Strengthening Biorisk Management in Research Laboratories with Security-Sensitive Biological Agents Like SARS-CoV-2.

In this chapter, we discuss potential incidents associated with SARS-CoV-2 experimental work in high containment research laboratories. The risk landscape in high containment laboratories is changing due to the strong innovation drive of the life sciences research. Thus, the WHO has recommended life sciences organizations to incorporate good research practices and ethical principles into a risk-based approach of the biorisk management (BRM). Currently, BRM systems in high containment laboratories are predominantly steered by operational personnel and laboratory professional. It is well known that without having a systematic approach and leadership support from the organization, the BRM system in the high containment laboratory will not be sustainable. Even though the roles of organizations and their leadership in establishing the BRM system are spelt out in many international standards, guidance documents and national legislations, operational aspects of these roles are rarely discussed.It is therefore important for everyone to understand about their roles in organizational processes (communication, decision, and performance evaluation) involved in implementation of BRM related operational activities. In this chapter, discussion is based on operational activities of four main organizational behaviors that are considered to have strengthened BRM systems in high containment laboratories: (1) displaying a visible commitment and support to the BRM system from different levels of management, (2) developing a competent and responsible workforce with BRM technical skills and problem identification/solving skills, (3) integrating learning and improvement principles into the BRM system, and (4) enhancing the continuous motivation of laboratory personnel to avoid complacency. The categorization of these organizational behaviors is based on the International Atomic Energy Agency's principles and guidance for strengthening the safety and security culture in nuclear facilities. Furthermore, we encourage the laboratory management to identify gaps in processes and activities related to those organizational behaviors so that one could rapidly address biosafety and biosecurity vulnerabilities in high containment laboratories.