| Literature DB >> 35414945 |
Djouaria Ghilani1,2, Olivier Luminet2,3, Olivier Klein1.
Abstract
The idea that the past holds lessons for the present, under the guise of historical analogies, is prevalent in political and public discourse. Those analogies are often accompanied by dire warnings befalling those who "forget" or otherwise neglect the powerful lessons of History-and would then be "doomed to repeat it", as the saying goes. So, Would remembering history make it seem more OR LESS likely to repeat itself in the future? In other words, does exposure to specific lessons about past events, especially ones involving causal claims, affect how people expect real-life events to turn out? Four studies (three preregistered) tested this experimentally. In Studies 1 and 2, participants expected the same behavior (the US adopting a harsh stance against Iran in the Nuclear Treaty) to result in a more negative outcome when this current stance seemed to match a "lesson" they had read about the break-out of World War II (European leaders adopting a harsh approach against Germany in the 1919 Versailles Treaty vs. a conciliatory approach in the 1938 Munich Agreement). Studies 3 and 4 attempted to eliminate some confounds present in the first two studies and to generalize the effect to different events. While results varied across studies, an internal meta-analysis indicated that the analogical effect on predictions (d = -.08) tended to become stronger as participants' knowledge about the target situation decreased (d-1SD = -.24). These findings support the possibility of analogical-based predictive effects for real-life political events, and are discussed in light of their research and political implications. Copyright:Entities:
Keywords: Historical analogies; politics; predictions; social cognition
Year: 2022 PMID: 35414945 PMCID: PMC8932355 DOI: 10.5334/pb.1075
Source DB: PubMed Journal: Psychol Belg ISSN: 0033-2879
Mean and standard deviations of the main variables by experimental condition in Studies 1 and Study 2.
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| STUDY | MUNICH – US CONCILIATORY | MUNICH – US UNCOMPROMISING | VERSAILLES – US CONCILIATORY | VERSAILLES – US UNCOMPROMISING | |
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| N1 = 31/N2 = 112 | N1 = 34/N2 = 79 | N1 = 33/N2 = 110 | N1 = 34/N2 = 91 | ||
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| Expectations about Iran’s future behavior | 1 | –11.77 (43.76) | –8.09 (45.56) | 7.70 (47.68) | –12.06 (37.64) |
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| 2 | 13.93 (39.23) | 7.13 (40.6) | 21.22 (39.35) | 14.81 (35.94) | |
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| Approval for US policy | 1 | 3.74 (1.22) | 3.91 (.98) | 4.11 (1.19) | 3.97 (1.02) |
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| 2 | – | – | – | – | |
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| Inevitability of future negative outcome | 1 | – | – | – | – |
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| 2 | 3.47 (1.41) | 3.44 (1.13) | 3.20 (1.34) | 3.46 (1.28) | |
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| Foreseeability of future negative outcome | 1 | – | – | – | – |
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| 2 | 2.99 (1.45) | 2.82 (1.38) | 2.87 (1.48) | 2.97 (1.37) | |
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| Current Knowledge | 1 | 4.05 (1.16) | 3.83 (1.27) | 3.56 (1.23) | 3.53 (1.18) |
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| 2 | 3.86 (1.07) | 3.99 (1.09) | 4.13 (1.08) | 3.88 (.94) | |
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Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. For the 1st variable (Expectations about future outcomes), the scale ranges from –100 to 100 (a more positive score = higher expectations for the positive future outcome relative to the negative one). All other scales are 7-points Likert-type ones. Cells containing dashes indicate that the corresponding variable was not measured in that study. n1 = sample size for study 1; n2 = sample size for study 2. Depending on the condition, past knowledge related to the Munich Accord or to the Versailles Treaty.
Effect of the experimental manipulation (WWII Lesson ⋅ US Policy) and the moderation by Current Knowledge on the dependent variables in Studies 1 and 2.
