| Literature DB >> 35763146 |
Abstract
The existing literature on smart city pilots mainly focuses on the city level and rarely addresses the firm level. This paper assesses the impact of smart city pilot policy (SCP) on firms' total factor productivity (TFP) and explores the impact of SCP under different heterogeneities as well as the mechanisms of action of the SCP. The LP approach is used in this paper to measure firms' TFP, and the impact of SCP is analyzed by the DID model with firms' panel data from 2009 to 2019 as research objects. First, it was found that the SCP can significantly increase the TFP of firms (0.041). Second, through heterogeneity analysis, we found that SCP can strengthen the monopoly position of monopolistic firms and state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the SCP can also alleviate the development imbalance of TFP between firms in coastal and non-coastal areas. In addition, SCP can significantly improve TFP of heavy polluting enterprises. Finally, we find that the important ways for SCP to improve firms' TFP is increasing investment in technological innovation, talent agglomeration, attracting financing, improving resource allocation efficiency, and digital transformation. The study provides unique insights for policy makers and business managers in China and other emerging countries to enhance TFP and achieve corporate sustainable development.Entities:
Keywords: Firms’ total factor productivity; Heterogeneity; Mechanism analysis; The smart city pilot policy
Year: 2022 PMID: 35763146 PMCID: PMC9243844 DOI: 10.1007/s11356-022-21681-1
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Environ Sci Pollut Res Int ISSN: 0944-1344 Impact factor: 5.190
Descriptive statistics
| Treated | Control | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | SD | Obs | Mean | SD |
| TFP_LP | 12,065 | 14.598 | 0.926 | 2,901 | 14.520 | 0.904 |
| Growth | 12,067 | 0.145 | 0.234 | 2,901 | 0.140 | 0.237 |
| Age | 12,068 | 2.706 | 0.353 | 2,901 | 2.717 | 0.341 |
| Size | 12,067 | 21.907 | 1.074 | 2,901 | 21.857 | 1.041 |
| Lev | 12,068 | 0.390 | 0.191 | 2,901 | 0.399 | 0.196 |
| BM | 12,068 | 2.761 | 0.206 | 2,901 | 2.761 | 0.191 |
| BF | 12,068 | 0.177 | 0.111 | 2,901 | 0.169 | 0.108 |
| BW | 12,046 | 15.128 | 0.733 | 2,897 | 15.019 | 0.708 |
| Pop | 12,068 | 6695.798 | 3381.087 | 2,901 | 6466.8 | 2818.146 |
| IS | 12,068 | 52.613 | 12.790 | 2,901 | 44.085 | 9.831 |
TFP_LP represents the total factor productivity of the firm, Growth represents the rate of increase in the firm’s turnover, Age represents the logarithm of the firm’s age, Size represents the logarithm of the firm’s total assets, Lev represents the ratio of the firm’s liabilities to total assets, BM represents the logarithm of the firm’s board of directors, BF represents the proportion of women on the firm’s board of directors, BW represents the logarithm of the firm board average annual wage, Pop represents the population of the city (unit: 10,000 people), and IS represents the share of the tertiary sector in the local GDP
The impact of SCP on TFP
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP |
| SCP | 0.340*** | 0.038* | 0.037** | 0.040*** | 0.041*** |
| (0.009) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | |
| Growth | 0.380*** | 0.373*** | 0.374*** | ||
| (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | |||
| Age | − 0.012 | 0.002 | 0.004 | ||
| (0.042) | (0.041) | (0.041) | |||
| Size | 0.505*** | 0.456*** | 0.455*** | ||
| (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |||
| Lev | − 0.130*** | − 0.074* | − 0.081** | ||
| (0.28) | (0.028) | (0.028) | |||
| BM | − 0.040 | − 0.039 | |||
| (0.028) | (0.028) | ||||
| BF | − 0.066 | − 0.069* | |||
| (0.042) | (0.042) | ||||
| BW | 0.159*** | 0.159*** | |||
| (0.008) | (0.008) | ||||
| POP | 0.00003* | ||||
| (0.00001) | |||||
| IS | − 0.0003 | ||||
| (0.001) | |||||
| C | 14.370*** | 14.087*** | 3.431*** | 2.223*** | 2.097*** |
| (0.007) | (0.014) | (0.178) | (0.189) | (0.211) | |
| Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Obs | 14,966 | 14,966 | 14,964 | 14,939 | 14,939 |
| R-sq | 0.834 | 0.865 | 0.911 | 0.913 | 0.913 |
*** indicates significance at the p < 0.01, ** indicates significance at the p < 0.05, * indicates significance at the p < 0.1
Fig. 1Years relative to policy implemented
Fig. 2Placebo test
The impact of SCP on TFP_Mr
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | TFP_Mr | TFP_Mr | TFP_Mr | TFP_Mr | TFP_Mr |
| SCP | 0.342*** | 0.038*** | 0.037** | 0.040** | 0.041** |
| (0.009) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | |
| Firm control | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Board control | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| City control | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Other policies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| C | 14.409*** | 14.125*** | 3.410*** | 2.200*** | 2.073*** |
| (0.007) | (0.014) | (0.178) | (0.189) | (0.211) | |
| Obs | 14,966 | 14,966 | 14,964 | 14,939 | 14,939 |
