| Literature DB >> 36211914 |
Jiahui Xia1, Zhanchi Wu1, Zhaolan Dang1, Rui Zhang2.
Abstract
The relationship between hometown attachment (HA) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a topic to be explored in depth. We measured the HA by the Chinese diaspora background and the immigrant culture of the ultimate controllers of the firm and employed the sample of Chinese non-financial private-listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2019 to investigate the impact of the HA on overseas Chinese entrepreneurs on CSR. We found that the HA of the overseas Chinese ultimate controller significantly increases the level of CSR, and this promoting effect rises when the firm ultimately held by the overseas Chinese entrepreneur is registered in the expatriate hometown. Our further analysis found that the personal characteristics of overseas Chinese entrepreneurs and regional cultural differences have a moderating effect on the above relationship. In particular, we found that overseas Chinese entrepreneurs who are women or with lower academic qualifications have a stronger sense of CSR. Moreover, in areas with low marketization or a high level of social trust, HA of overseas Chinese entrepreneurs plays a more active role in CSR. The results remain robust after the robustness test and the endogenous test. The conclusion of this study not only highlights the impact of psychological factors on the level of CSR but also provides a reference for the study of the decision-making behavior of overseas Chinese entrepreneurs.Entities:
Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR); hometown attachment (HA); migrants; overseas Chinese; social trust
Year: 2022 PMID: 36211914 PMCID: PMC9538926 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943701
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Psychol ISSN: 1664-1078
Industry distribution of sample firms.
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| Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery | 24 | 1.64% |
| Mining | 15 | 1.02% |
| Manufacturing | 1,089 | 74.33% |
| Electricity, heat, gas and water production, and supply industry | 6 | 0.41% |
| Construction | 27 | 1.84% |
| Wholesale and retail | 46 | 3.14% |
| Transportation, storage, and postal industry | 12 | 0.82% |
| Accommodation and catering industry | 2 | 0.14% |
| Information transmission, software, and information technology services | 122 | 8.33% |
| Real estate | 47 | 3.21% |
| Leasing and business services | 12 | 0.82% |
| Scientific research and technical services | 13 | 0.89% |
| Water, environment, and public facilities management industry | 6 | 0.41% |
| Residential services, repairs, and other services | 5 | 0.34% |
| Health and social work | 2 | 0.14% |
| Culture, sports, and entertainment industry | 11 | 0.75% |
| Comprehensive industry | 26 | 1.77% |
The industry classification is based on the Tier 1 classification of the Industry Classification Guidelines for Listed Companies (Revised in 2012) issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, with a total of 19 industries. Additionally, we excluded the financial industry. Moreover, the sample of companies in the education industry is 0. Therefore, Table 1 illustrates the sample distribution of 17 industries.
Year distribution of ultimate controllers.
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| 2003 | 8 | 14.55% | 47 | 85.45% | 55 |
| 2004 | 16 | 9.64% | 150 | 90.36% | 166 |
| 2005 | 25 | 11.31% | 196 | 88.69% | 221 |
| 2006 | 25 | 10.29% | 218 | 89.71% | 243 |
| 2007 | 25 | 9.26% | 245 | 90.74% | 270 |
| 2008 | 39 | 10.68% | 326 | 89.32% | 365 |
| 2009 | 45 | 10.77% | 373 | 89.23% | 418 |
| 2010 | 61 | 11.66% | 462 | 88.34% | 523 |
| 2011 | 95 | 11.11% | 760 | 88.89% | 855 |
| 2012 | 121 | 11.20% | 959 | 88.80% | 1,080 |
| 2013 | 124 | 10.38% | 1,071 | 89.62% | 1,195 |
| 2014 | 128 | 10.41% | 1,101 | 89.59% | 1,229 |
| 2015 | 137 | 10.33% | 1,189 | 89.67% | 1,326 |
| 2016 | 140 | 10.36% | 1,212 | 89.64% | 1,352 |
| 2017 | 136 | 10.21% | 1,196 | 89.79% | 1,332 |
| 2018 | 132 | 10.38% | 1,140 | 89.62% | 1,272 |
| 2019 | 50 | 10.35% | 433 | 89.65% | 483 |
Descriptive statistics.
