| Literature DB >> 35859705 |
Jagriti Srivastava1, Aravind Sampath2, Balagopal Gopalakrishnan3.
Abstract
In this article, we examine whether stakeholder engagement impacts firms' ability to raise debt during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using firm-level data from 51 countries, we find that firms with greater stakeholder engagement obtain higher debt financing during the COVID-19 pandemic. This effect is more pronounced for riskier firms, highlighting the importance of maintaining relationships with stakeholders. Moreover, we find that stakeholder engagement facilitates higher debt financing for less asset-intensive firms and firms in emerging economies. Our empirical analysis reinforces the role of firms' stakeholder engagement in mitigating the adverse impact of economic shocks.Entities:
Keywords: COVID-19; CSR; Debt financing; ESG; Stakeholder
Year: 2022 PMID: 35859705 PMCID: PMC9281449 DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.103125
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Financ Res Lett ISSN: 1544-6131
Variable definitions, data sources and summary statistics .
| Variable | Definition and construction | Data source | Observations | Mean | SD | Median | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change in debt scaled by total assets of the firm | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27718 | 0.818 | 7.650 | 0.000 | −47.741 | 283.170 | |
| Overall score based on the environmental score, social score and governance score of firms | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27718 | 40.118 | 19.884 | 37.955 | 5.120 | 84.660 | |
| A measure based on firm’s ability to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on the environmental opportunities | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27718 | 31.856 | 29.333 | 25.320 | 0.000 | 92.480 | |
| A measure based on the firm’s reputation and capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its stakeholder | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27718 | 42.455 | 23.682 | 39.480 | 1.850 | 93.710 | |
| A measure based on firm’s capacity to control its right and responsibilities through the creation of incentives | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27718 | 47.787 | 22.911 | 48.200 | 4.180 | 92.030 | |
| A measure based on the average of environmental score and social score of firms | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27718 | 37.139 | 24.622 | 31.510 | 1.190 | 89.750 | |
| Logarithm of total assets of the firm | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 26414 | 14.966 | 1.561 | 15.007 | 8.785 | 17.459 | |
| Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets of the firm | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27701 | 0.020 | 0.070 | 0.025 | −4.626 | 0.130 | |
| Net plant, property and equipment (Net PPE) scaled by total assets of the firm | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27700 | 0.271 | 0.234 | 0.200 | 0.000 | 0.966 | |
| Debt-to-equity ratio of the firm | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 27716 | 0.644 | 1.975 | 0.520 | −8.255 | 7.811 | |
| A measure based on the default risk of firms | Credit Research Initiative of National University of Singapore based on | 20295 | 0.002 | 0.013 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.870 | |
| A measure used to calculate the likelihood of bankruptcy of a firm | Thomson Reuters Eikon | 23422 | 3.239 | 16.436 | 1.744 | −1156.132 | 105.207 | |
| A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms in developed economies and 0 otherwise | International Monetary Fund | 25495 | 0.840 | 0.367 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |
| A measure based on the proportion of number of times COVID-19 or its synonym is mentioned in the quarterly earnings conference calls l to the total number of words in the transcript | 17372 | 0.228 | 0.744 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 13.352 | ||
| A measure based on the proportion of negative-tone words used in the quarterly earnings conference calls to the total number of words in the transcript | 17372 | 0.091 | 0.339 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 6.812 |
Country-wise distribution.
