| Literature DB >> 36091557 |
Chunkai Zhao1, Bihe Yan2.
Abstract
Based on the exogenous shock of digital financial development in China in 2013, a difference-in-differences (DID) model is set up in this paper to investigate the causal relationship between digital financial development and haze pollution reduction. The finding of the paper is that a one standard deviation increase in digital finance after 2013 decreases the PM2.5 concentrations by 0.2708 standard deviations. After a number of robustness checks, like placebo tests, instrumental variable (IV) estimations, eliminating disruptive policies, and using alternative specifications, this causal effect is not challenged. In addition, this paper explores three potential mechanisms of digital finance to reduce haze pollution: technological innovation, industrial upgrading, and green development. Moreover, the heterogeneous effects signify that the usage depth of digital finance works best in haze pollution reduction. Digital finance has more positive effects in cities in the north and those with superior Internet infrastructure and higher levels of traditional financial development. However, the quantile regression estimates suggest that for cities with light or very serious haze pollution, the positive impact of digital finance is limited. These findings supplement the research field on the environmental benefits of digital finance, which provides insights for better public policies about digital financial development to achieve haze pollution reduction.Entities:
Keywords: Chinese cities; PM2.5; digital financial development; exogenous shock; haze pollution
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36091557 PMCID: PMC9449125 DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.942243
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Public Health ISSN: 2296-2565
Figure 1Transaction value and number of transactions of mobile payments in China from 2006 to 2018. Source: The 2019 China Mobile Payment Development Report.
Figure 2Transaction amount and active users of Alipay from 2011 to 2018. Source: EnfoDesk and Alipay Annual Report.
Figure 3Total assets and users of Yu'E Bao from 2013 to 2018. Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1060702/china-mobile-payment-transaction-value/#statisticContainer.
Figure 4Digital finance level in Chinese cities (2011–2018).
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics.
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| PM2.5 | Annual average concentration of PM2.5 (μg/m3) | 1921 | 43.5086 | 19.280 |
| DFI | Digital Finance Index for prefecture-level cities | 1921 | 152.188 | 60.628 |
| CBI | Coverage breadth of digital finance | 1921 | 143.069 | 58.210 |
| UDI | Usage depth of digital finance | 1921 | 150.583 | 63.310 |
| DLI | Digitization level of digital finance | 1921 | 185.678 | 80.704 |
| Post13 | = 1 if the year is 2013 and later; 0 otherwise | 1921 | 0.7361 | 0.4409 |
| DFI*Post13 | The interaction item of DFI and post13 | 1921 | 133.056 | 87.305 |
| GDP per capita | GDP per capita of the city (10,000 yuan) | 1921 | 5.0261 | 3.0109 |
| Fiscal expenditures | The radio of fiscal expenditures to GDP | 1921 | 0.1855 | 0.0797 |
| Fiscal revenue | The radio of fiscal revenue to GDP | 1921 | 0.0786 | 0.0266 |
| Education expenditures | The radio of education expenditures to the total fiscal expenditures | 1921 | 0.1801 | 0.0388 |
| University | Number of universities or colleges | 1921 | 1.7509 | 0.8981 |
| Transport infrastructure | Road haulage traffic (100 million tons) | 1921 | 1.1842 | 0.9640 |
| Savings | Total savings in cities (100 million yuan) | 1921 | 3.7081 | 2.7790 |
| FDI | The radio of amount of foreign capital actually utilized to the GDP (multiplied by 100) | 1921 | 1.6777 | 1.5340 |
| Foreign-owned enterprises | Number of foreign-owned enterprises in the city (logarithmic) | 1921 | 3.2059 | 1.4621 |
| Above-scale enterprises | Number of above-scale enterprises in the city (logarithmic) | 1921 | 6.6838 | 0.9976 |
| Temperature | Annual average temperature of the city (°C) | 1921 | 15.2703 | 4.9668 |
| Relative humidity | Annual relative humidity of the city | 1921 | 0.6890 | 0.0934 |
| Precipitation | Annual precipitation of the city (mm/100) | 1921 | 0.4057 | 3.0794 |
| Internet penetration rate | The number of international Internet users to the total population | 1921 | 0.2036 | 0.1586 |
| Financial development | Total bank loans and deposits divided by the GDP | 1921 | 2.3060 | 1.0688 |
| Postal services | Total postal services of the city (10,000 yuan, logarithmic) | 1921 | 10.5842 | 1.1074 |
The effects of digital finance on air pollution: DID methods.