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| 12385 | 0.1209 | 0.0668 | 0.0177 | 0.1061 | 0.3880 |
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| 12385 | 0.1055 | 0.3072 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 |
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| 12385 | 0.0571 | 0.2320 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 |
| Firm characteristics | ||||||
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| 12385 | 21.7081 | 1.0547 | 19.2928 | 21.6173 | 24.8217 |
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| 12385 | 0.3903 | 0.1975 | 0.0467 | 0.3835 | 0.8783 |
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| 12385 | 0.2453 | 0.5857 | −0.6204 | 0.1478 | 4.7108 |
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| 12385 | 0.0404 | 0.0740 | −0.2038 | 0.0403 | 0.2490 |
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| 12385 | 0.0409 | 0.0586 | −0.2446 | 0.0402 | 0.2051 |
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| 12385 | 7.4535 | 5.7094 | 0.0000 | 6.0000 | 23.0000 |
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| 12385 | 0.0610 | 0.1297 | −0.8514 | 0.0684 | 0.3491 |
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| 12385 | 0.1947 | 0.2141 | 0.0000 | 0.1019 | 0.7059 |
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| 12385 | 3.2717 | 0.6995 | 3.0000 | 3.0000 | 6.0000 |
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| 12385 | 0.8107 | 0.3918 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
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| 12385 | 0.5460 | 0.4979 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| Ultimate controller's characteristics | ||||||
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| 12385 | 0.9523 | 0.2132 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
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| 12385 | 0.5284 | 0.0805 | 0.3400 | 0.5200 | 0.7400 |
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| 12385 | 3.3908 | 1.2403 | 1.0000 | 3.0000 | 6.0000 |
| Regional characteristics | ||||||
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| 12385 | 64664.6875 | 29985.2578 | 9440.0000 | 63374.0000 | 153095.0000 |
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| 12385 | 10.4442 | 3.7476 | 5.0000 | 11.0000 | 15.0000 |
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| 12385 | 41.8470 | 29.7919 | 1.0000 | 37.0000 | 103.0000 |
Figure 1Analysis framework of research questions.
Univariate test.
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| Difference | |||||
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| 11078 | 0.1230 | 1307 | 0.1317 | −0.0087 |
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| 11078 | 0.9548 | 1307 | 0.9290 | 0.0258 |
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| 11078 | 0.5285 | 1307 | 0.5274 | 0.0012 |
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| 11078 | 3.3882 | 1307 | 3.5293 | −0.1411 |
| Difference | |||||
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| 11678 | 0.1232 | 707 | 0.1354 | −0.0122 |
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| 11678 | 0.9537 | 707 | 0.9234 | 0.0304 |
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| 11678 | 0.5282 | 707 | 0.5317 | −0.0035 |
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| 11678 | 3.3998 | 707 | 3.4635 | −0.0637 |
p < 0.01.
The effect of the ultimate controller's HA on CSR (H1).
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 0.0066*** | 0.0068*** | 0.0062*** |
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| −0.0061*** | −0.0062*** | −0.0062*** |
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| 0.0456*** | 0.0453*** | 0.0462*** |
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| −0.0019 | −0.0019 | −0.0019 |
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| 0.1644*** | 0.1639*** | 0.1644*** |
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| 0.6461*** | 0.6477*** | 0.6479*** |
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| −0.0007*** | −0.0006*** | −0.0007*** |
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| −0.1238*** | −0.1244*** | −0.1243*** |
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| 0.0038 | 0.0030 | 0.0025 |
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| 0.0031*** | 0.0031*** | 0.0035*** |
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| 0.0016 | 0.0015 | 0.0014 |
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| 0.0058*** | 0.0056*** | 0.0059*** |
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| 0.0058** | 0.0061** | |
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| −0.0119* | −0.0122* | |
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| −0.0009** | −0.0010** | |
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| 0.0000** | ||
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| −0.0005*** | ||
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| 0.0000 | ||
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| 0.1380*** | 0.1417*** | 0.1466*** |
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| YES | YES | YES |
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| YES | YES | YES |
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| 12,385 | 12,385 | 12,385 |
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| 0.268 | 0.269 | 0.270 |
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The effect of the ultimate controller's HA on CSR (H2).
