| Literature DB >> 35886412 |
Adriana AnaMaria Davidescu1,2, Tamara Maria Nae3,4, Margareta-Stela Florescu5.
Abstract
Income inequality has become an increasingly pressing economic and social problem in Europe, especially in emerging countries with more significant inequalities than the EU average. The high-level inequality persistence can decrease well-being by accentuating the shortcomings at the household level, increasing poverty and social exclusion, generating political instability, leading to a decline in social cohesion, and, finally, a weakening of the Union as a whole. In this context, the paper aims to identify the main determinants of income inequality across the CEE countries and their significant implications in supporting the quality of life and well-being, highlighting the mediation and moderation effects. The analysis focuses on emerging European countries, using panel-based data analysis for ten EU countries covering 2008-2019. The empirical findings highlighted the importance of the minimum wage, high-tech exports, the degree of economic openness, the quality of institutions, and education spending in reducing income inequality. On the other hand, the proportion of the population with a higher education level and the interaction between official and unofficial economies led to income inequality. Therefore, to increase the quality of life, it is mandatory to decrease inequalities. Thus, fewer people will be at risk of living a less qualitative life. The empirical results also proved that the informal economy and the share of people employed in industry exhibited mediating roles. In contrast, the economic growth, the urbanization degree, and the share of people employed in services exhibited moderating roles. Additionally, we also tested the impact of the income inequality determinants of the quality of life, the empirical results supporting the influence of minimum wage, employment with tertiary education, government effectiveness, the degree of economic openness, and education expenditures.Entities:
Keywords: CEE countries; inequality determinants; mediation effect; moderation effect; panel data analysis; quality of life; well-being
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35886412 PMCID: PMC9323379 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19148555
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 4.614
Figure 1Minimum wage in EU. Source: European Commission, Eurostat [24].
Expected sanctions, detection risk and tax morale in East-Central Europe and Western Europe.
| East-Central Europe | Western Europe | |
|---|---|---|
| Participation in undeclared work (%) | 4.4% | 3.8% |
| Sanctions (%) | ||
| Tax or social security contributions due | 30.7% | 23% |
| Tax or social security contributions fine or prison | 69.3% | 77% |
| Tax morale index (mean) | 4.23 | 3.65 |
| No participation in undeclared work (%) | 95.6% | 96.2% |
| Sanctions (%) | ||
| Tax or social security contributions due | 30.4% | 16.8% |
| Tax or social security contributions fine or prison | 69.6% | 83.2% |
| Tax morale index (mean) | 2.67 | 2.11 |
Figure 2Determinants of income inequality in CEE countries [25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,44,46,47,48,51,52,55,56,59,60].
Variables’ description and data sources.
| Indicator | Definition | Source | Expected Impact on Inequality |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent Variables | |||
| Gini Coefficient | Gini coefficient calculated on disposable income (percentage values from 0 to 100, where 0 represents full equality and 100 represents full inequality) | Eurostat | - |
| Independent variables | |||
| Minimum wage | Minimum monthly salary, annual value is the average of annual data (purchasing power parity) | Eurostat | - |
| Minimum monthly wage as a share of average monthly earnings in industry, construction and services. (%) | Eurostat | - | |
| Human capital theory | |||
| Employed population with tertiary education | Share of the population employed with tertiary education in population aged 15–64. (%) | Eurostat | −/+ |
| Union density rate 1 (%) | Union density or union membership rate is the number of union members who are employed as a percentage of the total number of employees in a given industry or country. | ILOSTAT, ILO | |
| Collective bargaining coverage rate (%) | The coverage rate of collective bargaining represents the number of employees whose salaries and/or conditions of employment are determined by one or more collective agreements as a percentage of the total number of employees. The coverage of collective bargaining includes, as far as possible, workers covered by collective agreements by virtue of their extension. Collective bargaining coverage rates are adjusted for the possibility that some workers may not have the right to bargain collectively on wages (for example, public service workers whose wages are set by state regulations or other methods involving consultations), unless in which it is otherwise stated in the notes. | ILOSTAT, ILO | |
| Economic development | |||
| GDP per capita | The gross domestic product reported at no. of inhabitants, fixed base index 2010. | Eurostat | (+/−) |
| Economic growth/cap. | GDP growth rate, percentage change compared to the previous period, compared to no. residents. | Eurostat | (+/−) |
| Openness of the economy | The sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. (%) | Eurostat | (+/−) |
| Share of foreign direct investment in GDP | Foreign investment inflows directly reported by GDP. | Global Economy | (+/−) |
| The share of employees in industry | The share of the population employed in industry. | Eurostat | - |
| Technological progress | |||
| Share of high-tech exports | Exports of high-tech products as a share of total exports. (%) | Eurostat | +/− |
| Quality of institutions | |||
| Regualtory quality | It reflects perceptions of the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private sector development. | World Bank | (−) |
| Rule of law | World Bank | (−) | |
| Government Effectiveness | World Bank | (−) | |
| Perceptions of corruption | |||
| Corruption perception index | Indicator of public sector corruption. The values of the indicator are determined on the basis of information from surveys and evaluations. | Global Economy | (−/+) |
| Control of Corruption | It reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including forms of corruption, as well as the “capture” of the state by elites and private interests | World Bank | (−/+) |
| Informal economy (%) | |||
| Informal economy (%) | Informal economy as a share of GDP. (%) | Global Economy | (−/+) |
| Social expenditures | |||
| Education expenditure (%) | Share of education expenditure in GDP. | Eurostat | (−) |
| Health expenditure | Share of health expenditure in GDP | Eurostat | (−) |
| Control variables | |||
| Urbanization degree | The share of people living in urban areas. | Eurostat | (+/−) |
| Employees in the service sector (%) | Share of the employed population in the service sector (sum of the shares of economic activities in the field of services according to NACE Rev. 2) | Eurostat | |
| Harmonized index of consumer prices | Harmonized index of consumer prices, fixed base, 2010 = 100 | Eurostat | |
1 A trade union is defined as a workers’ organization set up for the purpose of promoting and defending the interests of workers. This union density rate transmits the number of union members who are employed as a percentage of the total number of employees. For the purposes of this indicator, in particular, union membership excludes members of unions who do not have a paid job (self-employed, unemployed, pensioners, etc.), unless otherwise provided in the notes.