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| EXPECTATIONS ABOUT FUTURE OUTCOMES | APPROVAL FOR US POLICY | PERCEIVED FORESEEABILITY OF FUTURE OUTCOME | PERCEIVED INEVITABILITY OF FUTURE OUTCOME | ||||||||||||
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| STUDY 1 | STUDY 2 | STUDY 1 ONLY | STUDY 2 ONLY | STUDY 2 ONLY | |||||||||||
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| Intercept | –.01 | –.11 | .915 | .01 | .12 | .901 | .00 | .02 | .986 | –.01 | –.12 | .904 | –.00 | –.09 | .928 |
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| Current Knowledge | –.02 | –.26 | .790 | .13 | 2.75 |
| –.07 | –.68 | .498 | –.03 | –.53 | .593 | –.09 | –1.74 | .081 |
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| WWII Lesson | –.09 | –1.03 | .303 | –.09 | –1.77 | .078 | –.09 | .92 | .358 | –.03 | –.55 | .580 | .04 | .85 | .393 |
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| US Policy | .07 | .74 | .460 | .08 | 1.61 | .109 | –.01 | –.11 | .922 | –.00 | –.09 | .926 | –.04 | –.85 | .393 |
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| Lesson × Policy | –.15 | –1.68 | .096 | .01 | .32 | .744 | –.07 | –.78 | .435 | .04 | .86 | .389 | .04 | .88 | .380 |
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| Lesson × Current Knowledge | –.04 | –.41 | .679 | –.05 | –1.14 | .271 | –.05 | –.49 | .626 | –.01 | –.30 | .762 | .02 | .34 | .732 |
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| Policy × Current Knowledge | .13 | 1.50 | .135 | .02 | .46 | .647 | .06 | .65 | .519 | –.02 | –.36 | .719 | –.06 | –1.25 | .213 |
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| Lesson × Policy × Current Knowledge | .17 | 1.91 | .058 | .12 | 2.47 |
| .05 | .47 | .638 | –.04 | –.81 | .417 | –.06 | –1.13 | .258 |
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Note: Results obtained using Model 3 of Process (Hayes, 2012). Alpha level in Study 1 = .05, Study 2 = .0336; p values below alpha level are indicated in bold font. Sample sizes: NStudy1 = 132; final NStudy2 = 392. The dependent variables used in each model appear in columns (only the 1st DV appears in both studies 1 & 2; the rest was only measured in one of the two). All variables are standardized.
Means (and standard deviations) of the main variables in Study 3 (total N = 361).
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| OPERATION CAUSED 9/11 CONDITION | OPERATION PREVENTED WORSE ATTACK CONDITION | |
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| N = 195 | N = 166 | |
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| Baseline expectation that Italian intervention will be successful (covariate 1) | 3.20 (1.59) | 3.3 (1.61) |
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| Baseline expectation that a terrorist attack will occur in Italy (covariate 2) | 4.49 (1.07) | 4.79 (.93) |
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| Expectations about future success of Italian intervention (DV1) | –4.89 (31.91) | –13.07 (32.26) |
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| Expectations about future terrorist attack in Italy (DV2) | 6.84 (1.86) | 7.09 (1.74) |
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| Current Knowledge (moderator 1) | 3.51 (.96) | 3.55 (1.08) |
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| Confidence in predictions | 3.85 (1.34) | 3.88 (1.22) |
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| Endorsement of the analogy between 1998 US intervention & Italian intervention against ISIS (moderator 2) | 3.83 (1.39) | 3.94 (1.29) |
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Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Expectations about future outcomes (DV1) range from –100 to 100 (a more positive score = higher expectations for the positive future outcome relative to the negative one) and the likelihood of a future terrorist attack in Italy (DV2) ranges from 1 (0% certainly not) to 11 (100% certainly). All other variables were measured on 7-points, Likert-type scales, where higher number = higher expectations/current & past knowledge/analogy endorsement/confidence.
Main and moderation effects on the dependent variables of Study 3.
