| Literature DB >> 36236647 |
Yao Xiao1, Chunying Kang1, Hongchen Yu1, Tao Fan1, Haofang Zhang1.
Abstract
In recent years, network traffic contains a lot of feature information. If there are too many redundant features, the computational cost of the algorithm will be greatly increased. This paper proposes an anomalous network traffic detection method based on Elevated Harris Hawks optimization. This method is easier to identify redundant features in anomalous network traffic, reduces computational overhead, and improves the performance of anomalous traffic detection methods. By enhancing the random jump distance function, escape energy function, and designing a unique fitness function, there is a unique anomalous traffic detection method built using the algorithm and the neural network for anomalous traffic detection. This method is tested on three public network traffic datasets, namely the UNSW-NB15, NSL-KDD, and CICIDS2018. The experimental results show that the proposed method does not only significantly reduce the number of features in the dataset and computational overhead, but also gives better indicators for every test.Entities:
Keywords: Gated recurrent unit; Harris Hawks optimization; deep learning; feature selection
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36236647 PMCID: PMC9571187 DOI: 10.3390/s22197548
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.847
Figure 1Gated Recurrent hidden layer unit.
Figure 2The overall process.
Experimental environment.
| CPU | AMD R5 3600X |
| GPU | Nvdia rtx2060 |
| RAM | 16 GB |
| Language | Python3.9 |
| Deep Learning Framework | Pytorch |
Composition of NSL-KDD dataset.
| Attack Category | Description | Train | Test |
|---|---|---|---|
| Normal | normal flow record | 67,341 | 9711 |
| Probe | Get detailed statistics on system and network configuration | 11,656 | 7456 |
| DoS | Attacks are designed to degrade network resources | 45,927 | 2421 |
| U2R | get permission | 114 | 1436 |
| R2L | Illegal access to a remote computer | 934 | 1520 |
| Total | 125,972 | 22,543 |
Composition of UNSW-NB15 dataset.
| Attack Category | Description | Train | Test |
|---|---|---|---|
| Normal | normal flow record | 37,000 | 56,000 |
| Backdoor | Techniques to gain access to programs or systems by bypassing security controls | 583 | 1746 |
| Analysis | Intrusion methods of infiltrating web applications through ports and web scripts | 677 | 2000 |
| Fuzzers | An attack that tries to find a security hole by passing a lot of random data, making it crash | 6062 | 18,184 |
| Shellcode | Attacks that control the target machine by sending code that exploits a specific vulnerability | 378 | 1133 |
| Reconnaissance | Attacks that collect computer network information to evade security controls | 3496 | 10,491 |
| Exploit | Code that takes control of the target system by triggering a bug or several bugs | 11,132 | 33,393 |
| DoS | Attacks are designed to degrade network resources | 4089 | 12,264 |
| Worms | Actively attacking malignant computer virus spread through the network | 44 | 130 |
| Genertic | A technique for colliding each block cipher using a hash function | 18,871 | 40,000 |
| Total | 82,332 | 175,341 |
Composition of CICIDS2018 dataset.
| Attack Category | Description | Train | Test |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brute-force attack | Perform brute force and password cracking attacks | 31,767 | 21,178 |
| Botnet | botnet | 17,167 | 11,445 |
| DoS | Attacks are designed to degrade network resources | 38,606 | 25,738 |
| DDoS | Distributed Denial of Service Attack | 82,307 | 54,871 |
| Infiltration | Intranet penetration attack | 13,640 | 9093 |
| SQL | SQL injection attack | 8 | 5 |
| Benign | benign traffic | 69,489 | 46,326 |
| Total | 252,984 | 168,656 |
Detailed experimental hyperparameters.
| Category | Description | |
|---|---|---|
| N | initial population | 30 |
| T | The maximum number of iterations of the feature selection algorithm | See the specific experiment section for details. |
| Max depth | Decision tree maximum depth | 4 |
| Hid dim | The number of hidden layer units in the neural network | 128 |
| Lr | Neural network learning rate | 0.0005 |
| E | The number of neural network iterations | 3000 |
|
| Neural network forgetting rate | 0.5 |
Figure 3The fitness of HHO.
Figure 4The fitness of EHHO.
Test the function variable scale.
| Function | Equation | Variable Domain | The Optimal Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ackley |
| [−5, 5] | 0 |
| Booth |
| [−10, 10] | 0 |
| Easom |
| [−100, 100] |
|
| Rastrigin |
| [−5.12, 5.12] | 0 |
Figure 5Rastrigin function.
Figure 6Ackley function.
Figure 7Booth function.
Figure 8Easom function.
Experimental results of NSL-KDD binary classification.
| Method | GRU | PSO | WOA | GA | HHO | EHHO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feature dimension | 41 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| accuracy | 78.34% | 77.94% | 79.77% | 81.42% | 79.97% | 82.47% |
| precision | 96.84% | 96.79% | 95.02% | 94.58% | 96.07% | 96.23% |
| recall | 64.03% | 63.34% | 68.03% | 71.46% | 67.58% | 72.02% |
| f1-score | 77.09% | 76.57% | 79.29% | 81.41% | 79.34% | 82.38% |
| Fpr | 2.76% | 2.78% | 4.72% | 5.41% | 3.66% | 3.73% |
Figure 9Binary classification histogram of NSL-KDD.
