| Literature DB >> 36078693 |
Lei Nie1,2, Purong Chen2, Xiuli Liu1,2, Qinqin Shi1,2, Jing Zhang1,2.
Abstract
Although the literature has studied the direction and extent of the effect of green finance on industrial-structure optimization, quantitative analysis of the coupling coordination and spatial-temporal differences between green finance and industrial structure is relatively scarce. Therefore, in this paper, we built the theoretical framework of the coupling coordination relationship between green finance and industrial-structure optimization, and then we used the coupling coordination degree and geographic detector model to investigate the spatial-temporal evolution characteristics and influencing factors of the coupling coordination between the two based on the panel data of 31 provinces from 2012 to 2019. The results show that China's green finance and industrial-structure optimization have basically reached the primary coupling, and the coupling coordination degree is from 0.40 to 0.43, which shows a "W"-type fluctuation trend of recovery. The regional gap of the coupling coordination degree firstly decreased and then increased, showing a change law of "agglomeration, equilibrium and agglomeration". In the spatial dimension, the high-level coordination region showed an increasing trend of "fragmentation" fluctuation, while the low-level coordination region concentrated in the central and western regions with a tendency of "low value locking". The trend surface showed a spatial characteristic of "high in the north and low in the south-high in the east and west and low in the middle". We also found that the dependence of foreign trade and technological innovation are the main factors affecting the coupling coordination degree, and the interaction between government support and human capital synergistic is the crucial channel for the coevolution of green finance and industrial structure to promote green and low-carbon development.Entities:
Keywords: coupling coordination; geographic detector; green finance; industrial-structure optimization
Mesh:
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Year: 2022 PMID: 36078693 PMCID: PMC9517838 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph191710984
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 4.614
Figure 1Coupling development path of green finance and industrial structure.
Comprehensive evaluation index system.
| Target Layer | Primary Index | Secondary Index | Index Definition | Effect |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Green finance | Green | Proportion of green-credit balance | Green-credit balance/GDP | Positive | 0.123 |
| Proportion of | Interest expenditure of six high-energy-consuming | Negative | 0.050 | ||
| Green | Proportion of | Market value of green | Positive | 0.316 | |
| Green investment | Proportion of | Investment in environmental pollution control/GDP | Positive | 0.104 | |
| Proportion of | Energy conservation and | Positive | 0.080 | ||
| Green | Proportion of | Agricultural insurance | Positive | 0.213 | |
| Agricultural | Agricultural insurance | Positive | 0.093 | ||
| Carbon | Financial carbon intensity | Carbon emissions/loan balance | Negative | 0.022 | |
| Industrial structure | Rationalization | Coordination | Theil index | Positive | 0.146 |
| Advanced | Advanced degree of | Improved Moore index | Positive | 0.397 | |
| Ecologicalization | GDP energy | Total energy consumption/GDP | Negative | 0.144 | |
| Air pollution | SO2 emission in industrial waste gas | Negative | 0.210 | ||
| Sewage disposal | Urban-sewage treatment rate | Positive | 0.103 |
Classification of coupling degree and coupling coordination degree.
| Coupling Degree | Coupling Level | Coupling Coordination | Coordination Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 < C < 0.42 | Basic coupling | 0 < D < 0.37 | Low coordination |
| 0.42 ≤ C < 0.45 | Low-level coupling | 0.37 ≤ D < 0.41 | Primary coordination |
| 0.45 ≤ C < 0.47 | Primary coupling | 0.41 ≤ D < 0.47 | Intermediate coordination |
| 0.47 ≤ C < 0.48 | Intermediate coupling | 0.47 ≤ D < 0.6 | High coordination |
| 0.48 ≤ C < 1 | High coupling | 0.6 ≤ D < 1 | Advanced coordination |
Detection types of two-factor interactions.
| Basis | Interaction |
|---|---|
| q(X1∩X2) < Min(q(X1), q(X2)) | Nonlinear weakening |
| Min(q(X1), q(X2)) < q(X1∩X2) < Max(q(X1), q(X2)) | Single-factor nonlinear weakening |
| q(X1∩X2) > Max(q(X1), q(X2)) | Two-factor enhancement |
| q(X1∩X2) = q(X1) + q(X2) | Independent |
| q(X1∩X2) > q(X1) + q(X2) | Nonlinear enhancement |
Influencing factors and definitions.
| Influencing Factors | Definition |
|---|---|
| Huca | Proportion of college students in the total number of the region |
| Tein | Proportion of internal expenditure of regional research and experimental development (R&D) funds in regional GDP |
| Enre | Environmental-regulation index (the evaluation values of industrial wastewater, sulfur dioxide, and smoke emissions) |
| Fixi | Proportion of fixed-asset investment in regional GDP |
| Export | Proportion of the total import and export of the region in regional GDP |
| Ur | Proportion of urban population in the total population |
| Fdi | Proportion of actual investment in regional GDP |
| Gov | Proportion of government budget expenditure in regional GDP |
Summary of coupling degree and coupling coordination degree.
