| Literature DB >> 35742788 |
Abstract
County-to-district reform (CTDR) is an important policy path for the government to promote the cultivation and construction of urban agglomerations, and exploring its "carbon emission" effect is of great significance for the high-quality development of urban agglomerations and the realization of the "dual carbon" goal. Based on the panel data of 120 counties in the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration from 2000-2017, this paper empirically tests the effect of county-to-district reforms on per capita carbon emissions in the counties of the central and peripheral cities of the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration under the Kutznets curve (EKC) hypothesis and the integrated difference-in-difference (DID) model and STIRPAT model. The results show that: (1) The carbon emission effect of county-to-district reforms have significant regional heterogeneity. The reforms of the central city of the urban agglomeration significantly reduced the per capita carbon emission of the county by 4.27%, whereas the reforms of the periphery cities of the urban agglomeration significantly increased per capita carbon emission by 6.56%. (2) The impact of county-to-district reforms on county per capita carbon emissions began to appear in the fourth year of reform. (3) Mechanism analysis showed that county-to-district reforms promoted central cities population agglomeration and reduction of carbon emission intensity can help reduce the per capita carbon emission level in counties, whereas peripheral cities have a dual carbon-increasing effect of decreasing population density and increasing carbon emission intensity. Therefore, the approval of county-to-district reforms should be strictly controlled, and the reform of non-central cities would be especially prudent, so as to reduce the negative effect of reform on the high-quality development of cities.Entities:
Keywords: Yangtze River Delta city cluster; center-periphery; county; county-to-district reform; per capita carbon emissions; regional integration
Mesh:
Substances:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35742788 PMCID: PMC9224401 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19127540
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 4.614
Figure 1Number of county-to-district reforms in China, 1999–2018. Data source: Calculated based on all reform documents.
Figure 2Carbon Emissions of Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomerations as a Percentage of China’s Carbon Emissions, 2000–2017. Data source: Calculated based on the county’s annual carbon emissions.
Different relationships between GDP and carbon emissions.
| Coefficients | Implication | ||
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
| |
| ≠0 | 0 | 0 | GDP and carbon emissions show a linear relationship |
| <0 | >0 | 0 | GDP and carbon emissions show a U-shaped curve relationship |
| >0 | <0 | 0 | GDP and carbon emissions show an inverted U-shaped curve relationship |
| >0 | <0 | >0 | GDP and carbon emissions show an N-curve relationship |
| <0 | >0 | <0 | GDP and carbon emissions show an inverted N-curve relationship |
Descriptive statistical analysis of variables.
| Variable | Meaning of Variables | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| ln | 1.6694 | 0.7830 | −0.7729 | 3.6812 | 2160 |
|
| Whether to reform | 0.1551 | 0.3621 | 0 | 1 | 2160 |
|
| ln | 14.0540 | 1.0765 | 10.0858 | 16.7800 | 2160 |
|
| ln | 102.432 | 16.164 | 60.383 | 170.451 | 2160 |
|
| ln | 0.487 | 0.103 | 0.027 | 0.859 | 2160 |
|
| ln | 6.1773 | 0.5597 | 4.3450 | 7.2858 | 2160 |
|
| ln | 0.9324 | 0.5002 | −1.6252 | 2.7398 | 2160 |
Baseline regression results of the reform.
|
| ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Reform × After | 0.875 *** | 0.0340 ** | 0.2070 *** | 0.0163 *** |
| (20.56) | (2.09) | (9.73) | (2.72) | |
| ln | –0.0669 *** | −0.3238 *** | ||
| (−3.82) | (−20.28) | |||
| ln | 0.7771 *** | 0.0453 *** | ||
| (21.33) | (5.45) | |||
| ln | 0.5640 *** | 1.0963 *** | ||
| (35.04) | (100.91) | |||
| ln | 0.2626 *** | −0.0445 *** | ||
| (16.86) | (−6.27) | |||
| ln | −4.0303 *** | −0.7188 *** | ||
| (−2.99) | (−2.81) | |||
| ln | 0.2424 ** | 0.1357 *** | ||
| (2.47) | (7.27) | |||
| ln | −0.0054 ** | −0.0035 *** | ||
| (−2.28) | (−7.72) | |||
| Time fixed effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Individual fixed effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 2160 | 2160 | 2160 | 2160 |
| Adjust-R2 | 0.1634 | 0.9773 | 0.8244 | 0.9971 |
| F | 422.72 | 678.79 | 1268..34 | 5104.04 |
t values are in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
Regional heterogeneity effects of reform.
