| Literature DB >> 35458944 |
Ramesh Velumani1, Hariharasitaraman Sudalaimuthu2, Gaurav Choudhary3, Srinivasan Bama4, Maranthiran Victor Jose5, Nicola Dragoni3.
Abstract
Advances in information technology have harnessed the application of Quick Response (QR) codes in day-to-day activities, simplifying information exchange. QR codes are witnessed almost everywhere, on consumables, newspapers, information bulletins, etc. The simplicity of QR code creation and ease of scanning with free software have tremendously influenced their wide usage, and since QR codes place information on an object they are a tool for the IoT. Many healthcare IoT applications are deployed with QR codes for data-labeling and quick transfer of clinical data for rapid diagnosis. However, these codes can be duplicated and tampered with easily, attributed to open- source QR code generators and scanners. This paper presents a novel (n,n) secret-sharing scheme based on Nonnegative Matrix Factorization (NMF) for secured transfer of QR codes as multiple shares and their reconstruction with a regularized Super Resolution Convolutional Neural Network (SRCNN). This scheme is an alternative to the existing polynomial and visual cryptography-based schemes, exploiting NMF in part-based data representation and structural regularized SRCNN to capture the structural elements of the QR code in the super-resolved image. The experimental results and theoretical analyses show that the proposed method is a potential solution for secured exchange of QR codes with different error correction levels. The security of the proposed approach is evaluated with the difficulty in launching security attacks to recover and decode the secret QR code. The experimental results show that an adversary must try 258 additional combinations of shares and perform 3 × 288 additional computations, compared to a representative approach, to compromise the proposed system.Entities:
Keywords: Nonnegative Matrix Factorization; basis matrix; coefficient matrix; convolutional neural network; quick response code; secret sharing; structural regularization; super resolution
Mesh:
Year: 2022 PMID: 35458944 PMCID: PMC9029129 DOI: 10.3390/s22082959
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Sensors (Basel) ISSN: 1424-8220 Impact factor: 3.576
Figure 1(n,n) QR code sharing.
Comparative analysis of visual secret-sharing schemes.
| Reference | Method Employed | Pros | Cons |
|---|---|---|---|
| Naor & Shamir [ | Polynomial | Secrets are converted into unconditionally secure shadow image | Requires additional storage as each shadow image is of the size of the secret image |
| Thien & Lin [ | Polynomial | Size of shadow image is smaller than secret image |
Traces of secret image are visible in the shadow images Method suffers from random pixel expansion |
| Yang et al. [ | Polynomials in the Galois Field | Lossless recovery without pixel expansion | High Computational Cost |
| Ding et al. [ | Polynomial scheme and modular algebraic recovery | Fully lossless recovery |
Random shape changes Large shadow size High computational complexity |
| Zhou et al. [ | Polynomial sharing and generalized Arnold permutation |
Two adjacent pixels are used as secrets Leakage of secret information into the shares is prevented | The model is not tested under attacks |
| Singh et al. [ | Basis matrices and error diffusion |
No pixel expansion Alignment of shares not required for reconstruction No need of explicit codebook for construction | Construction of the secret shares is performed in three steps adding to computational complexity |
| Huang et al. [ | Basis matrices and error correction mechanism of QR codes | The approach is tested with a wide range of attacks |
The secret code and all the shares are of same version. Though it is the underlying working principle of the method, when the number of shares increase more memory and transmission bandwidth will be required |
| Chen et al. [ | Facilitates sharing of WeChat Mini Program codes | Robustness of the approach is demonstrated with attacks |
Figure 2NMF reconstruction.
Figure 32-stage NMF.
Figure 4SRCNN architecture.
Figure 5Secret-share construction.
Figure 6Secret-image reconstruction.
Figure 7QR code super resolution.
Experimental results for QR code sharing and reconstruction.
| Original QR Code | Secret Share | Secret Share | Secret Share | Reconstructed QR Code | PSNR in dB | SSIM | Readability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| 32.3639 | 0.9373 | Yes |
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| 32.0880 | 0.9313 | Yes |
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| 32.2787 | 0.9310 | Yes |
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| 32.2555 | 0.9298 | Yes |
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| 32.3889 | 0.9297 | Yes |
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| 32.2646 | 0.9265 | Yes |
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| 31.5443 | 0.9201 | Yes |
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| 31.6609 | 0.9128 | Yes |
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| 32.1306 | 0.9110 | Yes |
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| 31.3103 | 0.9091 | Yes |
Comparisons of significant attributes.
