| Literature DB >> 35682465 |
Min Wang1, Youshi He1, Jianya Zhou1, Kai Ren2.
Abstract
The environmental pollution that accompanies economic growth has always been of widespread concern. The chemical industry is a highly energy-consuming industry in China, and the pollution this industry causes to the environment cannot be ignored. The paper is based on the Porter hypothesis and uses data from different regions of China. In this paper, we investigate the mediating role of different types of environmental regulation (divided into command-controlled, market-incentive, and voluntary environmental regulation) in positively affecting sustainability performance through green technology innovation (divided into green product innovation, green process innovation, and end-of-line management innovation). The results show that different versions of the Porter hypothesis can be accepted in Chinese chemical enterprises. This finding demonstrates that environmental regulation positively impacts both green technology innovation and sustainability performance. Green technology innovation plays a mediating role between environmental regulation and sustainability performance, especially in East China. However, the mediating effect of green product innovation is not significant. Further study shows that command-controlled environmental regulation has a more significant positive effect on sustainability performance. This suggests that the market-incentive and voluntary environmental regulation tools do not fully play their functional roles. Thus, the paper demonstrates the developmental shortcomings of environmental regulation, green technology innovation, and sustainability performance. This is more conducive to chemical enterprises improving green technology innovation and achieving long-term development and ecological environment protection.Entities:
Keywords: Porter hypothesis; environmental regulation; green technology innovation; sustainability performance
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35682465 PMCID: PMC9180368 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19116882
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Int J Environ Res Public Health ISSN: 1660-4601 Impact factor: 4.614
Figure 1Research design.
Sample characteristics.
| Attribute | Categories | Number of Samples | Proportion (%) | Attribute | Categories | Number of Samples | Proportion (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Area | East China | 150 | 37.5 | Profit | ≤20 M | 72 | 18 |
| Central China | 136 | 34 | 20~40 M | 80 | 20 | ||
| West China | 114 | 28.5 | 40~60 M | 136 | 34 | ||
| Enterprise age | ≤5 year | 88 | 22 | 60~80 M | 62 | 15.5 | |
| 6~10 year | 126 | 31.5 | 80~100 M | 32 | 8 | ||
| 11~15 year | 112 | 28 | ≥100 M | 18 | 4.5 | ||
| 16~20 year | 56 | 14 | Technical Staff (n) | ≤20 | 36 | 9 | |
| ≥20 year | 18 | 4.5 | 20~40 | 112 | 28 | ||
| Enterprise type | State-owned | 186 | 46.5 | 40~60 | 144 | 36 | |
| Private | 176 | 44 | 60~80 | 44 | 11 | ||
| Foreign | 22 | 5.5 | 80~100 | 38 | 9.5 | ||
| Joint venture | 16 | 4 | ≥100 | 26 | 6.5 |
Factor loadings and Cronbach α.
| Factor Loadings | Cronbach α | |
|---|---|---|
| Command-controlled environmental regulation | 0.821 | 0.876 |
| Market-incentive environmental regulation | 0.722 | 0.891 |
| Voluntary environmental regulation | 0.729 | 0.800 |
| Green product innovation | 0.780 | 0.822 |
| Green process innovation | 0.719 | 0.818 |
| End-of-line management innovation | 0.800 | 0.806 |
| Sustainability performance | 0.718 | 0.826 |
Results of model fitting.
| chisq/df | GFI | RMSEA | CFI | NNFI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Environmental Regulation | 1.72 | 0.912 | 0.031 | 0.931 | 0.906 |
| Green Technology Innovation | 1.68 | 0.940 | 0.071 | 0.958 | 0.915 |
| Green Sustainability performance | 0.98 | 0.971 | 0.078 | 0.930 | 0.955 |
Results of hypothesis testing.