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| DFI*Post13 | −0.0462 | −0.0459 | −0.0417 | −0.0598 |
| (0.0140) | (0.0142) | (0.0152) | (0.0189) | |
| GDP per capita | −0.4753 | −0.4628 | −0.3967 | 0.2401 |
| (0.2075) | (0.2068) | (0.2080) | (0.1152) | |
| Fiscal expenditures | 24.1045 | 23.6827 | 21.0556 | −2.7074 |
| (13.1553) | (13.1445) | (13.1727) | (5.3868) | |
| Fiscal revenue | −85.8466 | −84.7290 | −83.8340 | −24.2515 |
| (18.6175) | (18.4069) | (18.0406) | (10.3356) | |
| Education expenditures | 4.7590 | 4.3414 | 3.5617 | 5.0075 |
| (10.5647) | (10.6020) | (10.6283) | (6.9693) | |
| University | −0.7368 | −0.7970 | −0.8414 | 1.5586 |
| (1.4179) | (1.4209) | (1.4074) | (0.7594) | |
| Transport infrastructure | 0.1004 | 0.1114 | 0.0971 | 0.0560 |
| (0.4500) | (0.4503) | (0.4508) | (0.2378) | |
| Savings | 0.8375 | 0.8065 | 0.8052 | −0.5251 |
| (0.3736) | (0.3788) | (0.3824) | (0.3479) | |
| FDI | −0.6067 | −0.6061 | −0.6039 | −0.0111 |
| (0.2476) | (0.2455) | (0.2431) | (0.1202) | |
| Foreign-owned enterprises | −0.9952 | −1.0096 | −1.0421 | −0.1829 |
| (0.8997) | (0.9136) | (0.9310) | (0.5595) | |
| Above-scale enterprises | −0.6905 | −0.5491 | −0.1778 | −0.4216 |
| (1.1214) | (1.1242) | (1.1755) | (0.9620) | |
| Temperature | 0.0106 | 0.0644 | −0.6961 | |
| (0.4799) | (0.4803) | (0.4766) | ||
| Relative humidity | −5.5241 | −4.4828 | −1.9996 | |
| (6.2296) | (6.2740) | (4.4658) | ||
| Precipitation | −0.0340 | −0.0297 | −0.0259 | |
| (0.0628) | (0.0632) | (0.0405) | ||
| Internet penetration rate | −2.3942 | −3.8272 | ||
| (2.5325) | (1.4680) | |||
| Financial development | 0.7095 | −0.0464 | ||
| (0.7070) | (0.4002) | |||
| Postal services | −0.3988 | −0.0938 | ||
| (0.3972) | (0.2083) | |||
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | No | No | No | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9344 | 0.9343 | 0.9345 | 0.9769 |
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| 1921 | 1921 | 1921 | 1921 |
represent the significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level.
Figure 5Parallel trend tests.
Mechanism tests: Digital finance and technology innovation.
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| DFI*Post13 | 0.0007 | 0.0033 | 0.0037 | −0.0017 | 0.0008 | 0.0052 | 0.0003 |
| (0.0007) | (0.0016) | (0.0011) | (0.0011) | (0.0012) | (0.0021) | (0.0002) | |
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9427 | 0.9604 | 0.9621 | 0.9647 | 0.9637 | 0.8931 | 0.9583 |
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| 1921 | 1471 | 1469 | 1471 | 1469 | 1472 | 1921 |
represent the significant levels of 5%, and 1%, respectively. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Mechanism tests: Digital finance and industrial upgrading.
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| DFI*Post13 | 0.0007 | 0.0075 | −0.0003 | −0.0010 |
| (0.0003) | (0.0018) | (0.0003) | (0.0003) | |
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.9009 | 0.8859 | 0.8533 | 0.9102 |
| N | 1883 | 1919 | 1670 | 1878 |
represent the significant levels of 1%. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Mechanism tests: Digital finance and green development.
