| Literature DB >> 35875386 |
Abstract
In "Double Effect Donation," Camosy and Vukov argue that "there are circumstances in which it is morally permissible for a healthy individual to donate their organs even though their death is a foreseeable outcome". They propose that a living donor could ethically donate an entire, singular, vital organ while knowing that this act would result in death. In reply, I argue that it is not ethical for a living person to donate an entire, singular, vital organ. Moreover, mutatis mutandis, it is not ethical for surgeons and others to perform such a deadly operation. For to do so is "intentionally to cause the death of the donor in disposing of his organs". Such an act violates the dead donor rule which holds that an entire, singular, vital organ may be taken only from a corpse. Contrary to Camosy and Vukov's claims, double-effect reasoning does not endorse such organ donation. © Catholic Medical Association 2021.Entities:
Keywords: Action theory; Euthanasia; Life issues; Organ donation/transplantation; Principle of double effect
Year: 2021 PMID: 35875386 PMCID: PMC9297483 DOI: 10.1177/00243639211038128
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Linacre Q ISSN: 0024-3639