| Literature DB >> 35694035 |
Mohammed Imtyaz Ahmed1, G Kannan1.
Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT), 5G cellular technology, and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are enabling a wide range of IoT-based application cases that are both intelligent. As one of the most impactful applications of the Internet of Things (IoT), healthcare makes use of AAL (Ambient Assisted Living), mobile health (mHealth), and electronic health (eHealth). Spending on health is a significant portion of people's income. Traditional medicine is prone to long delays, waste of money and effort, and even death. RVO (Remote Victim Observation) can be utilized to circumvent problems associated with traditional healthcare facilities because of IoT's intelligence and predictive power. With the help of IoT-based RVO and wearable devices, sensor networks, and other digital infrastructure, we can detect oncoming situations before they become life-threatening or even fatal. IoT integration with healthcare units was demonstrated in order to build a trustworthy, available, and secure RVO system. Secure end to end communication, encryption of RFID data, and privacy protection are all part of the proposed solution. An android wearable watch (Biosensor | Body sensor), a server using REST framework, and a smartphone app to monitor and detect falls, blood pressure, and heart rate are all part of the system. As a bonus, the peace and quiet of this secluded location contribute to the attraction. Using this RVO could improve health care and quality of life, according to an empirical investigation.Entities:
Keywords: Biosensors; IoT; Medicalcare; Privacy; Remote victim observation; Security
Year: 2022 PMID: 35694035 PMCID: PMC9170562 DOI: 10.1007/s11042-022-13310-3
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Multimed Tools Appl ISSN: 1380-7501 Impact factor: 2.577
Fig. 1Architecture of RVO and IoT procedure
Fig. 2Features of health data and from a remote victim
Fig. 3Smartphone steps
Fig. 4Sequence server side functionality
Fig. 5Privacy and security overview
Notations
| Notation | Description |
|---|---|
| x’ s verified message | |
| Message m is decrypted using session key x. | |
| An elliptic curve E over Fq | |
| Message m is encrypted using session key x. | |
| A prime finite field | |
| ith one-way hash function | |
| Body sensor id | |
| Medical reader id | |
| The personal reader id | |
| Denotes a random number. Elliptic curve group uses it. | |
| Denotes a polynomial function of information related to elliptic curve. | |
| Signature of elliptic curve group of x. | |
| The session key and transaction number encrypted sensing data | |
| Data sensed by body sensor. | |
| Denotes f(x, y) equal to f(y, x) as polynomial function. | |
| Denotes cyclic additive group with composite order q | |
| A one-way hash function | |
| The group G’s generator | |
| It is the session key established between two parties namely data receiver and data sender | |
| Denotes a public key which is in the system PK = sP | |
| Denotes a k-bit prime | |
| Random numbers | |
| A secret key of the system | |
| Denotes a transaction ID | |
| Checks whether A and B are equal |
Computed cost of comparison
| Phase | Party | Server | Data receiver | Data sender | Body sensor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Registration of body sensor | N/A | 1TP + 1TH | N/A | N/A |
| Registration of data sender | 2 | 1TP + 1TH | 2TMul + 1TH + 1TCmp | N/A |
| Registration of data receiver | 2TMul + 1TH | 2TMul + 1TH + 1TCmp | N/A | N/A |
| Authentication & communication | N/A | 5TMul + 1TH + 1TCmp | 1TP + 5TMul + 7TH + 2TCmp + 3TENC | 5TP + 2TH + 1TCmp1TENC |
Communication cost analysis
| Phase/Item | Length of message | Number of rounds | 14 Mbps Speed (3G) | 100 Mbps Speed (4G) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Registration of body sensor | 400 bits | 2 | 0.029 ms | 0.004 ms |
| Registration of data sender | 880 bits | 4 | 0.063 ms | 0.009 ms |
| Registration of data receiver | 480 bits | 2 | 0.034 ms | 0.005 ms |
| Authentication & communication | 2448 bits | 5 | 0.175 ms | 0.024 ms |
Features compared with He et al.’s Scheme (Y for Yes, N for N)
| Feature/Scheme | Scheme of He et al. [ | Proposed Scheme |
|---|---|---|
| Comprehensive Scheme | N | Y |
| Forward and Backward Secrecy | N | Y |
| Replay Attack Prevention | Y | Y |
| User Untraceability | Y | Y |
| Data Integrity | Y | Y |
| Mutual Authentication | N | Y |
Level of privacy vs. number of compromised tags
| No. of compromised tags (C) | Level of privacy (R) | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| PriSens [ | Group based authentication [ | Proposed | |
| 0 | 0.995 | 1 | 1 |
| 10 | 0.745 | 0.75 | 0.75 |
| 20 | 0.545 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| 30 | 0.393 | 0.398 | 0.4 |
| 40 | 0.28355 | 0.28855 | 0.29 |
| 50 | 0.2139 | 0.2189 | 0.22 |
| 60 | 0.14425 | 0.14925 | 0.15 |
| 70 | 0.1144 | 0.1194 | 0.12 |
| 80 | 0.10445 | 0.10945 | 0.11 |
| 90 | 0.0945 | 0.0995 | 0.1 |
| 100 | 0.791 | 0.796 | 0.8 |
| 110 | 0.04475 | 0.04975 | 0.05 |
| 120 | 0.04475 | 0.04975 | 0.05 |
| 130 | 0.0348 | 0.0398 | 0.04 |
| 140 | 0.02485 | 0.02985 | 0.03 |
| 150 | 0.02485 | 0.02985 | 0.03 |
| 160 | 0.0149 | 0.0199 | 0.02 |
Fig. 6Level of privacy comparison
Information leakage vs. number of compromised tags
| No. of compromised tags (C) | Information leakage (bits) | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Proposed | Group based authentication [ | PriSens [ | |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | 0.95 | 1.5 | 1 |
| 20 | 1.9 | 3 | 2 |
| 30 | 2.85 | 4.5 | 3 |
| 40 | 3.325 | 5.25 | 3.5 |
| 50 | 3.61 | 5.7 | 3.8 |
| 60 | 3.895 | 6.15 | 4.1 |
| 70 | 4.18 | 6.6 | 4.4 |
| 80 | 4.465 | 7.05 | 4.7 |
| 90 | 4.75 | 7.5 | 5 |
| 100 | 5.035 | 7.95 | 5.3 |
| 110 | 5.32 | 8.4 | 5.6 |
| 120 | 5.605 | 8.85 | 5.9 |
| 130 | 5.89 | 9.3 | 6.2 |
| 140 | 6.175 | 9.75 | 6.5 |
| 150 | 6.46 | 10.2 | 6.8 |
| 160 | 6.745 | 10.65 | 7.1 |
Fig. 7Information leakage against number of compromised tags