| Literature DB >> 35814162 |
Bo Wang1, Shan Han1, Yibin Ao2, Fangwei Liao3, Tong Wang4, Yunfeng Chen5.
Abstract
Media has paid more attention recently on environmental issues caused by construction companies which imposes public opinion pressure on construction companies and could potentially impact their decision-making processes for green innovations. However, research on the relationship between public opinions pressure and construction company green innovation behavior is still limited. To understand how such public opinions pressure can impact construction companies' green transition and formulate advice accordingly, it is necessary to use empirical data to find the correlations. Therefore, this research has gathered questionnaire data of the construction companies in Chengdu-Chongqing economic circle of China to study the influencing mechanism of environmental public opinion pressure on enterprise green innovation behavior, analyzes the realization path of leaders' environmental intention as a mediating variable in the impact of environmental public opinion pressure on enterprise green innovation behavior, and reveals the role boundary of environmental regulation as a moderating variable in the impact of environmental public opinion pressure on enterprise green innovation behavior. The results show that environmental public opinion pressure has a significant positive impact on enterprise green innovation behavior. More specifically, enterprise green innovation behavior is affected by leaders' environmental intention and the latter plays a partial mediating role between environmental public opinion pressure and enterprise green innovation behavior. Environmental regulation also enhances the sensitivity of companies to environmental public opinion pressure, and therefore can significantly strengthen the relationship between environmental public opinion pressure and enterprise green innovation behavior. Further research find that, compared with incentive-based environmental regulations, mandatory environmental regulations make companies more sensitive to environmental public opinion pressure and has a more significant positive moderating effect. The research conclusions could be used to provide theoretical reference with empirical data for accelerating the green innovation transformation and promoting the high-quality development in the construction industry.Entities:
Keywords: enterprise green innovation behavior; environmental public opinion pressure; incentive environmental regulation; leaders' environmental intention; mandatory environmental regulation
Year: 2022 PMID: 35814162 PMCID: PMC9263538 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.936058
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Psychol ISSN: 1664-1078
Figure 1Theoretical model.
Figure 2Regional distribution of valid questionnaires.
Reliability and validity test.
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| Environmental public opinion pressure (EPOP) | EPOP1 | 0.828 | 0.985 | 0.530 | 0.809 |
| EPOP2 | 0.643 | ||||
| EPOP3 | 0.416 | ||||
| EPOP4 | 0.830 | ||||
| Incentive environmental regulation (IER) | IER1 | 0.849 | 0.795 | 0.599 | 0.853 |
| IER2 | 0.896 | ||||
| IER3 | 0.691 | ||||
| IER4 | 0.655 | ||||
| Mandatory environmental regulation (MER) | MER1 | 0.764 | 0.864 | 0.501 | 0.791 |
| MER2 | 0.480 | ||||
| MER3 | 0.740 | ||||
| MER4 | 0.816 | ||||
| Leaders' environmental intention (LEI) | LEI1 | 0.886 | 0.643 | 0.669 | 0.889 |
| LEI2 | 0.851 | ||||
| LEI3 | 0.856 | ||||
| LEI4 | 0.921 | ||||
| Enterprise green innovation behavior (EGIB) | EGIB1 | 0.902 | 0.888 | 0.797 | 0.934 |
| EGIB2 | 0.938 | ||||
| EGIB3 | 0.534 | ||||
| EGIB4 | 0.963 |
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis (N = 384).
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| SIZE | N/A | |||||||
| STATE | 0.261 | N/A | ||||||
| AGE | −0.009 | 0.111* | N/A | |||||
| EPOP | 0.192 | 0.117 | 0.093 | 0.728 | ||||
| IER | 0.152 | 0.135 | 0.150 | 0.119 | 0.774 | |||
| MER | 0.245 | 0.135 | 0.263 | 0.223 | 0.661 | 0.708 | ||
| LEI | 0.209 | 0.167 | 0.203 | 0.299 | 0.250 | 0.627 | 0.818 | |
| EGIB | 0.303 | 0.213 | 0.308 | 0.344 | 0.457 | 0.622 | 0.631 | 0.893 |
| Mean | 2.889 | 0.43 | 1.108 | 2.822 | 3.999 | 4.170 | 3.744 | 4.223 |
| Std. Dev | 0.711 | 0.496 | 0.089 | 0.581 | 0.698 | 0.654 | 0.829 | 0.661 |
| VIF | 1.160 | 1.111 | 1.097 | 1.124 | 1.949 | 3.102 | 1.160 | N/A |
indicate p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05, respectively. The diagonal data is the square root of the variable AVE.
Results of main and mediating effect test.
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| EPOP | 0.263 | 0.247 | 0.137 | |
| LEI | 0.546 | 0.511 | ||
| SIZE | 0.231 | 0.142 | 0.176 | 0.159 |
| STATE | 0.091 | 0.081 | 0.055 | 0.050 |
| AGE | 0.276 | 0.172 | 0.193 | 0.188 |
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| 0.265 | 0.152 | 0.469 | 0.486 |
| Δ | 0.257 | 0.143 | 0.464 | 0.479 |
| F | 34.144 | 16.989 | 83.775 | 71.477 |
indicate p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05, respectively.
Results of moderating effect test.
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| EPOP | 0.263 | 0.222 | 0.166 |
| IER | 0.210 | ||
| MER | 0.332 | ||
| EPOP × IER | 0.190 | ||
| EPOP × MER | 0.230 | ||
| SIZE | 0.231 | 0.183 | 0.119 |
| STATE | 0.091 | 0.065 | 0.068 |
| AGE | 0.276 | 0.233 | 0.144 |
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| 0.265 | 0.399 | 0.497 |
| Δ | 0.257 | 0.389 | 0.489 |
| F | 34.144 | 41.690 | 61.982 |
indicate p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05, respectively.
Bootstrapping tests of mediating effect and moderating effect.
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| EPOP → EGIB | 0.299 | 0.053 | 0.194 | 0.401 |
| EPOP → LEI | 0.352 | 0.047 | 0.203 | 0.492 |
| EPOP → LEI → EGIB | 0.156 | 0.042 | 0.074 | 0.241 |
| EPOP × IER → EGIB | 0.251 | 0.088 | 0.075 | 0.419 |
| EPOP × MER → EGIB | 0.304 | 0.083 | 0.141 | 0.466 |
Figure 3The moderating effect of incentive environmental regulation.
Figure 4The moderating effect of mandatory environmental regulation.
Equity heterogeneity test of moderating effects.
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| EPOP | 0.269 | 0.216 | 0.193 | 0.136 |
| IER | 0.185 | 0.216 | ||
| MER | 0.298 | 0.341 | ||
| EPOP × IER | 0.157 | 0.197 | ||
| EPOP × MER | 0.176 | 0.252 | ||
| SIZE | 0.328 | 0.242 | 0.055 | 0.028 |
| STATE | ||||
| AGE | 0.200 | 0.160 | 0.279 | 0.151 |
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| 0.501 | 0.553 | 0.308 | 0.433 |
| Δ | 0.485 | 0.538 | 0.292 | 0.420 |
| F | 31.876 | 39.264 | 18.940 | 32.524 |
indicate p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05, respectively.