| Literature DB >> 36052352 |
Muhammad Kaleem Khan1, R M Ammar Zahid2, Khuram Shahzad3, Muhammad Jameel Hussain4, Mbwana Mohamed Kitendo5.
Abstract
The current study analyzed whether the enhancement in managerial ability accelerates the environmental, social, and economic sustainability practices or not. Using panel data methodology on Chinese listed firms data from 2010 to 2019, we report that CEOs' managerial ability impacts the overall (environmental, social, and economic) sustainability practices of the firms positively. Moreover, we find that social sustainability and economic sustainability also increase with the increase of the CEO's managerial ability in the firm. The results remain robust after several alternative empirical tests. The findings justify the relationship between management skills and sustainability and demonstrate how each one of the sustainability pillars is affected individually. The support for sustainability practices that can be achieved through the communication of management skills is an essential conclusion for practitioners. Findings establish the link between CEO's managerial ability and environmental, social, and economic sustainability performance by taking insights from upper echelon theory.Entities:
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 36052352 PMCID: PMC9427282 DOI: 10.1155/2022/8588385
Source DB: PubMed Journal: J Environ Public Health ISSN: 1687-9805
Descriptive statistics.
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SP | 20643 | 23.331 | 14.961 | 0 | 73.31 |
| CEOMA | 20653 | 0.001 | 0.157 | −314 | 0.391 |
| BSize | 20651 | 8.569 | 1.699 | 0 | 20 |
| BMeeting | 20651 | 9.611 | 3.941 | 0 | 56 |
| CEOGender | 20651 | 0.938 | 0.242 | 0 | 1 |
| BIndependence | 20633 | 0.374 | 0.052 | 0.333 | 0.571 |
| DebttoAssets | 20651 | 0.415 | 0.215 | 0.049 | 0.944 |
| ROA | 20651 | 0.037 | 0.065 | −299 | 0.191 |
| RetiringCEO | 20651 | 0.023 | 0.149 | 0 | 1 |
| Duality | 20651 | 0.291 | 0.454 | 0 | 1 |
| HHI | 20651 | 0.319 | 0.267 | 0 | 1 |
| NOA | 20651 | 2.092 | 2.841 | −373 | 111.143 |
| Size | 20651 | 21.941 | 1.204 | 19.639 | 25.565 |
| TobinsQ | 20651 | 2.038 | 1.367 | 0 | 8.792 |
| AgeofFirm | 20651 | 20.805 | 5.406 | 4 | 41 |
| ZScore | 20651 | 0.838 | 5.015 | −569.231 | 72.59 |
Impact of CEO's Managerial Ability on Social, Environmental, and overall sustainability performance.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables |
|
|
|
|
| CEOMA | 3.627 | 1.401 | −0.349 | 2.907 |
| (0.720) | (0.213) | (0.247) | (0.210) | |
| BSize | 0.721 | 0.0633 | 0.263 | 0.0471 |
| (0.0792) | (0.0235) | (0.0271) | (0.0231) | |
| BIndependence | 11.04 | 2.985 | 3.458 | −1.060 |
| (2.281) | (0.660) | (0.783) | (0.658) | |
| BMeeting | −0.105 | −0.00187 | −0.0411 | −0.0283 |
| (0.0249) | (0.00695) | (0.00857) | (0.00708) | |
| CEOGender | 0.435 | 0.00101 | 0.245 | −0.0218 |
| (0.425) | (0.123) | (0.146) | (0.123) | |
| RetiringCEO | −1.104 | 0.0401 | −0.371 | −0.0999 |
| (0.616) | (0.172) | (0.212) | (0.175) | |
| Duality | −0.562 | −0.0953 | −0.284 | 0.206 |
| (0.230) | (0.0662) | (0.0790) | (0.0662) | |
| DebttoAssetsRatio | −2.896 | 0.463 | 0.527 | −4.574 |
| (0.633) | (0.185) | (0.217) | (0.183) | |
| ROA | 85.44 | 14.47 | 2.270 | 63.33 |
| (1.598) | (0.437) | (0.551) | (0.450) | |
| Size | 1.891 | 0.281 | 0.272 | 0.731 |
| (0.118) | (0.0355) | (0.0405) | (0.0346) | |
| TobinsQ | −0.125 | −0.0749 | 0.0392 | −0.237 |
| (0.0716) | (0.0197) | (0.0247) | (0.0202) | |
| AgeofFirm | 0.102 | 0.0994 | 0.0263 | −0.0879 |
| (0.0257) | (0.00898) | (0.00872) | (0.00793) | |
| HHI | 6.068 | 0.446 | 2.103 | 0.192 |
| (0.314) | (0.0855) | (0.109) | (0.0883) | |
| NOA | −0.136 | −0.0203 | −0.0285 | −0.0847 |
| (0.0347) | (0.00970) | (0.0119) | (0.00987) | |
| ZScore | −0.0515 | −0.00728 | −0.000741 | −0.0449 |
| (0.0166) | (0.00444) | (0.00573) | (0.00463) | |
| Constant | −33.16 | −6.093 | −9.479 | 0.144 |
| (2.702) | (0.823) | (0.924) | (0.794) | |
| Observations | 20,625 | 20,625 | 20,625 | 20,625 |
| Number of id | 3,052 | 3,052 | 3,052 | 3,052 |
Notes: Table 2 presents the random effect panel data estimation results of econometric models 3–6. Definition of each variable can be found in section 3.2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1.