| Index | Region | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | Mean | Rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coupling degree | East | 0.477 | 0.468 | 0.468 | 0.453 | 0.458 | 0.449 | 0.460 | 0.452 | 0.461 | 4 |
| Central | 0.488 | 0.485 | 0.477 | 0.458 | 0.465 | 0.458 | 0.458 | 0.437 | 0.466 | 3 | |
| West | 0.475 | 0.476 | 0.477 | 0.471 | 0.468 | 0.470 | 0.474 | 0.468 | 0.472 | 1 | |
| Northeast | 0.495 | 0.470 | 0.494 | 0.480 | 0.459 | 0.465 | 0.447 | 0.461 | 0.471 | 2 | |
| China | 0.480 | 0.475 | 0.476 | 0.463 | 0.463 | 0.460 | 0.464 | 0.456 | 0.467 | ||
| Coupling coordination | East | 0.464 | 0.447 | 0.449 | 0.446 | 0.454 | 0.440 | 0.450 | 0.473 | 0.453 | 1 |
| Central | 0.397 | 0.387 | 0.378 | 0.385 | 0.406 | 0.386 | 0.397 | 0.408 | 0.393 | 4 | |
| West | 0.406 | 0.390 | 0.396 | 0.398 | 0.406 | 0.394 | 0.390 | 0.399 | 0.397 | 3 | |
| Northeast | 0.417 | 0.399 | 0.416 | 0.421 | 0.412 | 0.394 | 0.371 | 0.424 | 0.407 | 2 | |
| China | 0.424 | 0.408 | 0.412 | 0.413 | 0.422 | 0.407 | 0.409 | 0.427 | 0.415 | ||
| Range | 0.067 | 0.060 | 0.072 | 0.061 | 0.049 | 0.054 | 0.078 | 0.074 | 0.067 | ||
| Standard deviation | 0.161 | 0.155 | 0.163 | 0.152 | 0.142 | 0.147 | 0.170 | 0.170 | 0.161 |
Figure 2Schematic diagram of annual variation trend of national and regional coupling coordination.
Figure 3Annual variation trend chart of regional coupling coordination degree difference.
Figure 4Temporal and spatial distribution of coupling coordination degree of provinces and regions in China, 2013–2019.
Figure 5Trend surface analysis of coupling coordination degree, 2013–2019.
Annual change in risk factor Q value.
| Year | Huca | Tein | Enre | Fixi | Export | Ur | Fdi | Gov |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 0.288 | 0.502 | 0.255 | 0.724 | 0.684 | 0.607 | 0.160 | 0.076 |
| 2013 | 0.115 | 0.591 | 0.228 | 0.583 | 0.682 | 0.611 | 0.122 | 0.076 |
| 2014 | 0.146 | 0.592 | 0.361 | 0.683 | 0.667 | 0.588 | 0.223 | 0.053 |
| 2015 | 0.139 | 0.735 | 0.323 | 0.820 | 0.712 | 0.529 | 0.289 | 0.057 |
| 2016 | 0.188 | 0.682 | 0.432 | 0.438 | 0.615 | 0.436 | 0.265 | 0.061 |
| 2017 | 0.166 | 0.602 | 0.476 | 0.360 | 0.588 | 0.447 | 0.382 | 0.162 |
| 2018 | 0.085 | 0.614 | 0.385 | 0.260 | 0.586 | 0.373 | 0.323 | 0.118 |
| 2019 | 0.282 | 0.584 | 0.416 | 0.322 | 0.625 | 0.403 | 0.158 | 0.039 |
| Whole | 0.121 | 0.562 | 0.339 | 0.423 | 0.611 | 0.391 | 0.140 | 0.048 |
| 0.460 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.016 | 0.999 |
Interaction results of two factors.
| Huca | Tein | Enre | Fixi | Export | Ur | Fdi | Gov | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Huca | 0.121 | |||||||
| Tein | 0.655 * | 0.562 | ||||||
| Enre | 0.476 ** | 0.701 * | 0.339 | |||||
| Fixi | 0.583 ** | 0.630 * | 0.716 * | 0.423 | ||||
| Export | 0.745 ** | 0.686 * | 0.758 * | 0.685 * | 0.611 | |||
| Ur | 0.487 * | 0.629 * | 0.591 * | 0.536 * | 0.640 * | 0.391 | ||
| Fdi | 0.370 ** | 0.633 * | 0.481 * | 0.624 ** | 0.680 * | 0.529 * | 0.140 | |
| Gov | 0.210 ** | 0.663 ** | 0.595 ** | 0.516 ** | 0.770 ** | 0.572 ** | 0.265 ** | 0.048 |
Note: “*”, “**” represents two-factor enhancement and nonlinear enhancement, respectively.