| Literature DB >> 36071364 |
Hamed Rajabzadeh1, Jörn Altmann2,3, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki4,5,6.
Abstract
The increasing rate of manufacturers and consequently the production of the products gave rise to an increase in used products. The growth in old goods, as well as their negative environmental and social consequences, prompted supply chain operators to focus more on reverse logistics for collecting and reusing these items. However, there are a few key issues that should be handled in this manner, covering how to implement an effective collecting plan. What categories of used items should be collected? And how should they be handled for the aim of reusing them? To address these questions, the pricing issues are investigated in a CLSC with a manufacturer and two retailers. As an effective collection strategy, the first retailer, along with selling new products, benefits from the product exchange program (PEP). In this program, the retailer, by offering two types of discounts on a new product's price, is able to collect two types of products, including those without and with useful lifetime left as the first- and second-category products, respectively. In terms of used products management, the first-category products are sent to the manufacturer for recycling, and the second-category ones are sold as second-hand products by the first retailer. Besides, the first retailer exercises a full refund return policy, where the returned defective products, after being remanufactured by the manufacturer, are sold to customers by the second retailer in the secondary market. With respect to buy back price of first-category products from the first retailer, two scenarios are considered: 1) the manufacturer pays as much as the difference between the original retail price and discounted retail price in order to encourage the retailer to offer exercise the PEP for returned used items, or 2) by considering the discount on wholesale price, the manufacturer pays as much as the difference between the original wholesale price and discounted wholesale price. In this study, a real-world case study is considered based on an Iranian automotive industry to understand the issue better and obtain practical results. The findings show that the second scenario is more profitable due to lower selling prices and greater demand rates. It is proved that the PEP along with providing environmental benefits can improve supply chain financial profit even for the first or the second-category products.Entities:
Keywords: Closed-loop supply chain; Game theory, Iran; Pricing; Product exchange program; Return policy
Year: 2022 PMID: 36071364 PMCID: PMC9452285 DOI: 10.1007/s11356-022-22671-z
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Environ Sci Pollut Res Int ISSN: 0944-1344 Impact factor: 5.190
Acronym list
| Acronym | Definition | Acronym | Definition |
|---|---|---|---|
| CLSC | Closed-loop supply chain | SH | Second-hand |
| CLSCM | Closed-loop supply chain management | EOL | End-of-life |
| PEP | Product exchange program | RP | Return policy |
| PEO | Product exchange offer |
Fig. 1New and used cars sales in the USA
Comparison of the related articles
| Article | SH | PEP | Recycling | RP | Remanufacturing | CLSC | Game structure | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nash | Stackelberg | |||||||
| Taleizadeh et al. ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
| Das and Dutta ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||
| Wen et al. ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||
| Maiti and Giri ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||
| Esenduran et al. ( | ✓ | ✓ | ||||||
| Jian et al. ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||
| Genc and De Giovanni ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
| Cianni ( | ✓ | |||||||
| Gorji et al. ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||
| Batarfi et al. ( | ✓ | ✓ | ||||||
| Wu et al. ( | ✓ | ✓ | ||||||
| Mondal and Giri ( | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||
| This study | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||
The most relevant previous studies and the related research gaps
| Article | Gaps |
|---|---|
| Batarfi et al. ( | Although different supply chain structures along with return policy and returned products refurbishment in a CLSC have been investigated, they failed to consider reverse logistics for old products as well as a PEP |
| Genc and De Giovanni ( | Two types of rebates, including fixed and variable, were studied as incentives to encourage customers to participate in return policy as a PEP in a CLSC; however, they did not study remanufacturing and returned old products categorization |
| Taleizadeh et al. ( | In a CLSC, they studied return policy under two scenarios where both manufacturer and retailer remanufacture returned products. Still, they did not consider any particular market for remanufactured products and a reverse logistic for EOL products |
| Wen et al. ( | Game models were developed to address pricing and collecting issues in a CLSC. However, the model did not enjoy the PEP, and the collection of old products with useful lifetime left was not considered |
| Mondal and Giri ( | In a double-period CLSC with one manufacturer as well as a retailer, three-collection strategies have been investigated where customers are paid for EOL returned products, and the collected products are remanufactured. Their model did not benefit from the PEP and the return policy for new defective products |
List of symbols
Fig. 2A schematic representation of the suggested model
Fig. 3Decision-making sequence
Fig. 4The difference between the values in scenarios one and two
Parameters’ values for case study
| 800 | 1000 | 600 | 400 | 1000 | 500 | 500 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.35 | 0.25 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
Fig. 5The impact of on selected decision variables, demands, and profit functions
Fig. 6The impact of on selected decision variables, demands, and profit functions
Total profit values in different modes
| Modes | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1st Scenario | 2nd scenario | |
| Mode 1: | 1,306,992 | 1,321,895.44 |
| Mode 2: | 1,147,475.58 | 1,155,167 |
| Mode3: | 1,224,485.64 | 1,239,974.28 |
| Mode4: | 1,060,886.68 | 1,060,886.68 |
Fig. 7The simultaneous effect of and on
Fig. 8The impact of on selected decision variables, demands, and profit functions
Fig. 9The simultaneous effect of and on