| Literature DB >> 35874283 |
Zengfu Li1, Liuhua Feng1, Zheng Pan2, Hafiz M Sohail1.
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance in stock prices during the market financial crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. We use the Chinese listed company data as the bases for adopting an event-study method to identify the impact of ESG performance on cumulative abnormal returns. Empirical results suggest that ESG performance significantly increases firms' cumulative abnormal returns and has asymmetric effects during the pandemic. Our results are robust to various robustness checks that consider the replacement of event window period, ESG measurement, adding other control variables, and sample exclusion of Hubei Province. We further find that reputation and insurance effects are important mechanisms through which ESG performance influences stock prices. Lastly, heterogeneous analyses show that ESG effects are considerably pronounced among firms with low human capital and bad image and in high-impact regions.Entities:
Keywords: Finance; Social science
Year: 2022 PMID: 35874283 PMCID: PMC9294757 DOI: 10.1057/s41599-022-01259-5
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Humanit Soc Sci Commun ISSN: 2662-9992
Variable definitions.
| Variable | Description | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| CAR | CAR[−5, 5] | The cumulative abnormal return for the five days before and after the event date |
| ESG | ESG performance | ESG disclosure score of the WSCI for the year before the event date divided by 100 |
| Lev | Leverage | Ratio of total liabilities to total assets |
| Roa | Profitability | Ratio of net earnings to total gross sales |
| Size | Firm size | Natural logarithm of total assets |
| Soe | Nature of equity | If a firm is state owned, the value is 1, and 0 otherwise |
| Bate | Degree of risk (CAPM Beta) | Factor loading on the market return from a Fama–French and Carhart four-factor model of daily returns over the trading days prior to the year before the event date. |
| Top1 | Ownership structure | Ratio of the largest shareholder |
| Board | Board size | Natural logarithm of the number of directors |
| Dual | Board leadership | A dummy variable of one if the CEO is the chair of the board |
| Independ | Board independence | The proportion of outside independent directors |
| Intangible | Intangible asset | Ratio of intangible assets to total assets |
| Tangible | Tangible asset | Ratio of tangible assets to total assets |
Descriptive statistics.
| Variables | Mean | P50 | Std | Min | Max | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAR | −0.0115 | −0.0367 | 0.1223 | −0.2496 | 0.4665 | 2188 |
| ESG | 0.8447 | 0.8413 | 0.0626 | 0.6824 | 0.9695 | 2188 |
| Lev | 0.4421 | 0.4332 | 0.1947 | 0.0714 | 0.8660 | 2188 |
| Roa | 0.0513 | 0.0694 | 0.1672 | −0.9242 | 0.3348 | 2188 |
| Size | 22.5890 | 22.4286 | 1.3525 | 17.9544 | 28.1935 | 2188 |
| Soe | 0.3944 | 0.0000 | 0.4888 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 2188 |
| Bate | 1.1319 | 1.1328 | 0.2428 | 0.5230 | 1.7427 | 2188 |
| Top1 | 34.6056 | 32.3150 | 14.7837 | 4.7600 | 81.1900 | 2188 |
| Board | 2.1260 | 2.1972 | 0.1983 | 1.6094 | 2.7081 | 2188 |
| Dual | 0.2706 | 0.0000 | 0.4444 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 2188 |
| Independ | 0.3761 | 0.3636 | 0.0539 | 0.3000 | 0.5714 | 2188 |
| Intangible | 0.0467 | 0.0347 | 0.0512 | 0.0000 | 0.3403 | 2188 |
| Tangible | 0.9247 | 0.9529 | 0.0858 | 0.5340 | 1.0000 | 2188 |
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main regression variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Fig. 1Average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns trends.
Trend of AARs and CARs for the event window (t−5–t+5 days).
Baseline results.
