| Literature DB >> 35783524 |
Shanshan Liu1, Zhiyun Jiang1, Luan Wang2, Jiaoling Huang3, Tao Zhang4, Chengjun Liu5,6, Yimin Zhang1.
Abstract
Objective: Family doctors fulfill the role of gatekeepers in protecting residents' health with contracted services. Providing these valuable services involves multiple causes, relationships, and indirectly observable variables. This study used structural equation modeling to construct a dynamic model of the work of family doctors to provide a basis for incentives.Entities:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35783524 PMCID: PMC9246594 DOI: 10.1155/2022/2648833
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Evid Based Complement Alternat Med ISSN: 1741-427X Impact factor: 2.650
Figure 1Hypothetical model path diagram of family doctor contracted services.
Figure 2Family doctor job satisfaction measurement model (model 1).
CFA fitting effect of the family doctor measurement model.
| Model | CMIN/DF | NFI | CFI | IFI | RMSEA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reference standard values | 2.0–5.0 | >0.90 | >0.90 | >0.90 | <0.08 |
| Model 1 (3 factors and 16 indicators) | 6.272 | 0.734 | 0.763 | 0.766 | 0.135 |
| Model 2 (4 factors and 20 indicators) | 3.689 | 0.667 | 0.725 | 0.733 | 0.096 |
| Model R2 (4 factors and 13 indicators) | 3.538 | 0.811 | 0.854 | 0.857 | 0.094 |
Figure 3Family doctor competence, cognition, contracting performance, and stability revised model (model R2).
CFA fitting effect of the dynamic path of the family doctor contracting service model.
| Model |
| NFI | IFI | CFI | RMSEA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reference standard values | 2.0–5.0 | >0.90 | >0.90 | >0.90 | <0.08 |
| Model 3 | 3.435 | 0.685 | 0.754 | 0.749 | 0.092 |
| Model R3 | 3.837 | 0.704 | 0.763 | 0.758 | 0.099 |
Figure 4Dynamic path of the family doctor contracting service revised model (model R3).
The structural path model' latent variables' standardized effect value.
| Independent variables (exogenous/endogenous variables) | Dependent variables (endogenous latent variables) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Environmental satisfaction ( | Income satisfaction ( | Support satisfaction ( | Stability ( | Contracting performance ( | ||
| Cognition ( | Direct effect | 0.37 | 0.54 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.11 |
| Indirect effect |
|
|
| 0.16 | 0.26 | |
| Total effect | 0.37 | 0.54 | 0.25 | 0.56 | 0.37 | |
| Environmental satisfaction ( | Direct effect |
|
|
| 0.12 |
|
| Indirect effect |
|
|
|
|
| |
| Total effect |
|
|
| 0.12 |
| |
| Income satisfaction ( | Direct effect |
|
|
| 0.22 |
|
| Indirect effect |
|
|
|
|
| |
| Total effect |
|
|
| 0.22 |
| |
| Stability ( | Direct effect |
|
|
|
| 0.51 |
| Indirect effect |
|
|
|
|
| |
| Total effect |
|
|
|
| 0.51 | |
| SMC ( | 0.140 | 0.290 | 0.062 | 0.369 | 0.343 | |
P < 0.05.