| Country | Observations | Mean | SD | Status | Country | Observations | Mean | SD | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 111 | 2.111 | 9.341 | 0 | Malaysia | 635 | 0.651 | 4.954 | 0 |
| Austria | 44 | 1.677 | 4.177 | 1 | Marshall Islands | 59 | −0.538 | 6.999 | 0 |
| Belgium | 20 | 0.095 | 3.288 | 1 | Mexico | 192 | 0.804 | 7.152 | 0 |
| Bermuda | 115 | 1.653 | 5.587 | – | Netherlands | 127 | 0.852 | 4.878 | 1 |
| Brazil | 552 | 0.005 | 6.174 | 0 | Norway | 213 | 0.759 | 4.563 | 1 |
| Canada | 3,203 | 0.798 | 6.915 | 1 | Oman | 16 | 11.239 | 36.729 | 0 |
| Cayman Islands | 217 | 0.769 | 5.420 | – | Panama | 20 | 0.863 | 3.924 | 0 |
| Chile | 194 | 0.507 | 3.537 | 0 | Peru | 116 | −0.169 | 2.123 | 0 |
| China | 1,200 | 0.695 | 6.770 | 0 | Philippines | 134 | 1.213 | 3.002 | 0 |
| Colombia | 31 | 0.511 | 1.675 | 0 | Poland | 77 | 0.810 | 3.252 | 0 |
| Denmark | 180 | 0.328 | 4.501 | 1 | Portugal | 16 | 0.435 | 2.224 | 1 |
| Egypt | 43 | −0.122 | 6.745 | 0 | Qatar | 12 | −0.545 | 1.123 | 0 |
| Finland | 216 | 0.177 | 5.353 | 1 | Russia | 123 | 0.196 | 2.724 | 0 |
| France | 10 | −0.338 | 4.716 | 1 | Saudi Arabia | 58 | −0.288 | 1.952 | 0 |
| Germany | 476 | 0.855 | 4.618 | 1 | Singapore | 354 | 0.726 | 6.210 | 1 |
| Greece | 16 | −0.843 | 2.660 | 1 | South Korea | 881 | 0.404 | 5.134 | 1 |
| Hong Kong | 4 | 1.427 | 1.754 | 1 | Spain | 22 | 0.254 | 5.259 | 1 |
| Hungary | 8 | −0.910 | 2.218 | 0 | Sweden | 657 | 1.301 | 10.940 | 1 |
| India | 69 | 0.079 | 11.234 | 0 | Switzerland | 33 | −0.800 | 3.027 | 1 |
| Indonesia | 209 | 0.211 | 5.063 | 0 | Taiwan | 840 | 0.545 | 3.324 | 1 |
| Ireland | 131 | 0.868 | 8.655 | 1 | Thailand | 219 | 1.189 | 4.118 | 0 |
| Israel | 117 | 0.547 | 5.339 | 1 | Turkey | 124 | 0.631 | 5.165 | 0 |
| Italy | 12 | 2.428 | 3.942 | 1 | United Arab Emirates | 28 | −0.105 | 2.343 | 0 |
| Japan | 2,836 | 0.274 | 3.033 | 1 | United Kingdom | 124 | 0.484 | 3.391 | 1 |
| Kuwait | 18 | −1.520 | 2.120 | 0 | United States | 12,578 | 1.082 | 9.405 | 1 |
| Luxembourg | 28 | −1.926 | 9.376 | 1 |
Notes: Table A.1 shows the country-wise summary of the sample used in the study. Observations show the number of observations from each country. Mean and SD represent the average Debt and variation in Debt respectively. Status shows the development state of country according to IMF classification. It equals 1 for developed countries and 0 otherwise.
Correlation table.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | 1 | ||||||||||||||
| (2) | −0.018 | 1 | |||||||||||||
| (3) | −0.023 | 0.837 | 1 | ||||||||||||
| (4) | −0.008 | 0.848 | 0.770 | 1 | |||||||||||
| (5) | −0.026 | 0.615 | 0.407 | 0.348 | 1 | ||||||||||
| (6) | −0.018 | 0.894 | 0.956 | 0.923 | 0.405 | 1 | |||||||||
| (7) | −0.034 | 0.034 | 0.032 | 0.048 | 0.039 | 0.041 | 1 | ||||||||
| (8) | −0.050 | −0.058 | −0.049 | −0.051 | −0.038 | −0.053 | 0.013 | 1 | |||||||
| (9) | −0.032 | −0.139 | −0.186 | −0.129 | −0.097 | −0.171 | −0.024 | −0.079 | 1 | ||||||
| (10) | −0.026 | 0.017 | 0.019 | 0.042 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.754 | 0.017 | −0.015 | 1 | |||||
| (11) | −0.029 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.025 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.669 | 0.014 | −0.021 | 0.873 | 1 | ||||
| (12) | 0.014 | 0.552 | 0.653 | 0.543 | 0.350 | 0.642 | −0.028 | −0.032 | −0.278 | −0.036 | −0.040 | 1 | |||
| (13) | −0.042 | 0.134 | 0.126 | 0.055 | 0.148 | 0.101 | −0.071 | −0.084 | 0.026 | −0.070 | −0.070 | 0.192 | 1 | ||
| (14) | −0.007 | −0.008 | 0.034 | −0.103 | 0.073 | −0.027 | 0.057 | 0.051 | −0.114 | 0.022 | 0.027 | 0.014 | 0.126 | 1 | |