Robustness Tests for reverse causality and endogeneity.
| Panel 1 | Panel 2 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| SP ( | SP_Soc ( | SP_Env ( | SP_Eco ( | SP | SP_Soc | SP_Env | SP_Eco | |
| l.SP | 0.254 | |||||||
| (0.00607) | ||||||||
| l.SO_Soc | 0.113 | |||||||
| (0.00655) | ||||||||
| l.SP_Env | 0.303 | |||||||
| (0.00631) | ||||||||
| 0.219 | ||||||||
| (0.00437) | ||||||||
| CEOMA | 3.624 | 1.235 | −0.398 | 2.563 | 2.849 | 1.559 | −0.102 | 1.447 |
| (0.833) | (0.245) | (0.259) | (0.321) | (0.577) | (0.163) | (0.198) | (0.153) | |
| BSize | 0.737 | 0.0624 | 0.264 | 0.0388 | 0.469 | 0.0219 | 0.155 | 0.0334 |
| (0.0906) | (0.0267) | (0.0282) | (0.0350) | (0.0626) | (0.0176) | (0.0215) | (0.0166) | |
| BInd | 10.41 | 2.528 | 3.353 | −1.208 | 8.558 | 2.169 | 2.669 | −1.032 |
| (2.651) | (0.756) | (0.827) | (1.025) | (1.939) | (0.548) | (0.666) | (0.515) | |
| BMeeting | −0.134 | −0.00348 | −0.0373 | −0.0681 | −0.0718 | 0.0244 | −0.0380 | −0.0126 |
| (0.0298) | (0.00810) | (0.00939) | (0.0116) | (0.0237) | (0.00668) | (0.00813) | (0.00628) | |
| CEOGender | 0.191 | −0.136 | 0.286 | −0.150 | 0.282 | −0.300 | 0.198 | 0.126 |
| (0.502) | (0.144) | (0.157) | (0.194) | (0.360) | (0.102) | (0.124) | (0.0957) | |
| RetiringCEO | −1.652 | −0.362 | −0.421 | −0.0989 | −1.103 | −0.0116 | −0.264 | −0.110 |
| (0.774) | (0.210) | (0.244) | (0.301) | (0.590) | (0.167) | (0.203) | (0.157) | |
| Duality | −1.049 | −0.104 | −0.392 | 0.118 | −0.399 | −0.0842 | −0.152 | 0.156 |
| (0.274) | (0.0777) | (0.0856) | (0.106) | (0.205) | (0.0579) | (0.0705) | (0.0546) | |
| DebttoAssetsRatio | −3.807 | 0.0981 | 0.792 | −5.980 | −2.455 | 0.754 | 0.0743 | −3.394 |
| (0.746) | (0.215) | (0.233) | (0.288) | (0.528) | (0.148) | (0.180) | (0.145) | |
| ReturnonAssets | 50.22 | 4.866 | 3.355 | 35.43 | 75.69 | 15.27 | 1.164 | 60.00 |
| (2.093) | (0.552) | (0.662) | (0.816) | (1.597) | (0.449) | (0.545) | (0.436) | |
| Size | 1.780 | 0.158 | 0.295 | 0.784 | 2.008 | 0.262 | 0.347 | 0.748 |
| (0.138) | (0.0407) | (0.0427) | (0.0530) | (0.0960) | (0.0262) | (0.0322) | (0.0253) | |
| WobinsQ | 0.396 | 0.0266 | 0.108 | 0.0189 | −0.0657 | −0.0486 | 0.0148 | −0.127 |
| (0.0862) | (0.0228) | (0.0272) | (0.0336) | (0.0711) | (0.0201) | (0.0244) | (0.0189) | |
| AgeofFirm | 0.0950 | 0.0996 | 0.0168 | −0.0672 | 0.0857 | 0.0916 | 0.0109 | −0.0402 |
| (0.0278) | (0.00961) | (0.00847) | (0.0106) | (0.0155) | (0.00443) | (0.00534) | (0.00415) | |
| HHI | 5.995 | 0.561 | 1.907 | 0.485 | 4.894 | 0.880 | 1.368 | 0.229 |
| (0.389) | (0.101) | (0.123) | (0.152) | (0.331) | (0.0932) | (0.114) | (0.0873) | |
| NOA | −0.182 | −0.0132 | −0.0415 | −0.105 | −0.111 | 0.0235 | −0.0368 | −0.0608 |
| (0.0410) | (0.0112) | (0.0129) | (0.0159) | (0.0308) | (0.00869) | (0.0106) | (0.00818) | |
| ZScore | −0.0226 | 0.00471 | 5.61 | −0.0245 | −0.0432 | −0.00615 | −0.00137 | −0.0381 |
| (0.0219) | (0.00567) | (0.00697) | (0.00858) | (0.0153) | (0.00432) | (0.00526) | (0.00406) | |