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| DFI*Post13 | 0.0012 | 0.0001 | 0.0014 |
| (0.0006) | (0.0007) | (0.0005) | |
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.5723 | 0.0723 | 0.6228 |
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| 1219 | 1219 | 1219 |
represent the significant levels of 5%, and 1%, respectively. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Heterogeneity effects for sub-indexes of digital finance.
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| CBI*Post13 | −0.0329 | ||
| (0.0131) | |||
| UDI*Post13 | −0.0545 | ||
| (0.0161) | |||
| DLI*Post13 | −0.0074 | ||
| (0.0052) | |||
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9767 | 0.9771 | 0.9765 |
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| 1921 | 1921 | 1921 |
represent the significant levels of 5%, and 1%, respectively. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Heterogeneity effects at the city level.
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| DFI*Post13 | −0.1182 | 0.0152 | −0.1112 | −0.0030 | −0.1209 | 0.0036 |
| (0.0281) | (0.0180) | (0.0335) | (0.0250) | (0.0251) | (0.0243) | |
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9786 | 0.9755 | 0.9757 | 0.9848 | 0.9725 | 0.9808 |
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| 827 | 1094 | 960 | 961 | 960 | 961 |
represent the significant levels of 1%. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Quantile regressions.
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| DFI*Post13 | −0.0282 | −0.0531 | −0.0670 | −0.0579 | −0.0175 |
| (0.0224) | (0.0139) | (0.0130) | (0.0128) | (0.0165) | |
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| 1921 | 1921 | 1921 | 1921 | 1921 |
represent the significant levels of 1%. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Placebo tests.
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| DFI*Post12 | −0.0187 | ||
| (0.0261) | |||
| DFI | −0.0025 | −0.0404 | |
| (0.0045) | (0.0277) | ||
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9774 | 0.9764 | 0.9765 |
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| 1921 | 1921 | 1921 |
Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Robustness checks by controlling for disruptive policies.
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| DFI*Post13 | −0.0639 | −0.0611 | −0.0598 | −0.0629 | −0.0642 | −0.0707 |
| (0.0202) | (0.0191) | (0.0189) | (0.0189) | (0.0192) | (0.0204) | |
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9769 | 0.9769 | 0.9769 | 0.9770 | 0.9770 | 0.9771 |
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| 1921 | 1921 | 1921 | 1921 | 1921 | 1921 |
represent the significant levels of 1%. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
IV estimations.
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| IV*Post13 | 0.3910 | |
| (0.1192) | ||
| DFI*Post13 | −0.5127 | |
| (0.1638) | ||
| First-stage F value | 10.7570 | |
| Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic | 72.0772 | |
| Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic | 3.5614 | |
| 0.0591 | ||
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes |
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| 1921 | 1921 |
represent the significant levels of 1%. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the city level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Robustness checks by using alternative specifications.
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| DFI*Post13 | −0.0851 | −0.0596 | −0.0647 | −0.0596 | −0.0524 | −0.0040 |
| (0.0257) | (0.0189) | (0.0215) | (0.0191) | (0.0190) | (0.0011) | |
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| City FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9769 | 0.9768 | 0.9769 | 0.9768 | 0.9787 | 0.8306 |
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| 1669 | 1921 | 1807 | 1689 | 2598 | 1833 |
represent the significant levels of 1%. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the county level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.
Robustness checks by adopting county-level data.
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| DFI*Post13 | −0.0269 | |||
| (0.0075) | ||||
| CBI*Post13 | −0.0053 | |||
| (0.0047) | ||||
| UDI*Post13 | −0.0283 | |||
| (0.0074) | ||||
| DLI*Post13 | −0.0157 | |||
| (0.0036) | ||||
| Baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province-by-year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted | 0.9777 | 0.9777 | 0.9778 | 0.9778 |
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| 8723 | 8723 | 8723 | 8723 |
represent the significant levels of 1%. Parentheses indicate standard errors clustered at the county level. The baseline control variables are consistent with column (4) in Table 2.