| Hypothesis | China | East China | Central China | West China | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Std | t Value | Results | Std | t Value | Results | Std | t Value | Results | Std | t Value | Results | |
| H1-1a | 0.33 *** | 7.81 | support | 0.31 *** | 6.49 | support | 0.28 *** | 4.33 | support | 0.31 *** | 6.09 | support |
| H1-1b | 0.29 ** | 5.00 | 0.21 ** | 4.10 | 0.23 ** | 3.83 | 0.20 * | 3.58 | ||||
| H1-1c | 0.30 *** | 6.01 | 0.28 *** | 4.66 | 0.21 ** | 3.50 | 0.19 * | 3.00 | ||||
| H1-2a | 0.29 ** | 4.70 | 0.27 ** | 4.38 | 0.29 *** | 4.88 | 0.23 ** | 3.91 | ||||
| H1-2b | 0.23 ** | 3.83 | 0.25 ** | 3.88 | 0.13 | 1.01 | not support | 0.20 ** | 3.49 | |||
| H1-2c | 0.22 ** | 3.48 | 0.23 ** | 3.47 | 0.28 ** | 4.30 | support | 0.13 | 1.49 | not support | ||
| H1-3a | 0.13 | 1.57 | not support | 0.23 ** | 3.28 | 0.20 ** | 5.30 | 0.21 ** | 3.66 | support | ||
| H1-3b | 0.32 *** | 7.62 | support | 0.30 *** | 6.30 | 0.25 ** | 3.99 | 0.19 * | 3.11 | |||
| H1-3c | 0.28 ** | 4.65 | 0.27 ** | 4.18 | 0.19 * | 2.78 | 0.11 | 1.38 | not support | |||
| H2a | 0.13 | 1.48 | not support | 0.17 * | 3.08 | 0.18 * | 2.96 | 0.18 * | 2.90 | support | ||
| H2b | 0.20 ** | 2.89 | support | 0.16 * | 2.91 | 0.14 | 1.91 | not support | 0.15 | 1.55 | ||
| H2c | 0.23 ** | 3.09 | 0.23 ** | 3.88 | 0.16 * | 2.68 | support | 0.10 | 1.27 | not support | ||
| H3a | 0.31 *** | 6.78 | 0.32 *** | 7.79 | 0.29 ** | 4.68 | 0.28 ** | 4.25 | support | |||
| H3b | 0.26 ** | 4.22 | 0.29 *** | 5.17 | 0.22 ** | 3.28 | 0.25 ** | 4.05 | ||||
| H3c | 0.25 ** | 4.05 | 0.30 *** | 6.29 | 0.20 * | 3.01 | 0.21 ** | 3.77 | ||||
Note: * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001, Std is the Standardized path coefficient.
Model fitting results for different regions.
| chisq/df | GFI | AGFI | RMSEA | NFI | TLI | CFI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| China | 1.90 | 0.978 | 0.932 | 0.041 | 0.922 | 0.980 | 0.905 |
| East China | 0.127 | 0.955 | 0.972 | 0.038 | 0.971 | 0.925 | 0.930 |
| Central China | 0.092 | 0.933 | 0.979 | 0.040 | 0.988 | 0.927 | 0.946 |
| West China | 1.07 | 0.925 | 0.909 | 0.032 | 0.938 | 0.926 | 0.985 |
Figure 2Results of the hypothesized model in China. * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001.
Figure 3Results of the hypothesized model in East China. * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001.
Figure 4Results of the hypothesized model in Central China. * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001.
Figure 5Results of the hypothesized model in West China. * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001. In this study, the self-help sampling method (bootstrap method) was used to further test for mediating effects (N = 400), and Bias correction was used to detect confidence intervals (see Table 6).
Basic information.
| Company Name | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Area: | a. East China | b. Central China | c. West China | |||
| Enterprise type | a. State-owned | b. Private | c. Foreign | d. Joint venture | ||
| Enterprise ag | a. ≤5 year | b. 6~10 year | c. 11~15 year | d. 16~20 year | e. ≥20 year | |
| Annual profit (RMB) | a. ≤20 M | b. 20~40 M | c. 40~60 M | d. 60~80 M | e. 80~100 M | f. ≥100 M |
| Technical staff (n) | a. ≤20 | b. 20~40 | c. 40~60 | d. 60~80 | e. 80~100 | f. ≥100 |
Questionnaire for command-controlled environmental regulation.