| (15) | −0.023 | 0.051 | 0.076 | 0.049 | 0.019 | 0.068 | 0.017 | −0.085 | −0.075 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.149 | −0.044 | 0.021 | 1 |
Impact of stakeholder relationship on debt financing.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.020** | |||||
| (0.009) | |||||
| −0.016* | |||||
| (0.008) | |||||
| 0.018*** | |||||
| (0.006) | |||||
| −0.007 | |||||
| (0.007) | |||||
| 0.016** | |||||
| (0.007) | |||||
| −0.011 | |||||
| (0.008) | |||||
| 0.012 | |||||
| (0.008) | |||||
| −0.010 | |||||
| (0.007) | |||||
| 0.019*** | |||||
| (0.007) | |||||
| −0.012 | |||||
| (0.009) | |||||
| 4.792*** | 4.793*** | 4.775*** | 4.785*** | 4.791*** | |
| (0.540) | (0.540) | (0.538) | (0.539) | (0.539) | |
| −29.180** | −29.219** | −29.230** | −29.169** | −29.222** | |
| (14.112) | (14.102) | (14.107) | (14.114) | (14.105) | |
| 5.760*** | 5.843*** | 5.784*** | 5.704*** | 5.828*** | |
| (2.148) | (2.156) | (2.153) | (2.148) | (2.155) | |
| −0.267*** | −0.268*** | −0.267*** | −0.269*** | −0.267*** | |
| (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.071) | |
| Constant | −71.034*** | −71.442*** | −70.932*** | −71.043*** | −71.192*** |
| (8.050) | (8.083) | (8.065) | (8.053) | (8.061) | |
| Observations | 27,718 | 27,718 | 27,718 | 27,718 | 27,718 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-country-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
Notes: We employ change in debt scaled by assets as the dependent variable in all the models. COVID-19 equals 1 for Q2’2020 to Q4’2020 and 0 otherwise. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variable construction and its definition. The standard errors shown in parenthesis are both robust and clustered at the firm-level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Moderating role of riskiness of firms on the relationship between CSR initiatives and debt financing.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.329** | ||||||||||
| (0.535) | ||||||||||
| 1.372*** | ||||||||||
| (0.515) | ||||||||||
| 1.214** | ||||||||||
| (0.502) | ||||||||||
| 0.486 | ||||||||||
| (0.366) | ||||||||||
| 1.368*** | ||||||||||
| (0.509) | ||||||||||
| −0.000 | ||||||||||
| (0.001) | ||||||||||
| −0.002* | ||||||||||
| (0.001) | ||||||||||
| −0.001* | ||||||||||
| (0.001) | ||||||||||
| 0.001 | ||||||||||
| (0.001) | ||||||||||
| −0.001* | ||||||||||
| (0.001) | ||||||||||
| Firm-level control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20,063 | 20,063 | 20,063 | 20,063 | 20,063 | 23,152 | 23,152 | 23,152 | 23,152 | 23,152 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-country-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
Notes: We employ change in debt scaled by assets as the dependent variable in all the models. Columns (1)-(5) show the results with Default probability as proxy for riskiness of firms and columns (6)-(10) show the results with Altman Z score as proxy for riskiness of firms. The firm-level control variables for estimations with default probability include size, profitability, tangibility and leverage of firms. The firm-level control variables for estimations with Altman Z score include size, profitability and tangibility of firms. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variable construction and its definition. The standard errors shown in parenthesis are both robust and clustered at the firm-level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. We do not show the double interaction terms and the level terms for brevity.