|
| ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Center | (2) Periphery | (3) Center | (4) Periphery | |
| Reform × After | −0.0566 * | 0.1220 *** | −0.0427 *** | 0.0656 *** |
| (−1.87) | (6.36) | (−3.63) | (8.63) | |
| ln | −0.3855 *** | −0.2729 *** | ||
| (−9.28) | (−15.86) | |||
| ln | −0.0022 | 0.0414 *** | ||
| (−0.07) | (5.13) | |||
| ln | 1.1841 *** | 1.0450 *** | ||
| (41.40) | (89.27) | |||
| ln | −0.0321 ** | −0.0473 *** | ||
| (−2.10) | (−5.96) | |||
| ln | 4.6353 *** | −0.9179 *** | ||
| (2.72) | (−3.69) | |||
| ln | −0.2234 * | 0.1510 *** | ||
| (−1.88) | (8.26) | |||
| ln | 0.0047 * | −0.0038 *** | ||
| (1.70) | (−8.69) | |||
| Constant term | 0.8573 *** | 0.8586 *** | −31.0090 *** | −3.4104 *** |
| (21.21) | (30.62) | (−3.87) | (−3.00) | |
| Double fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 432 | 1728 | 432 | 1728 |
| Adjust-R2 | 0.9674 | 0.9797 | 0.9958 | 0.9974 |
| F | 313 | 738.90 | 2152.99 | 5584.03 |
t values are in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Placebo test of reform.
|
| ||
|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | |
| 5th year before reform | −0.0124 | |
| (−1.04) | ||
| 4th year before reform | −0.0030 | |
| (−0.25) | ||
| 3rd year before reform | −0.0071 | |
| (−0.62) | ||
| 2nd year before reform | 0.0020 | |
| (0.20) | ||
| Year 1 before reform | 0.0072 | |
| (0.77) | ||
| The year of reform | 0.0055 | −0.0244 |
| (0.67) | (−1.08) | |
| The 1st year after reform | −0.0038 | |
| (−0.17) | ||
| The 2nd year after reform | 0.0347 | |
| (1.45) | ||
| The 3rd year after reform | 0.0374 | |
| (1.50) | ||
| The 4th year after reform | 0.0592 ** | |
| (2.38) | ||
| The 5th year after reform | 0.0514 ** | |
| (1.99) | ||
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Individual fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 2160 | 2160 |
| Adjust-R2 | 0.9971 | 0.9773 |
| F | 4909.14 | 656.38 |
t values are in parentheses, ** p < 0.05.
Robustness tests.
|
| ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000–2003 | 2009–2017 | |||
| (1) Center | (2) Periphery | (3) Center | (4) Periphery | |
| Reform × After | 0.0331 *** | 0.0977 *** | 0.0174 *** | 0.0308 *** |
| (5.15) | (11.56) | (4.27) | (6.26) | |
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 480 | 384 | 1080 | 864 |
| Adjust-R2 | 0.9995 | 0.9995 | 0.9991 | 0.9992 |
| F | 7303.2 | 7634 | 9195.74 | 10,319.30 |
t values are in parentheses, *** p < 0.01.
Mechanism test.
| Explained Variables | |||
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
| |
| Overall area | 0.0130 | −0.0724 *** | −0.1433 *** |
| (1.56) | (−3.64) | (−3.94) | |
| Central Cities | 0.0667 *** | −0.1763 *** | −0.0458 |
| (4.18) | (−4.28) | (−0.74) | |
| Peripheral Cities | −0.0326 *** | 0.0557 *** | −0.1976 *** |
| (−3.26) | (2.65) | (−4.26) | |
t values are in parentheses, *** p < 0.01.