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 0.0106*** | 0.0110*** | 0.0108*** |
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| −0.0061*** | −0.0061*** | −0.0062*** |
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| 0.0452*** | 0.0449*** | 0.0459*** |
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| −0.0018 | −0.0019 | −0.0019 |
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| 0.1642*** | 0.1638*** | 0.1645*** |
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| 0.6454*** | 0.6471*** | 0.6471*** |
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| −0.0007*** | −0.0006*** | −0.0007*** |
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| −0.1234*** | −0.1241*** | −0.1239*** |
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| 0.0036 | 0.0029 | 0.0025 |
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| 0.0032*** | 0.0032*** | 0.0036*** |
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| 0.0013 | 0.0013 | 0.0011 |
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| 0.0057*** | 0.0056*** | 0.0059*** |
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| 0.0060** | 0.0064*** | |
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| −0.0124* | −0.0128* | |
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| −0.0008** | −0.0010** | |
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| 0.0000** | ||
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| −0.0005*** | ||
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| 0.0000 | ||
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| 0.1378*** | 0.1414*** | 0.1464*** |
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| YES | YES | YES |
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| YES | YES | YES |
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| 12,385 | 12,385 | 12,385 |
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| 0.269 | 0.269 | 0.270 |
Robust t–statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
The moderating effect of characteristics of the ultimate controller (H3).
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| 0.0115** | −0.0228** | 0.0213*** | |||
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| 0.0218*** | 0.0068 | 0.0259*** | |||
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| −0.0056 | |||||
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| −0.0120* | |||||
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| 0.0550*** | |||||
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| 0.0075 | |||||
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| −0.0043*** | |||||
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| −0.0044** | |||||
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| Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
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| 0.1458*** | 0.1454*** | 0.1502*** | 0.1467*** | 0.1459*** | 0.1468*** |
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| YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
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| YES | YES | YES | YES | Year | YES |
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| 12,385 | 12,385 | 12,385 | 12,385 | 12,385 | 12,385 |
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| 0.2730 | 0.2736 | 0.2734 | 0.2735 | 0.2736 | 0.2739 |
Robust t–statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
The moderating effect of marketization (H4).
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| 0.0041* | 0.0066** | ||
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| 0.0058* | 0.0132*** | ||
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| Control | Control | Control | Control |
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| 0.1598*** | 0.1400*** | 0.1596*** | 0.1393*** |
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| YES | YES | YES | YES |
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| YES | YES | YES | YES |
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| 5,953 | 6,429 | 5,953 | 6,429 |
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| 0.299 | 0.256 | 0.299 | 0.256 |
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
The moderating effect of social trust (H5).
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| 0.0065*** | 0.0038 | ||
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| 0.0124*** | 0.0078 | ||
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| Control | Control | Control | Control |
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| 0.1802*** | 0.1191*** | 0.1798*** | 0.1189*** |
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| YES | YES | YES | YES |
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| YES | YES | YES | YES |
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| 6,284 | 6,101 | 6,284 | 6,101 |
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| 0.261 | 0.314 | 0.262 | 0.314 |
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01.
Changing key variables.
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| 0.0131*** |
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| Control |
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| 0.1461*** |
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| YES |
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| YES |
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| 12,385 |
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| 0.271 |
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01.
Excluding the impact of the financial crisis.
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|---|---|---|
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| 0.0055*** | |
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| 0.0095*** | |
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| Control | Control |
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| 0.1900*** | 0.1893*** |
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| YES | YES |
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| YES | YES |
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| 11,065 | 11,065 |
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| 0.268 | 0.268 |
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01.
Instrumental variables regression.
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| 0.0106*** | |
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| 0.0277*** | |
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| 0.0562*** | |
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| Control | Control |
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| 0.3287*** | 0.1276*** |
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| YES | YES |
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| YES | YES |
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| 12,385 | 12,385 |
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| 0.0558 | 0.2228 |
| Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic: 89.2880, | ||
| Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic: 45.1720 [19.93] | ||
| Hansen J statistic: 0.6870, | ||
| Endogeneity test: 6.1410, | ||
*** represents significance levels at the 1% levels. In column 1, the t-statistics in parentheses are clustered from the robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. In column 2, the z-statistics in parentheses are clustered from the robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic represents the result of the “unidentifiable” test, and the p-value = 0.0000 rejects the null hypothesis of “unidentifiable”. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic represents the results of the “weak instrumental variable” test, and the 10% threshold of the Stock-Yogo weak instrumental variable test is in parentheses. The Hansen J statistic represents the results of the “overidentification” test, with the null hypothesis that “all instrumental variables are exogenous”. The endogeneity test is the result of the endogeneity test of the independent variable, and the null hypothesis is “the independent variable is exogenous”.
Results of the hypotheses.
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| H1 | HA → CSR | + | Accepted |
| H2 | HA → CSR | + | Accepted |
| H3a | Gender × HA → CSR | - | Accepted |
| H3b | Age × HA → CSR | + | Accepted |
| H3c | Education × HA → CSR | - | Accepted |
| H4 | Marketization × HA → CSR | - | Accepted |
| H5 | Social Trust × HA → CSR | + | Accepted |