CSR initiatives, Firm Risk and COVID-19: Subsample analysis.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panel A - Size | ||||||||||
| 5.129* | 1.087 | |||||||||
| (2.887) | (0.673) | |||||||||
| 3.545* | 1.520** | |||||||||
| (2.125) | (0.676) | |||||||||
| 0.675 | 1.267** | |||||||||
| (2.575) | (0.627) | |||||||||
| 4.280** | 0.149 | |||||||||
| (1.719) | (0.800) | |||||||||
| 2.787 | 1.462** | |||||||||
| (2.412) | (0.651) | |||||||||
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 9,539 | 9,539 | 9,539 | 9,539 | 9,539 | 9,005 | 9,005 | 9,005 | 9,005 | 9,005 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-country-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| Panel B - Tangibility | ||||||||||
| 1.048 | 6.394* | |||||||||
| (0.736) | (3.381) | |||||||||
| 1.607** | 3.614* | |||||||||
| (0.806) | (2.095) | |||||||||
| 1.538 | 4.797* | |||||||||
| (1.032) | (2.809) | |||||||||
| 0.397 | 1.936 | |||||||||
| (0.505) | (2.256) | |||||||||
| 1.672* | 4.613* | |||||||||
| (0.920) | (2.605) | |||||||||
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 9,588 | 9,588 | 9,588 | 9,588 | 9,588 | 9,028 | 9,028 | 9,028 | 9,028 | 9,028 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-country-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.106 | 0.107 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.032 |
Notes: Panel A shows the results for subsamples based on size of firms and Panel B shows the results for subsamples based on tangibility of firms. Columns (1)-(5) show the results related to firms with large size/ high tangibility and columns (6)-(10) show the results related to firms with small size/ low tangibility. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variable construction and its definition. The standard errors shown in parenthesis are both robust and clustered at the firm-level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. We do not show the double interaction terms and the level terms for brevity.
CSR initiatives, firm risk and COVID-19: Development state.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.549** | 10.048** | |||||||||
| (0.609) | (4.197) | |||||||||
| 1.331** | 6.483** | |||||||||
| (0.549) | (2.973) | |||||||||
| 1.107** | 10.859** | |||||||||
| (0.511) | (4.559) | |||||||||
| 0.833** | 5.907 | |||||||||
| (0.412) | (3.734) | |||||||||
| 1.276** | 8.887** | |||||||||
| (0.526) | (3.626) | |||||||||
| Firm-level control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 15,905 | 15,905 | 15,905 | 15,905 | 15,905 | 2,909 | 2,909 | 2,909 | 2,909 | 2,909 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-country-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.009 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.010 | 0.111 | 0.108 | 0.113 | 0.108 | 0.111 |
Notes: We employ change in debt scaled by assets as the dependent variable in all the models. Columns (1)-(5) show the results for developed economies firms and columns (6)-(10) show the results for emerging economies firms. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variable construction and its definition. The standard errors shown in parenthesis are both robust and clustered at the firm-level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. We do not show the double interaction terms and the level terms for brevity.
Robustness test results based on COVID-19 sentiment.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.010* | ||||||||||
| (0.005) | ||||||||||
| 0.019 | ||||||||||
| (0.012) | ||||||||||
| 0.011*** | ||||||||||
| (0.003) | ||||||||||
| 0.022*** | ||||||||||
| (0.007) | ||||||||||
| 0.007* | ||||||||||
| (0.004) | ||||||||||
| 0.012 | ||||||||||
| (0.008) | ||||||||||
| 0.004 | ||||||||||
| (0.005) | ||||||||||
| 0.006 | ||||||||||
| (0.010) | ||||||||||
| 0.011*** | ||||||||||
| (0.003) | ||||||||||
| 0.021*** | ||||||||||
| (0.008) | ||||||||||
| Firm-level control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 | 16,745 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-country-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 |
Notes: We employ change in debt scaled by assets as the dependent variable in all the models. Columns (1)-(5) show the results with COVID-19 Exposure as a proxy of COVID-19. Columns (6)-(10) show the results with COVID-19 Negative sentiment as a proxy of COVID-19. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variable construction and its definition. The standard errors shown in parenthesis are both robust and clustered at the firm-level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Impact of stakeholder relationship on cost of debt.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| −0.022*** | |||||
| (0.008) | |||||
| 0.003 | |||||
