| Literature DB >> 35719624 |
Chengming Li1, Daming Li1, Si He1, Shiqi Sun2, Yuan Tian3, Zeyu Wang4.
Abstract
Whether families using big data-based digital payments will increase household healthcare expenditure is a subject that needs to be investigated in the era of big data. Based on the data from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), 24,126 samples from 2014 to 2018 are used to examine the impact and mechanism of big data-based digital payments on household healthcare expenditure. The empirical results of this paper show that the use of digital payments by households can significantly increase household healthcare expenditure with the empowerment of big data. This research employs the instrumental variable method to verify and produce consistent estimation results in order to address potential endogeneity issues such as measurement error and missing variables. We learn via mechanism analysis that household adoption of big data-driven digital payments can remove credit limitations and build social capital, resulting in higher household health-care spending. We also perform a heterogeneity analysis. The findings reveal that when a family's traditional financial accessibility is high, the head of the household is young or middle-aged, and the head of the household has a higher level of education, digital payment will play a larger role in encouraging household healthcare expenditure. The conclusions of this paper are still solid after changing the indicators of household healthcare expenditure substituting the indicators of digital payment, and adjusting the variables. As a result, this article provides micro-evidence for the usage of digital payments by households to enhance healthcare spending. JEL Classification: D12 G21 O30 O53 I12.Entities:
Keywords: big data; credit constraints; digital payments; household healthcare expenditure; social capital
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35719624 PMCID: PMC9201467 DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.922574
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Front Public Health ISSN: 2296-2565
Statistical description of variables.
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| Healthcare expenditure | The sum of household medical expenditure and household health expenditure | 24,126 | 6.901 | 2.711 | 0 | 13.84 |
| Digital payments | Extent of digital payments used by the household head | 24,126 | 0.460 | 1.276 | 0 | 6 |
| Age of the household head | Age of the household head | 24,126 | 52.98 | 13.15 | 16 | 93 |
| Age2 of the household head | Age2/100 of the household head | 24,126 | 29.80 | 14.13 | 2.560 | 86.49 |
| Gender of the household head (male = 1) | Gender of the household head | 24,126 | 0.514 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Marriage of the household head (married = 1) | Marital status of the household head | 24,126 | 0.870 | 0.336 | 0 | 1 |
| Party membership (party = 1) | Whether the household head is a party member | 24,126 | 0.107 | 0.309 | 0 | 1 |
| Household size | Number of families eating together | 24,126 | 3.786 | 1.876 | 1 | 21 |
| Child ratio | Number of child in the household size | 24,126 | 0.124 | 0.201 | 0 | 4 |
| Elderly ratio | Number of elderly in the household size | 24,126 | 0.240 | 0.350 | 0 | 3 |
| Net household income | Net income is the income after deducting the cost of agricultural production | 24,126 | 9.007 | 1.576 | 0 | 13.83 |
We define a child as an individual who is not older than 16 years old, an elderly person as an individual who is 60 years old and older.
Baseline regression results.
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| Digital payments | 0.0844*** | 0.0591** | 0.0594** | 0.0534** |
| (5.90) | (2.36) | (2.19) | (2.07) | |
| Age of the household head | −0.0170 | −0.0410 | ||
| (−0.28) | (−0.61) | |||
| Square of age of the household head/100 | 0.0175 | 0.0387 | ||
| (0.36) | (0.79) | |||
| Gender of the household head | 0.981 | 0.855 | ||
| (1.54) | (1.51) | |||
| Marriage of the household head | 0.685*** | 0.554*** | ||
| (3.78) | (3.01) | |||
| Party membership | −0.0226 | −0.0416 | ||
| (−0.11) | (−0.22) | |||
| Household size | 0.224*** | |||
| (9.98) | ||||
| Child ratio | −0.317 | |||
| (−1.55) | ||||
| Elderly ratio | −0.0492 | |||
| (−0.34) | ||||
| Net household income | 0.0642*** | |||
| (3.32) | ||||
| Household fixed effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 |
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| 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.016 |
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Robustness test: endogeneity treatment.
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| Digital payments | 0.952 | 1.046 | ||
| (3.26) | (3.42) | |||
| Driving distance | −142.296 | |||
| (−3.66) | ||||
| Spherical distance | −1.145 | |||
| (−4.00) | ||||
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 |
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| 0.130 | 0.083 | 0.130 | 0.105 |
| Wald value | 56.520 | 58.313 | ||
| first stage F-value | 88.11 | 91.55 |
Indicate significant at the 1% statistical levels, respectively, with t-values in parentheses.
Robustness test: replacement of explanatory variables.
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| Digital payments (0–1) | 0.265*** | 0.218** | 0.216** | 0.194** |
| (6.56) | (2.68) | (2.57) | (2.49) | |
| Control variables for household head | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | No | No | No | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 |
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| 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.016 |
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Robustness tests: replacement of explanatory variables.
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| Digital payments | 0.0432** | 0.157*** | 0.00840** | 0.00790** |
| (2.20) | (8.71) | (2.28) | (2.63) | |
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 |
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| 0.782 | 0.098 | 0.018 | 0.017 |
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Robustness test: replacement sample range.
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| Digital payments | 0.0559 | 0.0534 | 0.0534 |
| (2.17) | (2.07) | (2.07) | |
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 |
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| 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 |
Indicate significant at the 5% statistical levels, respectively, with t-values in parentheses.
Mechanism analysis: credit constraints.
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| Digital payments | 0.0534** | 0.00892*** | 0.0506* |
| (2.07) | (2.86) | (1.95) | |
| Credit Availability | 0.315*** | ||
| (5.87) | |||
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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| 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 |
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| 0.016 | 0.006 | 0.018 |
| Sobel Z | 2.803 | ||
| Sobel Z-P values | (0.0005) | ||
| Bootstrap Z | 2.60 | ||
| Bootstrap Z-P values | (0.009) | ||
| Intermediary effect as a percentage | 2.30% |
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Mechanism analysis: social capital.
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| Digital payments | 0.0525* | 0.0344* | 0.0493* |
| (1.93) | (1.86) | (1.84) | |
| Social Capital | 0.0951*** | ||
| (8.02) | |||
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 24,126 | 24,126 | 24,126 |
| R2 | 0.016 | 0.046 | 0.025 |
| Sobel Z | 5.543 | ||
| Sobel Z-P values | (0.000) | ||
| Bootstrap Z | 5.880 | ||
| Bootstrap Z-P values | (0.000) | ||
| Intermediary effect as a percentage | 7.24% |
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Heterogeneity of household financial accessibility.
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| Digital payments | 0.0294 | 0.0809 |
| (0.89) | (2.29) | |
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
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| 14,092 | 10,034 |
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| 0.017 | 0.017 |
Indicate significant at the 5% statistical levels, respectively, with t-values in parentheses.
Heterogeneity in the age of household heads.
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|---|---|---|
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| Digital payments | 0.0563 | 0.0766 |
| (1.99) | (1.39) | |
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
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| 16,142 | 7,984 |
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| 0.019 | 0.015 |
Indicate significant at the 10% statistical levels, respectively, with t-values in parentheses.
Heterogeneity in education level of household heads.
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| Digital payments | −0.0454 | 0.0536 |
| (-0.59) | (1.98) | |
| Control variables for household head | Yes | Yes |
| Control variables for household | Yes | Yes |
| Household fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes |
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| 6,050 | 18,076 |
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| 0.009 | 0.020 |
Indicate significant at the 10% statistical levels, respectively, with t-values in parentheses.