| Literature DB >> 36096765 |
Kewen Yang1, Shah Fahad2, Feimin Yuan3.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: With China's aging and declining fertility rate, the importance of population quality is increasing. As the main force of the labor market in the future, the Chinese government tries to promote the development of adolescents by increasing the financial investment in compulsory education, so as to improve the future population quality of China and enhance the national competitiveness. Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between financial investment in compulsory education and the health of Chinese adolescents.Entities:
Keywords: Adolescent; Financial investment in compulsory education; Health; Heterogeneity; Influence mechanism
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36096765 PMCID: PMC9465893 DOI: 10.1186/s12889-022-14125-5
Source DB: PubMed Journal: BMC Public Health ISSN: 1471-2458 Impact factor: 4.135
Descriptive statistics of major variables
| Variables | Meaning/value | Obs | Mean (%) | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-rated health | Five-category variable | 6516 | 3.876 | 0.922 | 1 | 5 |
| Illness frequency | Three-category variable | 6516 | 1.969 | 0.448 | 1 | 3 |
| Sick leave days | Continuous variable | 6516 | 1.766 | 4.980 | 0 | 115 |
| Depression | Same as above | 6516 | 21.73 | 7.995 | 10 | 50 |
| Financial investment | Add 1 to take logarithm | 6516 | 6.649 | 1.248 | 0 | 8.380 |
| Age | Continuous variable | 6516 | 13.90 | 0.859 | 12 | 17 |
| Gender | 1, boy; 0, girl | 6516 | 0.521 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Hukou | 1,agriculture; 0,nonagriculture | 6516 | 0.528 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Cognitive ability | Three-category variable | 6516 | 2.046 | 0.810 | 1 | 3 |
| Love | 1, yes; 0, no | 6516 | 0.114 | 0.318 | 0 | 1 |
| Parental marital status | 1, married; 0, not married | 6516 | 0.925 | 0.263 | 0 | 1 |
| Only child | 1, yes; 0, no | 6516 | 0.442 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Whether parents quarrel | Same as above | 6516 | 0.098 | 0.298 | 0 | 1 |
| Mother's education | Years | 6516 | 3.360 | 1.194 | 1 | 7 |
| Family economic status | Five-category variable | 6516 | 2.937 | 0.599 | 1 | 5 |
| Health environment | Four-category variable | 6516 | 2.786 | 0.624 | 1 | 4 |
| School level | Five-category variable | 6516 | 4.033 | 0.799 | 2 | 5 |
Source: CEPS data for the 2014–2015 school year, the same hereinafter
Basic model results
| Dep. variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial investment | 0.021** | -0.030*** | -0.207*** | -0.191** |
| (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.068) | (0.096) | |
| Age | -0.020 | -0.017 | 0.195* | 0.226 |
| (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.101) | (0.160) | |
| Boy | 0.125*** | -0.277*** | 0.092 | -0.386** |
| (0.027) | (0.034) | (0.128) | (0.189) | |
| Agriculture | -0.015 | -0.069* | 0.318** | -0.031 |
| (0.032) | (0.040) | (0.159) | (0.256) | |
| Cognitive ability | -0.064*** | 0.067*** | -0.220*** | -0.253* |
| (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.084) | (0.138) | |
| Love | -0.067 | 0.025 | 0.908*** | 2.842*** |
| (0.042) | (0.057) | (0.255) | (0.357) | |
| Parents married | 0.114** | 0.032 | -0.709** | -0.762** |
| (0.049) | (0.066) | (0.288) | (0.378) | |
| Only child | 0.015 | 0.022 | 0.109 | -0.625*** |
| (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.153) | (0.235) | |
| Parents quarrel | -0.323*** | 0.356*** | 0.104 | 4.187*** |
| (0.049) | (0.061) | (0.201) | (0.368) | |
| Mother's education | 0.007 | -0.002 | 0.202* | -0.023 |
| (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.103) | (0.118) | |
| Family economic status | 0.206*** | -0.089*** | 0.004 | -1.020*** |
| (0.026) | (0.028) | (0.199) | (0.206) | |
| Health environment | 0.108*** | -0.066** | -0.257* | -0.825*** |
| (0.023) | (0.030) | (0.133) | (0.165) | |
| School level | -0.027 | 0.032 | -0.001 | 0.595*** |
| (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.093) | (0.210) | |
| Constant | - | - | 2.134 | 25.681*** |
| - | - | (1.806) | (3.126) | |
| County (District) FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 6516 | 6516 | 6516 | 6516 |
| Wald/F statistic | 537.54 | 211.08 | 5.937 | 15.440 |
| Pseudo-R2/Adj- R2 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.079 |
Note: Values in parentheses are the cluster robust standard error. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Due to space limitations, the cut point is omitted
Marginal effects in the ordered probit model
| Explanatory variables | Y = 1 | Y = 2 | Y = 3 | Y = 4 | Y = 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial investment | |||||
| -0.0004** | -0.002** | -0.005** | 0.001** | 0.007** | |