| Item or Indicator | Inconformity ←--------→ Conformity | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| The government strictly regulates chemical companies to comply with exhaust emission standards. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government strictly regulates chemical companies to comply with wastewater discharge standards. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government strictly regulates chemical companies to comply with chemical solid waste discharge standards. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government strictly regulates chemical companies to comply with standards for the use of green technology. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government enforces very severe penalties on chemical companies that exceed emissions standards. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
Questionnaire for market-incentive environmental regulation.
| Item or Indicator | Inconformity ←--------→ Conformity | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| The Government strictly regulates the sewage charges levied on chemical companies. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government imposes a reasonable and regulated environmental tax on chemical companies. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The tradable emission permits issued by the government to chemical companies are in line with local development requirements. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government sets up a reasonable and regulated special fund for technological progress. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government offers reasonable and regulated credit concessions to chemical companies. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
Questionnaire for voluntary environmental regulation.
| Item or Indicator | Inconformity ←--------→ Conformity | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| Voluntary participation agreements are regularly signed between the government and chemical companies. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government is proactive in improving market regulation mechanisms for voluntary environmental regulation. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government is proactive in disclosing information to the community about the environmental protection of chemical companies. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government proactively monitors the voluntary participation of chemical companies. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The government is proactive in educating chemical companies on eco-ethical awareness. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
Questionnaire for green product innovation.
| Item or Indicator | Inconformity ←--------→ Conformity | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| Chemical companies strictly regulate the choice of raw materials for green products. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The development of green product projects in chemical companies is ongoing. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Chemical companies develop green products that meet domestic environmental standards. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Green products developed by chemical companies are very easy to pass the domestic green product certification. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Chemical companies develop green products that are beneficial to the health of consumers. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
Questionnaire for green process innovation.
| Item or Indicator | Inconformity ←--------→ Conformity | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| Emissions of industrial “three wastes” from chemical companies were significantly reduced. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Chemical companies have taken the initiative to upgrade their green process technologies. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The production process for green processes in chemical companies is clear and standardized. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Chemical companies are decisively phasing out obsolete processes that are heavy polluters. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Chemical companies are proactive in adapting traditional processes. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
Questionnaire for end-of-line management innovation.
| Item or Indicator | Inconformity ←--------→ Conformity | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| Wastewater treatment technology for chemical companies is constantly being upgraded. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Waste gas treatment technology for chemical companies is constantly being upgraded. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Waste residue treatment technologies for chemical companies are constantly being upgraded. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Chemical companies are constantly upgrading their pollutant management equipment. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Research into the “three waste” treatment technologies for chemical companies is ongoing. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
Questionnaire for sustainability performance.
| Item or Indicator | Inconformity ←--------→ Conformity | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| The actual return on a company’s green product is in line with the company’s expected return. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Green technology innovation keeps companies in good financial shape. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The ability of companies to innovate with green technology has increased significantly. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The cost of pollution control for companies has been significantly reduced. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| The market share of a company’s green products is higher than that of its competitors in the market. | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ | □ |
Indirect effects of environmental regulations on sustainability performance through green technology innovation.
| Mediators | Indirect Effects | Bias Corrected 95% CI | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CER → SP | Green product innovation | 0.031 | 0.020 to 0.588 |
| Green process innovation | 0.104 | 0.054 to 0.830 | |
| End-of-line management innovation | 0.098 | 0.019 to 0.725 | |
| MER → SP | Green product innovation | 0.051 | 0.025 to 0.610 |
| Green process innovation | 0.036 | 0.028 to 0.526 | |
| End-of-line management innovation | 0.025 | 0.016 to 0.313 | |
| VER → SP | Green product innovation | 0.019 | 0.012 to 0.406 |
| Green process innovation | 0.073 | 0.045 to 0.739 | |
| End-of-line management innovation | 0.038 | 0.030 to 0.594 |
Note: CER = Command-controlled environmental regulation, SP = Sustainability performance, MER = Market-incentive environmental regulation, VER = Voluntary environmental regulation.