Figure 3Mediation and moderation effects between dependent and independent variables. Source: Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005) [65].
Empirical results of income inequality determinants.
| Variables | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 | M5 | M6 | M7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minimum wage | −0.02 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.005 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.007 * | −0.009 *** | −0.01 *** |
| Minimum wage (% median wage) | |||||||
| Min_wage * urban | 0.0001 *** | ||||||
| Min_wage * Informality | 0.0005 | ||||||
| Tertiary ed.(%) | 0.47 *** | 0.45 *** | 0.28 *** | ||||
| Coll. Bargaining (%) | −0.03 * | ||||||
| Union density(%) | |||||||
| Innovation index | −0.05 | ||||||
| High tech. exp. (%) | −0.079 *** | ||||||
| GDP per capita | 0.08 *** | ||||||
| Economic growth | 0.15 *** | 0.14 *** | 0.94 *** | 0.17 | |||
| Economic openness | −0.07 *** | −0.06 *** | −0.06 *** | −0.05 *** | −0.01 | −0.07 *** | −0.07 *** |
| FDI (%) | |||||||
| Emp. in manufacturing (%) | −1.60 *** | ||||||
| Emp in manufacturing * Emp in services | 0.01 | 0.01 * | 0.005 | −0.01 *** | |||
| Emp in manuf. * union density | −0.0001 | 0.0004 | 0.002 | −0.002 | |||
| Regul. quality | |||||||
| Rule of law | −3.58 *** | −0.23 * | 0.02 * | −2.58 *** | −1.83 *** | ||
| Gov. effectiveness | −1.69 | −4.12 *** | |||||
| Corruption Perception Index(CPI) | |||||||
| Control of corruption | |||||||
| Informal ec. (%) | 0.05 ** | −0.39 *** | 0.064 | ||||
| Informal ec. * Ec. growth | 0.005 *** | ||||||
| Educ. Expend.(%) | −1.39 ** | −1.19 * | −0.84 ** | −0.4 | |||
| Health Expend(%) | 0.26 | ||||||
| Educ. expend* Ec. growth | −0.13 *** | 0.005 | |||||
| Urbanization | |||||||
| Emp. in services | −1.09 *** | 0.20 *** | |||||
| HIPC | −0.03 | ||||||
| Constant | 34.57 | 64.27 | 62.51 | 56.51 | 58.43 | 37.94 | 20.60 |
| Obs.no. | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| F-test | 127.99 *** | 67.75 *** | 66.78 *** | 52.56 *** | 7.47 *** | 26.66 *** | 102.81 *** |
| RMSE | 2.08 | 2.08 | 1.98 | 2.19 | 1.38 | 1.85 | 1.64 |
| S.E. of Reg. | 2.15 | 2.16 | 2.07 | 2.29 | 1.44 | 1.92 | 1.71 |
| R2 | 0.88 | 0.83 | 0.84 | 0.81 | 0.35 | 0.65 | 0.89 |
| Adj.R2 | 0.88 | 0.81 | 0.83 | 0.79 | 0.30 | 0.63 | 0.88 |
| Jarque–Bera | 3.05 | 4.2 | 2.94 | 4.47 | 95 | 5.02 | 4.74 |
| LM test for random effects | 19.70 | 110.75 | 98.01 | 137.48 | 183.04 | 17.95 | 2.42 |
| Breusch–Pagan LM | 114.70 | 82.69 | 61.83 | 105.29 | 96.87 | 108.11 | 109.39 |
| Pesaran Scaled LM | 7.34 | 3.97 | 1.77 | 6.35 | 5.46 | 6.65 | 6.78 |
| Pesaran CD | 0.96 | 2.97 | 1.76 | 5.04 | 0.54 | 0.21 | 3.40 |
| Panel Cross Section Heteroskedasticity LR test | 55.09 | 61.28 | 58.77 | 81.30 | 87.62 | 58.50 | 35.11 |
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| Minimum wage | −0.01 *** | −0.01 *** | −0.01 *** | −0.001 *** | −0.006 ** | −0.001 *** |
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| Minimum wage (% median wage) | |||||||
| Min_wage *urban | 0.0001 *** | 0.0001 *** | 0.0001 *** | 7.65 * | 0.0001 *** |
| |
| Min_wage * Informality | |||||||
| Tertiary ed.(%) | 0.49 *** | 0.29 *** | 0.29 *** | 0.30 *** | 0.17 *** | 0.32 *** |
|
| Coll. Bargaining (%) | |||||||
| Union density (%) | |||||||
| Innovation index | −0.08 | ||||||
| High tech. exp. | −0.004 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.006 *** | −0.005. *** |