| Methods | Recovery of Secret Image | Shadow Size with Respect to Secret Image Size | Pixel Expansion | Pre-Encryption & Decryption | Complexity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Naor & Shamir [ | Lossy | 1 | No | No | |
| Thien and Lin [ | Lossy | 1/ | No | Yes | |
| Thien and Lin [ | Lossless | 1/ | Yes | Yes | |
| Yang et al. [ | Lossless | 1 | No | No | High |
| Ding et al. [ | Lossless | 1 | No | No | |
| Zhou et al. [ | Lossless | 1/1 − | No | Yes | |
| Zhou et al. [ | Lossless | 1/1 − | No | No | |
| Singh et al. [ | Lossless | 1 | No | No | |
| Huang et al. [ | Lossless | 1 | No | No | |
| Chen et al. [ | Lossless | 1 | No | No | |
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Comparison of execution times.
| Method | Sharing Time (s) | Recovery Time (s) |
|---|---|---|
| Naor & Shamir [ | 7.721 | 7.831 |
| Thien and Lin [ | 1.792 | 2.764 |
| Ding et al. [ | 138.219 | 10.585 |
| Zhou et al. [ | 1.732 | 2.424 |
| Zhou et al. [ | 2.714 | 3.205 |
| Singh et al. [ | 1.3219 | 0.0615 |
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No. of combinations for construction of shares.
| Size of Secret |
| No. of Combinations | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Singh et al. [ | Proposed Method | |||
| Minimum | Maximum | |||
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| 29 × 29 | 29 | 22523 | 261 | 22581 |
| 33 × 33 | 33 | 23267 | 269 | 23333 |
| 41 × 41 | 41 | 25043 | 285 | 25125 |
| 45 × 45 | 45 | 26075 | 293 | 26165 |
| 53 × 53 | 53 | 28427 | 2109 | 28533 |
| 57 × 57 | 57 | 29747 | 2117 | 29861 |
| 61 × 61 | 61 | 211,163 | 2125 | 211,285 |
| 77 × 77 | 77 | 217,787 | 2157 | 217,941 |
Figure 8Brute-force attack—number of combinations of shares.
Number of iterations of Arnold Transform to unscramble the secret.
| Size of Secret |
| No. of Iterations of Arnold Transform 3(2 |
|---|---|---|
| 29 × 29 | 29 | 3 × 227 |
| 33 × 33 | 33 | 3 × 231 |
| 41 × 41 | 41 | 3 × 239 |
| 45 × 45 | 45 | 3 × 243 |
| 53 × 53 | 53 | 3 × 251 |
| 57 × 57 | 57 | 3 × 255 |
| 61 × 61 | 61 | 3 × 259 |
| 77 × 77 | 77 | 3 × 275 |
Total number of computations to recover the secret.
| Secret Size | Singh et al. [ | No. of Computations to Recover the Secret [Proposed System] | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Minimum | Maximum | ||
| 29 × 29 | 22524 | 3 × 292 | 3 × 22612 |
| 33 × 33 | 23268 | 3 × 2104 | 3 × 23368 |
| 41 × 41 | 25044 | 3 × 2128 | 3 × 25168 |
| 45 × 45 | 26076 | 3 × 2140 | 3 × 26212 |
| 53 × 53 | 28428 | 3 × 2164 | 3 × 28588 |
| 57 × 57 | 29748 | 3 × 2176 | 3 × 29920 |
| 61 × 61 | 211,164 | 3 × 2188 | 3 × 211,348 |
| 77 × 77 | 217,788 | 3 × 2236 | 3 × 218,020 |
Figure 9Brute-force attack—number of computations to recover secret.
No. of computations for LR to HR conversion.
| Secret Size | No. of Computations |
|---|---|
| 29 × 29 | 1.14 × 108 |
| 33 × 33 | 1.48 × 108 |
| 41 × 41 | 2.28 × 108 |
| 45 × 45 | 2.74 × 108 |
| 53 × 53 | 3.81 × 108 |
| 57 × 57 | 4.40 × 108 |
| 61 × 61 | 5.04 × 108 |
| 77 × 77 | 8.03 × 108 |
Figure 10Brute-force attack—number of iterations for Arnold Transform and number of computations of Image Super Resolution.
Figure 11QR code reconstruction from tampered share (a) 5th QR code, (b) 6th QR code, (c) S1 (5th QR code), (d) S2 (5th QR code), (e) S3 (6th QR code), (f) reconstructed QR code.
Figure 12QR code reconstruction from selectively tampered share (a) S1 (6th QR code), (b) S2 (6th QR code), (c) S3 (6th QR code), (d) reconstructed QR code.
Figure 13QR code reconstruction from share added with noise (a) S1 (6th QR code), (b) S2 (6th QR code), (c) S3 (6th QR code), (d) Reconstructed QR code.