| Literature DB >> 36193399 |
Abstract
This study explores the relationship between perceived government pressure for environmental regulation and corporate eco-innovation. Based on the questionnaire data of Chinese private firms in 2016, this study explores the role of government pressure perceived by private firms in corporate environmental innovation, and the moderating effects of foreign ownership and entrepreneurs' political status. The results show that there is a positive relationship between perceived government environmental regulatory pressure and corporate eco-innovation, and this relationship can be strengthened by foreign ownership and entrepreneurs' political status. These findings provide a new strategic motivation for firms to undertake eco-innovation, i.e., the environmental regulatory pressure released by the government can urge firms to undertake strategies as an external "booster."Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36193399 PMCID: PMC9526559 DOI: 10.1155/2022/2337867
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Environ Public Health ISSN: 1687-9805
Characteristics of the sample.
| N | Mean | S. D. |
| P99 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eco-innovation | 2,244 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 0 | 1 |
| Government pressure | 2,244 | 2.51 | 1.28 | 1 | 5 |
| Gender | 2,244 | 0.82 | 0.38 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 2,244 | 45.89 | 9.47 | 25 | 67 |
| Education | 2,244 | 2.98 | 1.13 | 1 | 6 |
| Foreign education | 2,244 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Salary | 2,244 | 3.18 | 1.43 | 0 | 7.67 |
| Political connection | 2,244 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Charity member | 2,244 | 0.2 | 0.40 | 0 | 1 |
| Firm size | 2,244 | 3.56 | 1.81 | 0 | 7.78 |
| Firm age | 2,244 | 10.5 | 6.66 | 1 | 30 |
| ROA | 2,244 | 7.64 | 233.76 | −1 | 3.62 |
Correlation matrix of variables.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Eco-innovation | 1.00 | |||||||||||
| (2) Government pressure | 0.18 | 1.00 | ||||||||||
| (3) Gender | 0.07 | 0.05 | 1.00 | |||||||||
| (4) Age | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 1.00 | ||||||||
| (5) Education | 0.16 | −0.01 | 0.04 | −0.15 | 1.00 | |||||||
| (6) Foreign education | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | −0.04 | 0.22 | 1.00 | ||||||
| (7) Salary | 0.15 | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 1.00 | |||||
| (8) Political connection | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.29 | 0.20 | 0.10 | 0.23 | 1.00 | ||||
| (9) Charity member | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 1.00 | |||
| (10) Firm size | 0.31 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.26 | 0.35 | 0.13 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.24 | 1.00 | ||
| (11) Firm age | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.40 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.36 | 0.13 | 0.48 | 1.00 | |
| (12) ROA | −0.01 | 0.01 | −0.02 | −0.04 | −0.02 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.02 | −0.01 | −0.02 | −0.03 | 1.00 |
Regression results.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eco-innovation | Eco-innovation | Eco-innovation | Eco-innovation | Eco-innovation | |
| Gender | −0.004 | −0.015 | −0.026 | 0.035 | 0.029 |
| (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.104) | (0.123) | (0.124) | |
| Age | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
| Education | 0.121 | 0.131 | 0.127 | 0.139 | 0.140 |
| (0.035) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.042) | (0.042) | |
| Foreign education | 0.113 | 0.130 | 0.101 | 0.135 | 0.090 |
| (0.098) | (0.098) | (0.100) | (0.116) | (0.118) | |
| Salary | 0.059 | 0.052 | 0.045 | 0.063 | 0.054 |
| (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.029) | (0.030) | |
| Political connection | 0.102 | 0.092 | 0.045 | −0.019 | −0.090 |
| (0.081) | (0.081) | (0.084) | (0.096) | (0.1) | |
| Charity member | 0.246 | 0.262 | 0.278 | 0.320 | 0.325 |
| (0.082) | (0.083) | (0.084) | (0.097) | (0.098) | |
| Firm size | 0.147 | 0.137 | 0.137 | 0.168 | 0.166 |
| (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.033) | (0.033) | |
| Firm age | −0.001 | −0.002 | −0.004 | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |
| ROA | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| Government pressure | 0.154 | 0.015 | 0.151 | 0.020 | |
| (0.028) | (0.071) | (0.034) | (0.083) | ||
| Political status | −0.030 | −0.013 | |||
| (0.039) | (0.047) | ||||
| Political status × Government pressure | |||||
| 0.026 | 0.024 | ||||
| (0.013) | (0.015) | ||||
| Foreign ownership | −0.040 | −0.029 | |||
| (0.020) | (0.020) | ||||
| Foreign ownership × Government pressure | |||||
| 0.010 | 0.007 | ||||
| (0.005) | (0.005) | ||||
| Industrial dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Regional dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Constant | −2.489 | −2.943 | −2.725 | −3.115 | −3.043 |
| (0.377) | (0.392) | (0.435) | (0.458) | (0.514) | |
| Observations | 2,244 | 2,244 | 2,192 | 1,738 | 1,705 |
| Pseudo | 0.178 | 0.193 | 0.199 | 0.228 | 0.235 |
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses, p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.1.