| (0.0002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.0003) | (0.003) | |
| 0.006*** | -0.001** | -0.005*** | - | - | |
| (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | - | - | |
Note: Values in parentheses are the Delta-method standard errors
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Instrumental variable test (1): Correlation test
| Dep. variables | Financial investment | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Instrumental variable | 0.875*** | 0.921*** | 1.084*** |
| (0.314) | (0.340) | (0.396) | |
| Control variables | N | Y | Y |
| County (District) FE | N | N | Y |
| Observations | 6272 | 6272 | 6272 |
| F statistic | 7.779 | 3.942 | 175.953 |
| Adj- R2 | 0.087 | 0.135 | 0.363 |
Note: (1) Values in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. (2) To save space, neither control variables nor constants are reported here. (3) The controlled variables are the same as those in Table 2
Instrumental variable test (2): Exogeneity test
| Dep. variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Instrumental variable | 0.071* | 0.018 | -0.589** | -0.148 |
| (0.039) | (0.015) | (0.241) | (0.323) | |
| Control variables | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| County (District) FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 6412 | 6412 | 6412 | 6412 |
| F statistic | 12.376 | 5.687 | 6.139 | 13.832 |
| Adj- R2 | 0.057 | 0.026 | 0.022 | 0.075 |
| Financial investment | 0.009 | -0.014*** | -0.164** | -0.201* |
| (0.010) | (0.004) | (0.075) | (0.104) | |
| Instrumental variable | 0.062 | 0.034** | -0.412 | 0.070 |
| (0.044) | (0.015) | (0.251) | (0.338) | |
| Control variables | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| County (District) FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 6412 | 6412 | 6412 | 6412 |
| F statistic | 12.535 | 5.836 | 6.753 | 14.824 |
| Adj- R2 | 0.057 | 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.075 |
Note: (1) Values in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. (2) To save space, neither control variables nor constants are reported here. (3) The controlled variables are the same as those in Table 2
2SLS regression analysis
| Dep. variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial investment | 0.066 | 0.017 | -0.544** | -0.137 |
| (0.041) | (0.017) | (0.248) | (0.289) | |
| Control variables | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| County (District) FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 6272 | 6272 | 6272 | 6272 |
| F statistic | 14.414 | 4.933 | 5.212 | 14.526 |
| Adj- R2 | 0.052 | 0.021 | 0.020 | 0.079 |
| DWH test | 1.97 | 5.06* | 2.7 | 0.04 |
Note: (1) Values in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. (2) To save space, neither control variables nor constants are reported here. (3) The controlled variables are the same as those in Table 2
Heterogeneity analysis
| Dep. variables | Hukou | Only child | Family economic status | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.021** | 0.004 | -0.013 | 0.037*** | -0.005 | 0.018** | |
| (0.010) | (0.019) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.027) | (0.008) | |
| -0.011** | -0.013 | -0.020 | -0.039** | -0.030*** | -0.010*** | |
| (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.004) | |
| -0.252*** | -0.101 | 0.078 | -0.352*** | -1.393 | -0.150** | |
| (0.088) | (0.097) | (0.093) | (0.054) | (0.951) | (0.059) | |
| -0.200** | -0.149 | -0.235* | -0.170 | -0.092 | -0.190** | |
| (0.093) | (0.160) | (0.133) | (0.109) | (0.352) | (0.091) | |
Note: (1) Values in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. (2) To save space, neither control variables nor constants are reported here. (3) The controlled variables are the same as those in Table 2
Fig. 1Mechanism of financial investment in compulsory education
Mediating effect test based on KHB method
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total effect | 0.017** | -0.011*** | -0.207*** | -0.191* |
| (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.065) | (0.098) | |
| Direct effect | 0.010 | -0.009** | -0.214*** | -0.091 |
| (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.072) | (0.099) | |
| Indirect effect | 0.007** | -0.001 | 0.007 | -0.101*** |
| (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.018) | (0.032) | |
| Proportion of indirect effects (%) | 39.81 | 11.87 | -3.13 | 52.63 |
| Watch sports events | 13.44 | -15.00 | 22.66 | 10.70 |
| School sports facilities | 36.32 | 113.28 | 328.19 | 55.52 |
| Parental education expectation | 26.46 | -18.17 | -200.91 | 17.05 |
| Learning good friends | 23.78 | 19.90 | -49.94 | 16.72 |
Note: (1) Values in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. (2) To save space, neither control variables nor constants are reported here. (3) The controlled variables are the same as those in Table 2