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| EXPECTATIONS ABOUT FUTURE SUCCESS OF ITALIAN INTERVENTION | EXPECTATIONS ABOUT A FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACK IN ITALY | |||||
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| β | T | P | β | T | P | |
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| Intercept | –.00 | –.03 | .977 | –.00 | –.00 | .999 |
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| Current Knowledge | .01 | .25 | .799 | .06 | 1.36 | .173 |
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| Covariate (corresponding baseline measure) | .34 | 5.94 |
| .62 | 15.83 |
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| Experimental condition | –.14 | –2.81 |
| –.02 | –.54 | .587 |
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| Experimental condition × Current Knowledge | .08 | 1.64 | .101 | .00 | .01 | .987 |
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| Intercept | –.00 | –.03 | .973 | –.00 | –.01 | .991 |
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| Analogy endorsement | –.22 | –4.58 |
| .13 | 3.25 |
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| Covariate (corresponding baseline measure) | .35 | 6.31 |
| .62 | 15.72 |
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| Experimental condition | –.13 | –2.68 |
| –.03 | –.65 | .515 |
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| Experimental condition × Analogy endorsement | .04 | .81 | .421 | .01 | .28 | .781 |
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Note: These results were obtained using Model 1 of Process (Hayes, 2012). Alpha level = .0336; p values below this alpha level are indicated in bold font. Total N = 361. Experimental condition = either being told that the 1998 US intervention caused the September 11th 2001 attack vs. that 1998 US intervention prevented a worse attack; Analogy endorsement = endorsement of the analogy between the 1998 US intervention against Al-Qaeda and the 2017 Italian intervention against ISIS.
Main and moderation effects on the dependent variables of Study 4.
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| EXPECTATIONS ABOUT POSITIVE FUTURE IN CATALONIA | APPROVAL FOR FUTURE INVESTMENT IN CATALONIA | |||||
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| Intercept | –.00 | –.00 | .998 | .00 | .01 | .993 |
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| Self-reported Current Knowledge | .10 | 2.30 | .022 | –.04 | –.86 | .390 |
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| Covariate (corresponding baseline measure) | .46 | 10.49 |
| .19 | 3.81 |
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| Causal role manipulation | .02 | .55 | .583 | .06 | 1.27 | .205 |
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| Causal role × Self-reported Current Knowledge | –.02 | –.48 | .631 | .07 | 1.48 | .138 |
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| Intercept | .00 | .00 | .998 | .00 | .00 | .992 |
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| Objective Current Knowledge | –.06 | -1.37 | .392 | –.07 | -1.52 | .129 |
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| Covariate (corresponding baseline measure) | .48 | 10.81 |
| .18 | 3.69 |
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| Causal role manipulation | .02 | .54 | .586 | .06 | 1.29 | .197 |
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| Causal role × Objective Current Knowledge | –.01 | –.25 | .805 | –.04 | –.89 | .372 |
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Note: These results were obtained using Model 1 of Process (Hayes, 2012). Alpha level = .0336; p values below this alpha level are indicated in bold font. Total N = 397. The p values are reported here in bilateral, but according to the preregistration of this study, one-tailed tests were conducted (i.e., the reported p values in the text were split in two). Causal role (experimental) manipulation = perceived minor vs. major role of 1991 Kosovo referendum in subsequent Kosovo War; Self-reported Current Knowledge = current knowledge as measured in Studies 1-3 through self-report scales; Objective Current Knowledge = current knowledge as measured through true/false questions.
Two internal meta-analyses of cumulative main and moderation effects of exposure to historical analogy on predictions across Studies 1–4.
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| STUDIES | INTERNAL META-ANALYSES | |||||
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| 1 (N = 132) | 2 (N = 392) | 3 (N = 361) | 4 (N = 397) | FIXED-EFFECTS (N = 1282) | RANDOM-EFFECTS (N = 1282) | |
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| Main effect of analogy on predictions | –.13 | .00 | –.14** | .02 | –.04 [–.09, .01] | –.05[–.14, .03] |
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| Interaction effect Analogy × Current Knowledge on predictions | .17† | .12* | .09† | –.02 | .07** [.02, .13] | .08† [–.00, .16] |
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| Simple effect at -1SD of current knowledge | –.32** | –.11 | –.22*** | .04 | –.12***[–.17, –.07] | –.15† [–.29, .01] |
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| Simple effect at +1SD of current knowledge | .02 | .14† | –.05 | .00 | .03 [–.02, .09] | .03† [–.06, .12] |
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Note: All effect sizes are Pearson’s r. The random effect meta-analysis was obtained using the Sidik-Jonkman method. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10. 95% confidence intervals are provided in brackets.