| Variables | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|
| ESG | 0.1479*** (3.5072) | 0.1316*** (2.7766) |
| Lev | −0.0655*** (−4.0606) | |
| Roa | 0.0021 (0.1384) | |
| Size | 0.0143*** (5.9616) | |
| Soe | −0.0025 (−0.3939) | |
| Bate | 0.0624*** (5.3495) | |
| Top1 | −0.0003* (−1.7543) | |
| Board | 0.0029 (0.1907) | |
| Dual | 0.0124* (1.9414) | |
| Independ | 0.0002 (0.0034) | |
| Intangible | −0.0708 (−0.9197) | |
| Tangible | −0.1300** (−2.3958) | |
| Constant | −0.1365*** (−3.7895) | −0.3626*** (−4.4803) |
| Observations | 2188 | 2188 |
| 0.114 | 0.149 | |
| Province fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
This table presents the baseline results for the impact of ESG performance on the cumulative abnormal return. The dependent variable is CAR in columns (1) and (2). Detailed variable definitions are presented in Table 1. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates and are calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Risk exposure test results.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative excess return | Industry | |||
| High risk exposure | Low risk exposure | High risk exposure | Low risk exposure | |
| ESG | −0.0550 (−0.5955) | 0.0927*** (3.5646) | 0.0387 (0.2201) | 0.2195** (2.2060) |
| Constant | 0.4465*** (2.9646) | −0.4716*** (−10.6212) | −0.1792 (−0.7021) | −0.3320** (−2.2043) |
| Observations | 720 | 1,467 | 280 | 499 |
| 0.113 | 0.185 | 0.317 | 0.147 | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
This table presents the baseline results for the impact of ESG performance on the cumulative abnormal return. The dependent variable is CAR in Table 4. We control for the Lev, Roa, Size, Soe, Bate, Top1, Board, Dual, Independ, Intangible, and Tangible. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Table 1. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates and are calculated based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Results of robustness tests.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAR[−3+3] | CAR[−7,+10] | CAR[−7,+11] | CAR[−7,+14] | CAR | CAR | CAR | CAR | |
| ESG | 0.0752*** (2.8186) | 0.1327*** (2.6966) | 0.1239** (2.4487) | 0.0994* (1.9121) | 0.1317*** (2.72) | 0.1288*** (2.71) | ||
| ESG1 | 0.1322*** (2.8273) | |||||||
| ESG2 | 0.1363*** (2.9299) | |||||||
| Constant | −0.1260*** (−2.7609) | −0.1810** (−2.0266) | −0.1465 (−1.5726) | −0.1706* (−1.8982) | −0.3633*** (−4.4923) | −0.3660*** (−4.5283) | −0.3462*** (−4.21) | −0.3457*** (−4.14) |
| Observations | 2188 | 2188 | 2188 | 2188 | 2188 | 2188 | 2136 | 2188 |
| 0.121 | 0.138 | 0.139 | 0.136 | 0.149 | 0.150 | 0.151 | 0.150 | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
This table presents the robustness results for the impact of ESG performance on the cumulative abnormal return. We control for the Lev, Roa, Size, Soe, Bate, Top1, Board, Dual, Independ, Intangible, and Tangible. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Table 1. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates and are calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Results of the mechanism test.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESG | 0.4907*** (2.9067) | 0.3380*** (3.8429) | 0.0105 (0.1739) | 0.0247 (0.3991) |
| New1_ESG | −0.0903** (−2.2361) | |||
| New1 | 0.0831** (2.3496) | |||
| New2_ESG | −0.0961*** (−3.1402) | |||
| New2 | 0.0867*** (3.2737) | |||
| Risk1_ESG | 0.7086** (2.4027) | |||
| Risk1 | −0.7054*** (−2.8392) | |||
| Risk2_ESG | 0.0675** (1.9851) | |||
| Risk2 | −0.0671** (−2.3375) | |||
| Constant | −0.6460*** (−3.8372) | −0.4924*** (−4.5006) | −0.2335*** (−2.6378) | −0.2518*** (−2.8153) |
| Observations | 2188 | 2188 | 2188 | 2188 |
| 0.153 | 0.156 | 0.161 | 0.158 | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
This table presents the mechanism test results for the impact of ESG performance on the cumulative abnormal return. The dependent variable is CAR in Table 6. We control for the Lev, Roa, Size, Soe, Bate, Top1, Board, Dual, Independ, Intangible, and Tangible. Detailed variable definitions are presented in the Table 1. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates and are calculated based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Results of heterogeneity test.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Human capital | Negative report | Epidemic regions | ||||
| Above Median | Below Median | Above Median | Below Median | Yes | No | |
| ESG | 0.0321 (0.4409) | 0.2350*** (3.6715) | 0.2104*** (3.3078) | 0.0323 (0.4339) | 0.1465** (2.4184) | 0.0953 (1.2877) |
| Constant | −0.6348*** (−4.5868) | −0.2475** (−2.3545) | −0.3005*** (−2.6858) | −0.5358*** (−3.9630) | −0.3779*** (−3.6733) | −0.3332*** (−2.6015) |
| Observations | 1094 | 1094 | 1104 | 1084 | 1518 | 670 |
| 0.173 | 0.174 | 0.212 | 0.136 | 0.121 | 0.244 | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
This table presents the heterogeneity test results for the impact of ESG performance on the cumulative abnormal return. The dependent variable is CAR in Table 7. We control for the Lev, Roa, Size, Soe, Bate, Top1, Board, Dual, Independ, Intangible, and Tangible. Detailed variable definitions are presented in the Table 1. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates and are calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.