| |
| GDP per capita | |||||||
| Ev. growth | |||||||
| Ec. openness | −0.07 *** | −0.05 *** | −0.04 *** | −0.04 *** | −0.05 *** |
| |
| FDI (%) | −0.01 | ||||||
| Emp. in manufacturing (%) | −0.51 *** | −0.53 *** | −0.48 *** | −0.63 *** | −0.48 *** | ||
| Emp. in manufacturing * Emp. in services | |||||||
| Emp. in manufacturing * union density | |||||||
| Regul. quality | −2.35 ** | −1.79 ** | |||||
| Rule of Law | −1.06 ** | ||||||
| Gov. effectiveness | −2.44 *** |
| |||||
| Corruption Perception Index (CPI) | −0.07** | ||||||
| Control of corruption | −2.92 ** |
| |||||
| Informality (%) | |||||||
| Informality * Ec. growth | 0.003 * | 0.003 ** | 0.003 * | 0.003 * | 0.003 * |
| |
| Educ. Expend. (%) | −1.12 *** | −1.22 *** | −1.23 *** | −0.98 *** | −0.58 * | −1.22 *** |
|
| Health expend. (%) | |||||||
| Educ. Expend. * Ec. growth | |||||||
| Urbanization | |||||||
| Emp. in services | |||||||
| HIPC | |||||||
| Constant | 43.12 | 50.98 | 52.46 | 48.04 | 49.53 | 52.51 |
|
| Obs.no. | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
|
| F-test | 33.12 *** | 94.65 *** | 74.06 *** | 78.56 *** | 18.44 *** | 94.21 *** |
|
| RMSE | 1.87 | 1.70 | 1.63 | 1.61 | 1.37 | 1.67 |
|
| S.E. of Reg. | 1.94 | ||||||
| R2 | 0.67 | 0.88 | 0.85 | 0.86 | 0.60 | 0.88 |
|
| adj.R2 | 0.65 | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.85 | 0.56 | 0.87 |
|
| Jarque–Bera | 4.79 | 2.16 | 3.44 | 2.65 | 11.02 | 2.24 |
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| LM RE Breusch–Pagan Two Sided | 17.71 | 8.71 | 3.64 | 3.15. | 6.84 | 6.86 | |
| Breusch–Pagan LM | 94.85 | 99.30 | 89.30 | 96.71 | 76.94 | 98.67 |
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| Pesaran Scaled LM | 5.25 | 5.72 | 4.67 | 5.45 | 3.36 | 5.65 |
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| Pesaran CD | 0.81 | 0.70 | 1.20 | 1.82 | 2.38 | 1.70 |
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| Panel Cross Section Heteroskedasticity LR test | 46.74 | 45.17 | 44.41 | 46.81 | 48.04 | 45.60 |
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Note: ***, **, * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; () represents the probability. Optimal model is marked in bold.
Figure 4Determinants of income inequality. Empirical results in CEE countries.
The empirical results of the income-inequality determinants on the quality of life.
| Dependent Variable | Basic Needs | Fundamental Well-Being | Opportunities | SPI |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient | Coefficient | |
| Intercept | 90.34512 *** | 66.13353 *** | 70.50241 *** | 77.55094 *** |
| Minimum wage | 0.004662 *** | 0.0074 *** | −0.001238 * | 0.003928 *** |
| Government Effectiveness | 3.712574 *** | 4.783452 *** | 2.503778 *** | |
| Employed population with tertiary education | 0.192782 *** | |||
| Trade | 0.028504 *** | 0.00916 *** | ||
| Shadow economy * Economic Growth | −0.001776 ** | |||
| Shadow economy | −0.04362 * | |||
| Education Expenditures | 0.524479 * | |||
| Hausman test prob. | 0.55 | 0.65 | 0.18 | 0.71 |
| R-squared | 0.77 | 0.44 | 0.36 | 0.58 |
| F-statistic | 105.34 *** | 24.08 *** | 17.61 *** | 43.27 *** |
| Prob(F-statistic) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Note: ***, **, * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; () represents the probability.
Figure 5Mediation effect in exploring the determinants of income inequality.