| Constant | −29.85 | −2.899 | −10.13 | −0.191 | −38.41 | −5.761 | −9.528 | −5.350 |
| (3.090) | (0.931) | (0.958) | (1.190) | (2.126) | (0.588) | (0.726) | (0.553) | |
| Observations | 17,071 | 17,071 | 17,071 | 17,071 | 17,075 | 17,075 | 17,075 | 17,075 |
| Number of id | 2,931 | 2,931 | 2,931 | 2,931 | 2,930 | 2,930 | 2,930 | 2,930 |
| R2 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 0.17 | 0.57 | ||||
| AR1 test value | −36.98 | −32.98 | −31.98 | −30.09 | ||||
| AR1 significance | 3.83 | 3.09 | 3.29 | 3.28 | ||||
| AR2 test value | −6.34 | −6.36 | −6.46 | −6.63 | ||||
| AR2 significance | 2.45 | 1.98 | 1.87 | 1.93 | ||||
Notes: Panel 1 depicts the random panel data estimation results whereas panel 2 presents system GMM estimation results. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Definitions of all variables can be found in section 3.2. p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1.
Robustness Tests: Alternative definition of managerial ability.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables |
|
|
|
|
| IndAdjROA | 5.167 | 2.616 | 0.0326 | 2.482 |
| (2.041) | (0.526) | (0.723) | (0.513) | |
| BSize | 0.864 | 0.0583 | 0.311 | 0.0568 |
| (0.128) | (0.0329) | (0.0454) | (0.0308) | |
| BIndependence | 14.15 | 3.313 | 4.514 | −1.399 |
| (3.580) | (0.924) | (1.272) | (0.878) | |
| BMeeting | −0.128 | 0.00922 | −0.0495 | −0.0390 |
| (0.0391) | (0.0101) | (0.0139) | (0.00976) | |
| CEOGender | −0.124 | −0.140 | 0.113 | −0.0285 |
| (0.719) | (0.186) | (0.256) | (0.176) | |
| RetiringCEO | −1.160 | −0.154 | −0.276 | −0.317 |
| (1.112) | (0.287) | (0.394) | (0.278) | |
| Duality | −0.665 | −0.0366 | −0.322 | 0.187 |
| (0.402) | (0.104) | (0.143) | (0.0987) | |
| DebttoAssets | −5.947 | 0.374 | −0.543 | −4.706 |
| (1.019) | (0.263) | (0.362) | (0.248) | |
| ROA | 92.70 | 16.02 | 4.395 | 66.43 |
| (2.669) | (0.688) | (0.944) | (0.675) | |
| SizeTA | 3.682 | 0.355 | 0.727 | 1.201 |
| (0.201) | (0.0519) | (0.0716) | (0.0485) | |
| TobinsQ | −0.331 | −0.0681 | −0.0906 | −0.122 |
| (0.0979) | (0.0252) | (0.0346) | (0.0247) | |
| AgeofFirm | 0.142 | 0.124 | 0.0210 | −0.0683 |
| (0.0485) | (0.0126) | (0.0175) | (0.0110) | |
| HHI | 1.868 | 0.435 | 0.782 | −0.123 |
| (0.567) | (0.146) | (0.201) | (0.142) | |
| NOA | −0.208 | −0.0369 | −0.0371 | −0.101 |
| (0.0514) | (0.0133) | (0.0182) | (0.0128) | |
| ZScore | −0.0559 | −0.00729 | −0.00615 | −0.0384 |
| (0.0217) | (0.00559) | (0.00766) | (0.00553) | |
| Constant | −69.51 | −7.993 | −17.94 | −10.85 |
| (4.655) | (1.202) | (1.660) | (1.114) | |
| Observations | 11,007 | 11,007 | 11,007 | 11,007 |
| Number of id | 2,147 | 2,147 | 2,147 | 2,147 |
|
| 0.389 | 0.487 | 0.385 | 0.329 |
Notes: Table 4 represent the panel data estimations of the relationship of industry-adjusted ROA with SO, SP_Soc, SP_Env, and SP_Eco. Definitions of all variables can be found in section 3.2, except the definition of industry-adjusted ROA, which is given in section 4.2. p < 0.01, p < 0.055, and p < 0.1.