| R-sq | 0.835 | 0.866 | 0.911 | 0.914 | 0.914 |
*** indicates significance at the p < 0.01, ** indicates significance at the p < 0.05, * indicates significance at the p < 0.1
The impact of SCP on TFP with removing other policies
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP |
| SCP | 0.417*** | 0.048*** | 0.039** | 0.042** | 0.042** |
| (0.011) | (0.016) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | |
| Firm control | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Board control | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| City control | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Other policies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| C | 14.384*** | 14.087*** | 3.431*** | 2.222*** | 2.087*** |
| (0.007) | (0.014) | (0.178) | (0.189) | (0.211) | |
| Obs | 14,966 | 14,966 | 14,964 | 14,939 | 14,939 |
| R-sq | 0.836 | 0.866 | 0.911 | 0.913 | 0.913 |
*** indicates significance at the p < 0.01, ** indicates significance at the p < 0.05, * indicates significance at the p < 0.1
Balancing test
| Variable | Sample | Mean | Bias (%) | Reduct | t-test | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treated | Control | t | p >|t| | ||||
| Age | Unmatched | 2.508 | 2.534 | − 5.9 | 85.1 | − 0.99 | 0.325 |
| Matched | 2.507 | 2.503 | 0.9 | 0.22 | 0.823 | ||
| Size | Unmatched | 21.475 | 21.375 | 9.4 | 92.0 | 1.55 | 0.121 |
| Matched | 21.433 | 21.441 | − 0.7 | − 0.20 | 0.842 | ||
| Growth | Unmatched | 0.217 | 0.222 | − 0.9 | − 11.1 | − 0.14 | 0.893 |
| Matched | 0.216 | 0.210 | 1.0 | 0.26 | 0.791 | ||
| Lev | Unmatched | 0.358 | 0.350 | 2.6 | 98.8 | 0.38 | 0.701 |
| Matched | 0.244 | 0.345 | − 0.00 | − 0.01 | 0.990 | ||
| Board | Unmatched | 2.753 | 2.740 | 6.3 | 37.6 | 1.05 | 0.294 |
| Matched | 2.746 | 2.738 | 4.0 | 1.05 | 0.295 | ||
| Female | Unmatched | 0.171 | 0.168 | 3.0 | 54.8 | 0.50 | 0.619 |
| Matched | 0.171 | 0.173 | -1.3 | − 0.33 | 0.741 | ||
| Wage | Unmatched | 14.962 | 14.813 | 21.3 | 96.1 | 3.59 | 0.000 |
| Matched | 14.936 | 14.93 | 0.8 | 0.24 | 0.808 | ||
All covariates were measured at pre-treatment period
The impact of SCP on TFP within PSM-DID
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP |
| SCP | 0.332*** | 0.027* | 0.022* | 0.026** | 0.027** |
| (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | |
| Firm Control | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Board Control | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| City Control | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| C | 14.37*** | 14.08*** | 3.313*** | 2.231*** | 2.057*** |
| (0.00669) | (0.0139) | (0.152) | (0.169) | (0.190) | |
| Obs | 13,542 | 13,542 | 13,540 | 13,529 | 13,529 |
| R-sq | 0.828 | 0.862 | 0.907 | 0.909 | 0.909 |
*** indicates significance at the p < 0.01, ** indicates significance at the p < 0.05, * indicates significance at the p < 0.1
The regression results based on firm heterogeneity
| SOE | Non-SOE | PE | Non-PE | CE | Non-CE | ME | Non-ME | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
| Variables | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP | TFP_LP |
| SCP | 0.042* | 0.041* | 0.052** | 0.045* | 0.043** | 0.047* | 0.039* | 0.037* |
| (0.020) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.015) | (0.022) | (0,021) | (0.017) | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| C | 2.098*** | 2.173*** | 3.775*** | 1.145*** | 2.604*** | 2.293*** | 2.743*** | 2.288*** |
| (0.351) | (0.270) | (0.338) | (0.270) | (0.248) | (0.476) | (0.275) | (0.378) | |
| Obs | 5,546 | 9,393 | 5,782 | 9,157 | 9,584 | 5,355 | 8,101 | 6,838 |
| R-sq | 0.916 | 0.904 | 0.909 | 0.917 | 0.925 | 0.899 | 0.945 | 0.907 |
*** indicates significance at the p < 0.01, ** indicates significance at the p < 0.05, * indicates significance at the p < 0.1
Mechanism testing
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | RTI | PA | KL | TW | FC | IE | DT |
| SCP | 0.001* | 12.188* | 0.088*** | 0.063** | − 0.017*** | − 0.002* | 0.094* |
| (0.001) | (7.266) | (0.018) | (0.022) | (0.005) | (0.001) | (0.052) | |
| Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| C | 0.002 | − 579.937*** | − 6.644*** | − 11.685*** | 4.278*** | 0.141*** | − 9.674*** |
| (0.011) | (124.266) | (0.304) | (0.377) | (0.081) | (0.020) | (0.884) | |
| Obs | 14,941 | 14,941 | 14,941 | 14,941 | 14,941 | 10,793 | 14,941 |
| R-sq | 0.805 | 0.707 | 0.942 | 0.853 | 0.867 | 0.152 | 0.663 |
*** indicates significance at the p < 0.01, ** indicates significance at the p < 0.05, * indicates significance at the p < 0.1. RTI represents the firm’s R&D investment intensity (compared to operating income). PA represents the number of patents filed. KL represents a firm’s knowledge flow, measured by the logarithm of patent citations. TW is the logarithm of technical staff. FC refers to financing constraints. IE represents resource allocation efficiency, measured by Richardson’s (2006) investment efficiency. DT represents a firm’s digital transformation, using text analysis to retrieve the frequency of occurrence of keywords related to digitalization (Rha and Lee, 2022)