [ |
| Scalability | When a parameter is altered, there are changes in both throughput and latency (e.g., the network size or the hardware configuration of a node) | [ |
Prior approaches to enhance electoral process.
| Scalable Classifications or Approaches | Impact on Scalability | Articles | Issues/Challenges | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| Blockchain pipelining | Throughput | [ | It is well-known that some approaches, such as BigchainDB, are vulnerable to a 33 percent attack. |
| Blockchain delivery network | Throughput and storage | [ | Malicious actors may be able to spread blocks via this vulnerability. Reliable network infrastructure is a must here. | |
| Block size adjustment | Throughput and latency | [ | Application-specific, forks, increased block generation rate (BGR) | |
|
| Payment channel networks | Throughput | [ | Issues with one’s privacy and security. For transactions to be committed, it is necessary for both parties to be online or to lock their tokens. |
| Sharding | Throughput | [ | Security (shard takeover problem) Exchange of information (maintaining atomicity and preventing overloading of shards in cross-shard transactions) | |
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| Throughput and latency | [ | Adding nodes degrades performance. TPS/latency centralises. Requires an attractive incentive system | |
| Throughput and BGR | [ | Requires numerous active miners in a single network | ||
| Horizontal/vertical scalability | [ | Fork avoidance, adversaries, avoidance incentive mechanism | ||