Multi-classification experimental results of NSL-KDD.
| Method | GRU | PSO | WOA | GA | HHO | EHHO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feature dimension | 42 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 8 |
| accuracy | 86.27% | 85.14% | 84.14% | 86.13% | 84.13% | 86.85% |
| normal tpr | 96.72% | 98.89% | 97.11% | 97.29% | 98.23% | 97.52% |
| normal fpr | 24.89% | 29.56% | 29.71% | 25.81% | 30.95% | 24.55% |
| DoS tpr | 98.92% | 83.23% | 93.12% | 95.21% | 77.83% | 97.46% |
| DoS fpr | 0.43% | 1.06% | 0.48% | 0.38% | 0.54% | 0.36% |
| r2l tpr | 0.23% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 7.05% | 0.00% |
| r2l fpr | 0.04% | 0.00% | 0.07% | 0.03% | 0.28% | 0.02% |
| probe tpr | 99.37% | 52.08% | 91.32% | 99.28% | 69.62% | 99.46% |
| probe fpr | 1.67% | 5.73% | 1.32% | 2.17% | 5.27% | 1.97% |
| u2r tpr | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| u2r fpr | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
Figure 10Multi-classification histogram of NSL-KDD.
The results of the UNSW-NB15 binary classification experiment.
| Method | GRU | PSO | WOA | GA | HHO | EHHO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feature dimension | 42 | 19 | 23 | 18 | 11 | 20 |
| accuracy | 74.08% | 87.04% | 75.56% | 88.37% | 89.33% | 90.26% |
| precision | 99.59% | 98.31% | 98.7% | 98.57% | 98.62% | 96.96% |
| recall | 62.18% | 82.38% | 64.94% | 84.13% | 85.51% | 88.46% |
| f1-score | 76.56% | 89.64% | 78.34% | 90.78% | 91.6% | 92.52% |
| Fpr | 0.55% | 3.02% | 1.82% | 2.59% | 2.54% | 5.92% |
Figure 11Binary classification histogram of UNSW-NB15.
The results of the UNSW-NB15 multi-classification experiment.
| Method | GRU | PSO | WOA | GA | HHO | EHHO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feature dimension | 42 | 19 | 11 | 16 | 16 | 22 |
| accuracy | 74.01% | 85.97% | 86.45% | 88.17% | 86.14% | 88.67% |
| Normal TPR | 99.3% | 98.41% | 98.79% | 98.62% | 98.45% | 97.76% |
| Normal FPR | 37.86% | 17.77% | 19.35% | 16.74% | 19.64% | 15.6% |
| Generic TPR | 97.87% | 97.9% | 98% | 97.78% | 97.85% | 97.78% |
| Generic FPR | 0.1% | 0.21% | 0.33% | 0.15% | 0.14% | 0.04% |
| Exploits TPR | 7.06% | 54.3% | 54.76% | 54.95% | 51.18% | 53.66% |
| Exploits FPR | 2.09% | 3.74% | 3.46% | 3.62% | 3.52% | 3.89% |
| Fuzzers TPR | 4.09% | 8.66% | 6.42% | 7.8% | 9.07% | 12.4% |
| Fuzzers FPR | 0.37% | 0.59% | 0.51% | 0.66% | 1.41% | 0.99% |
| DoS TPR | 64.2% | 70.14% | 71.71% | 72.97% | 70.21% | 73.88% |
| DoS FPR | 9.85% | 10.6% | 10.73% | 10.96% | 10.69% | 11.02% |
| Reconnaissance TPR | 33.92% | 42.64% | 43.35% | 69.96% | 41.46% | 71.9% |
| Reconnaissance FPR | 0.09% | 0.44% | 0.67% | 0.41% | 0.66% | 0.6% |
| Analysis TPR | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Analysis FPR | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Backdoor TPR | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1.83% | 0% | 0% |
| Backdoor FPR | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Shellcode TPR | 33.54% | 6.62% | 8.21% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Shellcode FPR | 0.35% | 0.09% | 0.04% | 0% | 0% | 0.01% |
| Worms TPR | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Worms FPR | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
Figure 12Multi-classification histogram of UNSW-NB15.
The results of the CICIDS2018 binary classification experiment.
| Method | GRU | PSO | WOA | GA | HHO | EHHO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feature dimension | 80 | 18 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 11 |
| accuracy | 94.57% | 93.94% | 94.06% | 93.66% | 94.15% | 94.20% |
| precision | 99.87% | 98.93% | 98.33% | 98.3% | 99.38% | 99.51% |
| recall | 92.64% | 92.65% | 93.41% | 92.87% | 93.41% | 92.48% |
| f1-score | 96.12% | 95.69% | 95.81% | 95.51% | 95.83% | 95.86% |
| Fpr | 0.31% | 2.65% | 4.22% | 4.26% | 1.53% | 1.22% |
Figure 13Binary classification histogram of CICIDS2018.
Figure 14Confusion Matrix of GRU.
Figure 15Confusion Matrix of EHHO.