| (0.006) | |||||
| −0.007 | |||||
| (0.007) | |||||
| −0.003 | |||||
| (0.006) | |||||
| −0.004 | |||||
| (0.007) | |||||
| 0.004 | |||||
| (0.008) | |||||
| −0.013*** | |||||
| (0.005) | |||||
| −0.007 | |||||
| (0.006) | |||||
| −0.007 | |||||
| (0.008) | |||||
| 0.005 | |||||
| (0.001) | |||||
| Firm-level control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 862 | 862 | 862 | 862 | 862 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-country-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.852 | 0.848 | 0.847 | 0.851 | 0.848 |
Notes: We employ weighted average bond yield (%) of all bonds issued by firm i in quarter q as the dependent variable in all the models. COVID-19 equals 1 for Q2’2020 to Q4’2020 and 0 otherwise. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variable construction and its definition. The standard errors shown in parenthesis are both robust and clustered at the firm-level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Additional robustness tests.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.802* | 0.562 | |||||||||
| (0.420) | (0.347) | |||||||||
| −0.177 | −0.165 | |||||||||
| (0.227) | (0.212) | |||||||||
| 1.284*** | 1.038*** | |||||||||
| (0.425) | (0.349) | |||||||||
| −0.450 | −0.340 | |||||||||
| (0.304) | (0.296) | |||||||||
| 0.607 | 0.310 | |||||||||
| (0.460) | (0.362) | |||||||||
| −0.248 | −0.345 | |||||||||
| (0.295) | (0.274) | |||||||||
| 0.200 | 0.389 | |||||||||
| (0.444) | (0.365) | |||||||||
| −0.071 | −0.083 | |||||||||
| (0.211) | (0.203) | |||||||||
| 1.177*** | 0.899*** | |||||||||
| (0.427) | (0.350) | |||||||||
| −0.177 | 0.899*** | |||||||||
| (0.296) | (0.277) | |||||||||
| Firm-level control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 25,827 | 25,827 | 25,827 | 25,827 | 25,827 | 27,718 | 27,718 | 27,718 | 27,718 | 27,718 |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-quarter-industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.008 | 0.009 |
Notes: We employ change in debt scaled by assets as the dependent variable in all the models. Columns (1)-(5) show the results based on propensity score matching difference-in-differences analysis. Columns (6)-(10) show the results based on difference-in-differences analysis. High ESG score, High environmental score, High social score, High governance score and High env & social score equals 1 for the above-median value of ESG score, environmental score, social score, governance score and env & social score, respectively and 0 otherwise. COVID-19 equals 1 for Q2’2020 to Q4’2020 and 0 otherwise. Table 1 provides a brief description of the variable construction and its definition. The standard errors shown in parenthesis are both robust and clustered at the firm-level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Two-stage least square regression results (2SLS).
| Panel A - First-stage regression | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| 0.119** | |||||
| (0.018) | |||||
| 0.156*** | |||||
| (0.039) | |||||
| 0.231*** | |||||
| (0.050) | |||||
| −0.348*** | |||||
| (0.090) | |||||
| 0.209*** | |||||
| (0.039) | |||||
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-Quarter-Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 27,657 | 27,657 | 27,657 | 27,657 | 27,657 |
| SW F test | 4.93 | 18.02 | 19.41 | 13.26 | 29.40 |
| Prob | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Panel B - Second stage regression | |||||
| 0.097*** | |||||
| (0.030) | |||||
| 0.115 | |||||
| (0.194) | |||||
| 0.064*** | |||||
| (0.016) | |||||
| −0.029 | |||||
| (0.087) | |||||
| 0.050*** | |||||
| (0.019) | |||||
| 0.081 | |||||
| (0.081) | |||||
| 0.132 | |||||
| (0.147) | |||||
| −0.088 | |||||
| (0.086) | |||||
| 0.063*** | |||||
| (0.018) | |||||
| 0.032 | |||||
| (0.078) | |||||
| Firm-level controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year-Quarter-Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 27,657 | 27,657 | 27,657 | 27,657 | 27,657 |
| Endogeneity test | 0.579 | 0.017 | 1.496 | 0.777 | 0.476 |
| Prob | 0.447 | 0.897 | 0.221 | 0.378 | 0.49 |
Notes: Notes: Panel A shows the first-stage regression results. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) is ESG score, Environmental score, Social score, Governance score, Env & Social score respectively. The SW test shows the Sanderson-Windmeijer chi-square value. Panel B shows the second-stage regression results. We employ change in debt scaled by assets as the dependent variable in all the models in Panel B. The description of all variables is presented in Table 1. The standard errors are shown in parenthesis which are clustered at the firm level. ***,**,* denotes significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.